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ABSTRACT
This thesis addresses three questions concerned with 
children’s attributions of responsibility to others for 
behavioural outcomes Involving injury.
The first question explored hypotheses concerned with 
developmental differences In relation to Holder’s (1958) levels 
of responsibility. Subjects ranged from middle childhood to 
early adulthood. Although judgements became Increasingly 
differentiated with age, even the youngest subjects could make 
significant discriminations, especially If given time to 
compare and revise evaluations. Other findings demonstrated 
that attributions of cause differed from those of blame and 
punishment; the latter were strongly Interrelated.
The second question concerned individual differences In 
children’s attrlbutlonal style. No clear link was found with 
intelligence; but significant effects were found for locus of 
control under conditions where an actor, whose guilt was 
ambiguous, was perceived as personally similar to the subject.
For some results, however, the effects were more pronounced 
with girls. It was also demonstrated that locus of control in 
Interpersonal situations Is not a unldlmenslonal construct.
The third question concerned attributions to a victim. 
Support was found for the hypothesis that judgements would vary 
as a function of the victim’s virtue and subjects’ age.
(1)
Results of this experimental investigation are interpreted 
in the context of attribution theory, social learning theory, 
cognitive developmental theory, and ’just world’ theory. It 
is concluded that the conditions In which judgements are made 
significantly affect the ability of young children to attribute 
responsibility In terms of Holder's model; that children’s 
attributions to others are related to their locus of control 
orientations, but not straightforwardly; and that children's 
attributions to a victim are more easily interpreted in terms 
of cognitive developmental theory than 'just world’ concepts. 
The study also resulted In a methodological Innovation for 
facilitating perceived similarity between subject and actor, 
and the application of this to attltudlnal research Involving 
young children is discussed.
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
The author recently conducted a literature search based on 
the descriptor ’attribution of responsibility’, using the 
computerized Psycinfo database and covering the period 1967 to 
May 1 9 8 5 . The number of journal articles, unpublished papers 
and dissertations located on the subject was Ü6 7 . However, 
when the qualifying descriptor ’children’ was added, the number 
of items fell to kO. This thesis makes a modest attempt to 
redress this balance by focussing on the attributional 
tendencies of children of Primary school age with respect to 
their responsibility judgements in cases of actions which 
result in personal injury to others.
The research addresses three main issues. The first 
concerns developmental differences: Are judgements concerning
cause, blame and punishment made by children aged 8 and 11 
years less differentiated than those made by adults, and is 
differentiation less pronounced among the younger than the 
older children? The second issue concerns individual 
differences. Some attention is given to differences according 
to gender and to general ability, but the main emphasis is on 
subjects’ internal-external locus of control: In attributing
responsibility to others for the outcomes of actions, do 
children’s evaluations vary as a function of the attributors* 
locus of control tendencies? The third issue concerns 
attributions made with respect to the victim of an accident:
To what extent do children attribute responsibility to a victim
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and see the adversity as deserved, and to what extent will the 
nature of these judgements be related to age and the subject’s 
knowledge of the victim’s behaviour prior to the accident?
The study begins with two introductory chapters. In 
Chapter 1, the concept of ’responsibility’ is discussed, and 
attention is drawn to the importance of acknowledging 
different meanings of ’responsibility’ in empirical work. The 
failure of some researchers to acknowledge conceptual 
distinctions is brought out in Chapter 2, with special 
reference to studies based upon Heider’s (1958) model of 
attribution of responsibility. This chapter also discusses a 
range of factors which may be related to individual differences 
in children’s attributional style. From the review of the 
literature, it is concluded that there is scope for further 
Investigation into children's developing understanding of 
attributional situations involving others, and that there is 
even more scope for research into individual differences in 
such understanding. In this latter respect, special emphasis 
is given to the potential contribution of the social learning 
theory developed by Rotter et al (1972). Areas of research for 
the present investigation in these respects are then 
identified.
Following these two introductory chapters, eight related 
experiments are then reported in two blocks with a connecting 
chapter, i.e. Experiments 1 to Ü (Chapters 3 to 6) and 
Experiments 5 to 8 (Chapters 8 to 11), linked by Chapter 7.
The first investigation (Experiment 1), reported in
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Chapter 3, constitutes pilot work which is largely concerned 
with a partial replication of an attributional study by 
Ferguson and Rule (19Ô0). It also explores hypotheses in 
relation to individual differences in the attribution of 
responsibility to others. Following the failure of the results 
to demonstrate a consistent link between attribution of 
personal responsibility and locus of control, it is 
hypothesized that an association might emerge if locus of 
control is more adequately operationalized. Experiment 2 
(Chapter k) therefore involves the development of a more 
refined self-attribution measure which takes account of the 
success or failure of the outcome, the stability of its 
perceived cause, and the status/familiarity of target person.
It is concluded that locus of control in interpersonal contexts 
is not a unitary concept. Data from this study is then used to 
predict variations in attributional tendencies which are 
examined in Experiment 3 (Chapter 5). which also constitutes 
the main investigation into developmental differences. 
Experiment li (Chapter 6) explores the effect on attribution of 
responsibility ratings when subjects are given time to compare, 
and, if necessary, revise their initial evaluations.
In general, the results of Experiments 1 to k offer strong 
support for the developmental hypotheses but only minimal 
support for hypotheses related to individual differences. The
hypothesis concerning locus of control and the attribution of 
responsibility to others is accordingly followed up in Chapters 
7 to 11. Chapter 7 discusses ways in which studies with adults 
on locus of control and attribution of responsibility could 
inform methodology which would be appropriate in related
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experiments with children. This chapter also discusses 
responsibility evaluations with respect to a virtuous or 
non-virtuous victim, drawing particularly on the ideas of 
Piaget (1 9 3 0, 1 9 3 2 ), Karniol (1 9 8 0 ), and Lerner (1970). The
conclusions from Chapter 7 are then followed up in the second 
block of investigations. Experiments 5 to 8.
Experiment 5 (Chapter 8) is the first of two pilot studies 
which investigate the hypothesized association between 
children’s locus of control tendencies and their attributions 
relating to the behavioural outcomes of others in a complex 
situation. The guilt of the main actor, who is either Self or 
Other, is made ambiguous partly by the presence of an 
intervening actor and partly because the act is one of omission 
rather than commission. A further hypothesis concerns 
attributions to a young victim, whose behaviour is manipulated 
to be ’good* or ’bad’. The hypothesis concerning evaluations 
in relation to the victim’s behaviour received general support; 
but, because the locus of control hypothesis received support 
only in the Self condition, it was concluded that the 
experimental arrangements had not allowed subjects in the Other 
condition to identify with the main actor. This problem is 
pursued in Experiment 6 (Chapter 9). which concerns the 
development of a measure, suitable for use with children of 
Primary school age, to facilitate personal similarity and, by 
implication, identification between subject and story 
character. The new measure is employed in further pilot work 
(Experiment 7, Chapter 10), in which the results show some 
support for the locus of control hypothesis, but the effects 
fall short of statistical significance.
The main investigation of this block (Experiment 8, 
Chapter 11) is conducted with children whose locus of control 
tendencies are relatively extreme. In the central results, 
locus of control is found to be significantly associated with 
attribution of responsibility, though for girls rather than 
for boys. The results relating to victim behaviour are 
generally consistent with the hypothesis, and are discussed in 
terms of immanent justice concepts, children’s developing 
understanding of physical causality, and beliefs in a ’just 
world’.
The final chapter (Chapter 12) is a general discussion of 
the findings from the eight experiments and implications for 
future research.
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Chapter 1
ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY: THREE DIMENSIONS
I conclude, then, that there is, after all, a 
sense in which we can properly inquire and even 
say 'what it really means to say so and so'.
For we can ask what is the real form of the 
fact recorded when this is concealed or 
disguised and not duly exhibited in the 
expression in question. And we can often 
succeed in stating this fact in a new form of 
words which does exhibit what the other failed 
to exhibit.'
Gilbert Ryle, 'Systematically 
misleading expressions'.
Responsibility is a polymorphous concept. The conceptual 
distinctions made by Hart (1 9 6 8 ) illustrate clearly the different 
forms which the term can take. Hart distinguished between four 
central usages: 'capacity responsibility', denoting the ability
of a person to control his actions and so be 'responsible';
'role-responsibility', referring to duties of one person in 
relation to another; 'liability-responsibility', inferring that 
blame, praise or punishment is in order; and
'causal-responsibility', indicating the connection between a 
person's behaviour and an effect. In a critique of Hart, Haydon 
(1 9 7 8 ) has suggested a further term, 'virtue-responsibility', to 
encompass the notion of 'having a sense of responsibility'.
Early attribution theory and empirical studies tended to 
disregard the various usages of the term 'responsible', but 
fortunately this neglect has been remedied recently in papers by 
Fincham and Jaspars (1 9 8 0) and Shultz and Schleifer (1983), 
whilst Lloyd-Bostock (1979, 1 9 8 3 ) has written about the relevance
of legal concepts and problems to the attributional enquiries of 
psychologists. This chapter will not attempt to examine all the
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shades of meaning pertaining to the term 'responsibility' as 
found in philosophy (e.g. Bodenheimer, 198O; Glover, 1 97O;
Haydon, 1978) or in jurisprudence (Hart, 1 9 6 8 ; Hart and Honoré, 
1 9 5 9 ), but rather will concentrate on the more obvious conceptual 
issues encountered in psychological studies in which subjects are 
asked to attribute responsibility to a person for an event.
There are also practical problems in relation to questions put to 
children, who may not understand terms in the same way as adult 
subjects, as demonstrated in a recent study involving 'blame' as 
the dependent variable (Schleifer et al, 1 9 8 3 ). Thus, conceptual 
refinement is of fundamental importance in empirical work related 
to attribution of responsibility, both for itself and for its 
contribution to the task of finding the means by which dimensions 
of responsibility can be unambiguously operationalized.
Cause, blame and punishment
In their seminal attribution study based on Heider (1958), 
Shaw and Sulzer (196Ü) used the term 'responsibility' raw in each 
vignette of their twenty-item questionnaire. This practice 
continued when the instrument was lengthened to forty items by 
Garcia-Esteve and Shaw (1 9 6 8 ) and in six further studies by 
M.E.Shaw and his associates up to and including Shaw and Iwawaki 
(1 9 7 2 ). Admittedly the introductory announcements included the 
following instruction; 'If a person is responsible for something, 
that means we might blame him or thank him for it '. But such 
brief assistance cannot have been adequate for the 6-9 year-olds 
who constituted the sample, especially in view of the finality of 
the warning 'If you don't understand something, tell me now 
because I won't be able to answer questions once we get 
started'! Further, although the dependent variable.
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’responsibility', was defined in terms of blaming or thanking, 
Garcia-Esteve and Shaw (1 9 6 8 ) refer to levels of 'causality’ in 
their discussion.
Although Shaw and Reitan (1 9 6 9 ) distinguished between 
attribution of responsibility (blame/praise) and attribution of 
sanctions (punishment/reward), it was not until 1977 that Harris, 
in a study dealing with object-damage, broke new ground by asking 
separate questions concerning perceptions of causality and 
judgements of responsibility, 'cause' or 'reason for' being used 
to operationalize the former concept and 'naughtiness' to 
operationalize the latter, Fincham and Jaspars (1979) followed 
suit by distinguishing between cause and blame for personal 
injury, but Ferguson and Rule (19SO), in another attributional 
study concerning injury, ignored the causal dimension and 
constructed heterogeneous moral responsibility scores from
responses to questions on 'badness', blame and punishment.
Hart and Honoré (1959) point out how the expression 
'responsible for' may refer to a factual connection between a 
perpetrator and the harm done; alternatively, it may refer to a 
person's liability for blame, punishment, or payment of 
compensation. Sometimes, however, a person is held liable for 
blame even if a direct causal link between him and the event is 
not implied (vicarious responsibility), as when Tony Benn, 
commenting on the violence associated with the miners' strike of
1984-85, told the Home Secretary in Parliament (March 1984), 'You
should accept responsibility for everything that is happening'. 
And when direct cause is not in question, blame will not 
necessarily be attributed, even if the action is voluntary, as.
— 8 —
for instance, in the case of a psychopath killing intentionally. 
More generally, circumstances surrounding the harm caused by a 
person’s voluntary actions may be taken as mitigating if he or 
she was acting under provocation, compulsion, or with honourable 
motives - though in law, unless the defence brings forth such 
factors, the presumption of mens rea (the guilty mind) will be 
made. In moral discourse, blame may be less closely linked to 
cause than in legal theory: e.g. we may blame someone who cheats
or breaks promises, even if no one has suffered (Hart and Honore, 
1959).
In law, an event must be a necessary and/or sufficient 
condition for a cause to be established. Necessary conditions 
are based upon the sine qua non rule, that the harm would not 
have occurred but for the perpetrator’s actions. The 
establishment of a sufficient condition would occur if the 
perpetrator’s behaviour was the sole (’differentiating’) factor 
which made the difference between the harmful situation of the 
present and the harmless situation of the past (Gorovitz, 1965. 
cited in Shultz and Schleifer, 1983). Thus whether subjects use 
the necessary or sufficient conditions rule is a question to 
which attributional research can be addressed. Shultz et al 
(1 9 8 1 ) have demonstrated the difficulty subjects have in using 
the sufficiency principle, a matter discussed at length in Shultz 
and Schleiffer (1983).
If causation and moral blame are distinct, so also are each 
of these concepts from liability for punishment, the notion 
implied in legal liability-responsibility (Hart, I9 6 8 ).
Punishment is usually dependent on the establishment of causation
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and blame, but in law its determination will also be influenced 
by general social consequences, which in moral censure may be of 
less significance than blameworthiness (Hart and Honore, 1959). 
Nevertheless, punishment is closely linked to blame and cause in 
ethics, one argument being that punishment is necessarily 
retributive in that it involves doing something to someone for 
what he or she has done (Peters, 1966).
There are, then, at least three dimensions of 
’responsibility’ which should be acknowledged in attributional 
studies in psychology. These relate to perceptions of cause, 
judgements of blame, and liability for punishment. Perception of 
cause is essentially a scientific matter, whereas attribution of 
moral responsibility (blame and punishment) is essentially a 
judgemental one. As Fincham and Jaspars (I9 8O) have pointed 
out, the confusing results which have sometimes emerged in 
attributional studies may have arisen because some subjects were 
assigning responsibility in one sense and some in another. It is 
to a consideration of attributional theory and related empirical 
work which we now turn.
The concept of responsibility in attribution theory
In his analysis of action, Fritz Heider (1958), the ’father’ 
of attribution theory, distinguished between personal and 
impersonal causality. Personal causality involves the notions of 
’can’ and ’trying’. ’Can’ may be stable or unstable, depending 
on, say, ability (stable) or luck (unstable). ’Trying’ entailes 
the notions of exertion (the quantitative aspect) and ’intention’ 
(the directional aspect). For Heider, personal causality invokes 
the notions of ’can' combining with ’trying’ to produce an
— 10 —
effect. Personal causality is thus characterized by intentional, 
goal-directed behaviour, and is the equivalence of causal agency: 
’Attribution to personal causality reduces the necessary 
conditions to one, the person with intention’ (Heider, 1958, 
p.102). Accidental occurrences do not fall within this category 
since they are unintentional: there is a causal link between the
person and the effect, but it is impersonal. In short, 'It makes 
a real difference whether a person discovers that the stick which 
struck him fell from a rotting tree or was hurled by an enemy' 
(Heider, 1958, p.l6).
A difficulty inherent in this analysis is that Heider does 
not specify whether he means ’responsibility’ in a moral or 
strictly causal sense. However, given his explicit emphasis on 
the roles of intentionality (signifying that an event was 
purposeful and unaffected by environmental contingencies) and 
justified action (signifying that, although the person intended 
the action, the source of his motivation was in the environment), 
and the fact that he relates his model to Piaget’s (1932) 
discussion of moral responsibility, it would seem that Heider is 
including the notion of blameworthiness. We might qualify 
Heider’s hypothesis by arguing that, while differentiation 
between impersonal and personal responsibility is important in 
perceptions of causality, it is even more significant when making 
moral evaluations. The question ’Did person P cause event E? ’ 
meaning ’But for P, E would not have occurred’, should elicit 
high amounts of attribution in the causal sense as long as it is 
true that P ’s action was a necessary or sufficient condition for 
E to have occurred. Of course, rather more cause should be 
attributed if E is taken to be the result of P's intention: in
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such circumstances, we might say 'P was even more the cause of 
E. ’ Yet while we may confidently attribute a measure of 
causality for unintentional acts, we are more hesitant to assign 
moral responsibility in such cases. In short, we are more 
discriminating in judging between circumstances when attributing 
moral responsibility than when attributing causality.
Other attribution theorists have not made Heider's 
distinction between personal and impersonal causality. However, 
Jones and Davis (1972) emphasized the perceiver's knowledge of 
the actor's dispositions; the more an action is 'out of 
character' with the actor's role-prescribed behaviour, the more 
responsibility is attributed. Kelley (196 7. 1973) argued that,
in making attributions, people go through a process akin to
analysis of variance, providing explanations in terms of 
covariations between events. The observer tends to attribute 
causality to the actor rather than to the situation/target person 
when he judges that the behaviour occurs often (high 
'consistency'), that few people would produce the same response 
in the situation (low 'consensus'), and that the actor behaves 
the same way in varied situations (low 'distinctiveness'). 
According to the 'discounting principle', behaviour is discounted 
as an indication of disposition when it may plausibly have been 
caused by situational pressures - a notion also implicit in 
Heider's distinction between intentional and justified action.
Children's causal reasoning
The way in which children infer causes has been the subject 
of recent reviews by Kassin (1 9 8 1 ), Ruble and Rholes (198I), 
Sedlak and Kurtz (1 98I) and Fincham (1983). The first of
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these are largely concerned with children's use of causal 
inference principles. For instance, Kassin (1 98I) shows how 
children come gradually to rely less exclusively on the use of 
first-order principles and to employ second- and third-order 
principles as developed in the attribution theory of Kelley 
(1 9 7 2 ). When presented with a single oause-effect sequence, 
children aged three or four years focus on factors that are 
temporally contiguous, spatially proximal, physically similar, or 
antecedent to the event (first order principles). Under optimal 
conditions, a limited use of the covariation principle is 
employed at five or six years to attribute an effect to one of 
two independent causes (second-order principles). Children of i
this age can also, in very carefully controlled conditions, j
employ the concept of 'multiple sufficient causes', understanding I
that one of two or more causes is sufficient to produce an effect j
(as in turning off a lamp either by the switch or by removing the j
plug). Only later can they use the concept of 'multiple j
necessary causes', appreciating that more than one cause is !
required to produce an effect (as in knowing that a lamp will |Ilight ■ only if the plug is in and the switch is on). !
i1iHowever, such causal analysis in the physical domain may not j
be a reasonable basis for prediction in the social domain, a |
factor emphasized in the reviews by Sedlak and Kurtz (I9SI) and |
1Ruble and Rholes (198I). As Ruble and Rholes point out, the j
physical and social contexts differ since in the latter both !
i
agent and target may be responsible for an effect (as in 'Why is 
John nice to me?'). It also appears that young children are 
reluctant to use covariation information in self-attributions, 
but are relatively mature in their judgements of external events.
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For instance, pre-school children who consistently fail in a 
series of tasks tend to attribute as much ability to themselves 
as do children who consistently succeed (Ruble et al, 1 9 7 6); yet 
children of this age attribute greater ability to others who are 
consistently successful than to those who are inconsistently so 
or whose failure is consistent (Shaklee, 1976). This may reflect 
the young child’s pronounced egoistic bias towards
self-enhancement, or the salience of personal factors in relation 
to self-judgements, or the inability to prevent the self 
intruding into self-evaluations (Ruble and Rholes, 198I).
A further developmental difference brought out by Ruble and 
Rholes (1 9 8 1) concerns the stability and locus of causality. 
Younger children's perceptions of themselves and of others seem 
to be relatively unstable and external in orientation compared 
with older children, who focus more on dispositional factors.
This may be because the young child finds it easier to focus on 
the immediate and tangible aspects of a situation (Ruble et al, 
1 9 7 9 )î or that he/she may be unable to sift the information 
required for perceiving dispositions (Fevers and Secord, 1973); 
or that, as Piaget (1932) suggested, parents of young children 
focus more upon external factors in their punishment practices, 
particularly when outcomes are negative. However, the 
interaction between locus and stability of control may be 
important in social attribution, as we shall see in Experiment 2 
(Chapter 5).
The methodology which is employed to understand children's 
causal reasoning is a matter raised by Lalljee et al (1983) in a 
review of studies concerning the way children explain social
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events. The authors stress the importance of asking whether 
children make the same assumptions as adults in their causal 
reasoning, and whether they always explain the same event in the 
same way. Rather than rely exclusively on ratings, Lalljee et al 
argue that investigators should allow subjects to provide 
explanations in their own words (a technique taken up in 
Experiments 5, 7 and 8 in this thesis). They suggest that young
children are able to explain in terms of causes and reasons, 
though at first these will not entail the more distant 
connections, which are perceived as memory develops and social 
knowledge is acquired. However, the young child will sometimes 
make assumptions about what is going on which is different from 
the adult's, as has been shown with respect to imputed 
intentionality (Sedlak, 1979) and kindness (Baldwin and Baldwin, 
1970). In inter-personal relationships, subjects' accounts may 
offer different reasons according to the status and familiarity 
of the person to whom the explanation is given - a matter which 
will be taken up in Experiment 2.
Children's understanding of the relations between causality, 
blameworthiness and liability, for punishment
Whether children in fact make use of Heider's distinction 
between personal and impersonal causality in their assignment of 
blame has been a subject of some research during the last decade. 
Sometimes, investigators simply infer children's use of causal 
attributions from their moral evaluations (e.g. Karniol and Ross, 
1 9 7 6 ), but some recent studies have not taken this for granted. 
Sedlak (1979) found that 8-11 year-olds would sometimes impute 
intentionality in circumstances where adults did not, and so
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offer more extreme evaluations. Fincham (1982a), working with 
children of five and nine years plus adults, found that it was 
the presence of an internal rather than an external cause which 
was fundamental in assigning blame, though more so with age: 
subjects attributed more blame when they only knew about the 
internal (personal) cause than when they only knew about the 
external cause.
Empirical work has also demonstrated the extent to which 
people base judgements of punishment on those of blame, and 
perceive relationships between these evaluations, cause, and the 
nature of the outcome. Shaw and Reiten (1969), for instance, 
showed how, across various occupational groups, the intensity of 
the outcome has a greater impact on attributions of sanctions 
than on attributions of blame. This finding is interesting in 
view of the comment made by Hart and Honoré, noted above, that 
decisions about punishment in law must take into account not only 
the blameworthiness of the defendant but the gravity of the 
offence in relation to the general life of society. However, the 
Shaw and Reitan study also showed how, for all groups, ratings 
for sanctions are lower than those for blame. In a more recent 
study with adults, Shultz et al (198I) found that if harm could 
not have been foreseen, subjects reduced their judgements of 
moral responsibility but not those of punishment. At the same 
time, the link between perceptions of cause and evaluations of 
punishment was shown to be less than between causation and moral 
responsibility or between moral responsibility and punishment. 
Still more recently, Schleifer et al (1 9 8 3 ) found a link between 
cause and punishment to be less remote in children, though this 
result must be interpreted in relation to the limited context of
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the study, which was concerned only with acts of omission by an 
adult.
Conclusions
In this chapter, an attempt has been made to illustrate the 
complexity of the concept of 'responsibility * and the importance 
of acknowledging conceptual distinctions in empirical work which 
is concerned with the attribution of responsibility in social 
settings. Among the crucial distinctions to be made are those 
between causation, blameworthiness, and liability for 
punishment. Establishment of the first involves reasoning which 
is largely concerned with information processing, whereas the 
attribution of moral responsibility involves the making of value 
judgements. But blame and punishment, whilst both moral 
concepts, are not necessarily attributed on the same basis.
It is impossible to be definitive about the meanings of 
cause, blame, and punishment since the terms are not used in a 
consistent way, even within a single discipline such as law or 
philosophy. Yet, from the standpoint of the psychologist 
investigating people's attributional styles, it is clearly vital 
that subjects understand the kind of attribution that is being 
expected of them. Certainly the term 'responsibility', 
unqualified by definition or a prefix such as 'moral', is 
unlikely to elicit reliable responses. In so far as stipulative 
definitions can be offered, we might conclude by concurring with 
Shultz and Schleifer (1983, p.60) that 'causation refers 
essentially to event generation, responsibility to moral 
evaluation of an actor, and punishment/reward to the recommended 
consequences for the actor'.
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Chapter 2
ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY; LEVELS OF COMMISSION AND
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
Differentiation is the essence, the sine qua 
non of consciousness.
Carl Jung, 1953
In the case of D.P.P. v. Newbury, 1977. the House of Lords 
heard an appeal on behalf of two 15 year-old boys who had 
pushed a paving stone from the parapet of a railway bridge into 
the path of an oncoming train. The stone had killed the 
guard. Although the boys were convicted of manslaughter and 
their appeal dismissed, the Court of Appeal certified the 
following point of law: ’Can a defendant be properly convicted
of manslaughter, when his mind is not affected by drink or 
drugs, if he did not foresee that his act might cause harm to 
another?' (Elliott and Wood, 1982, pp444-7).
Apart from legal niceties, which we shall not enter into 
here, the Newbury case draws our attention to a number of 
issues regarding the predicament faced by the layman in 
attributing responsibility. The problem of assigning cause, 
blame and punishment to an actor for an outcome, the subject of 
the last chapter, becomes further complicated when considered 
in relation to the particular set of circumstances, the subject 
of the present chapter. In one sense, applying the sine qua 
non ('but for') rule, the boys clearly caused the train guard's 
death, since, but for their behaviour, the stone would not have 
killed him. In another sense, bearing in mind Heider's (1958) 
distinction between personal and impersonal causality, cause 
cannot so easily be attributed to the boys since there was no
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specific intention to kill. At the same time, the event could 
not be dismissed as a simple accident since the boys of this 
age, unaffected by drink or drugs, should have been able to 
foresee that some harm might ensue from their negligent 
behaviour. Thus even if there is a sense in which they should 
not be blamed for the death of the guard (because the effect 
was not intended), there is another sense in which the culprits 
should be blamed since the act was voluntary and should have 
been seen as highly dangerous. This factor, plus the personal 
tragedy which ensued, makes punishment seem fitting.
The Newbury case has been cited to illustrate how, besides 
taking account of the outcome, the law has to weigh a variety 
of factors in decisions involving the attribution of cause, 
blame, and punishment - e.g. the foreseeability of the 
incident, the voluntariness and intentionality of the act, the
motivation of the defendant and extenuating circumstances. The
same kinds of factors may be presumed to apply in our everyday 
attributions, and have been the subject of psychological theory
and research. It is therefore to levels of commission, and
their impact on our attributional tendencies, that we now turn.
This chapter is concerned with the following questions;
(1) How are factors relating to personal and environmental 
circumstances likely to affect attributional judgements? (2) 
How will the impact of these factors vary with age? (3) How 
will individual differences affect attributional style in 
relation to levels of commission?
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Helder’s model of levels of commission
The term 'attribution* refers to the process of organizing 
and interrelating information. In an extended use, it also 
refers to the process of making evaluative judgements. 
Attribution theory in psychology focusses on the way 'ordinary 
man' explains events and attributes them to causes; in the 
case of Heider (1958), it focuses particularly on the way the 
layman makes social judgements of responsibility. We are 
motivated to attribute causality and responsibility perhaps 
because of a need to predict and control events (Kelley, 1971), 
or the need to feel that there is order and consistency in our 
perceptions and beliefs (Shaver, 1975), or because we wish to 
avoid conclusions which are threatening (Walster, 1966; Shaver, 
1970; Lerner, 1970), or because we are more concerned with our 
self-esteem (Bradley, 1978; Zuckerman, 1979).
Heider's discussion of the phenomenology of social 
perception is of particular interest to developmental theorists 
since the maturity of the observer is held to be of 
significance in assignment of responsibility. Heider (1958, 
pp.113-114) outlined five 'contextual levels' of commission in 
which attributions are based upon the relative contributions of 
internal (personal) factors and external (environmental) 
factors. The distinctive characteristics of each of these 
levels (using labels suggested by Shaver, 1975), together with 
brief examples and comments of parallels in law, are as 
follows :
(1) Association. At the most primitive level, a person is held 
responsibile for the outcome of an event with which he is 
associated in any way. Although such attributions might be
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more prevalent in early childhood, adults will sometimes 
attribute responsibility by association, as when, for instance, 
all Irish are assumed to be like the IRA. The nearest 
equivalent in law would be vicarious responsibility in the law 
of torts, in which A may incur to C for the negligence of B. 
However, in law it is required that A should be standing a 
particular relationship to B, such as master and servant 
(Rogers, 1984), whereas in Heider the nature of the association 
is purely spatial and temporal.
(2) Causality. At the second level, a person is held 
responsible for the results of his or her own actions even if 
the person 'could not have foreseen the outcome however 
cautiously he had proceeded' (Heider, 1958, p.113). Of all 
levels, this one most clearly involves the notion of impersonal 
causality, discussed in the last chapter, and Heider relates it 
to the notion of 'objective responsibility' found in Piaget 
(1932). In law, this level is reflected in strict liability.
If the recommendations of the Pearson Committee, 1 9 7 8, were to 
be implemented, a drug company could be held responsible for 
the unforeseen side-effects produced by a pain-killer which it 
manufactured, even after exhaustive clinical trials (Rogers, 
1984).
(3) Foreseeability. At the third level, attribution of 
responsibility is dependent upon the foreseeability of an 
outcome, though Heider was unclear whether the perpetrator had 
actually to foresee the effect or whether he should have done 
so. This was a problem noted in the Newbury case cited at the 
beginning of this chapter, and may well be particularly crucial 
in judgements of punishment. In law, it has been argued that 
actual foresight is sufficient for responsibility. The key
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case here is that of Hyam v. D.P.P. (1975) where Lord Hailsham 
held that, where a person foresees the consequences of his 
actions as certain rather than probable, then he effectively 
intends them (Elliott and Wood, 1982). Baldwin (1979). 
however, has questioned this standpoint, arguing that intention 
implies desire, and. since consequences can be foreseen without 
being desired, foreseen actions are conceptually distinct from 
intentional ones.
(4) Intentionality. The fourth level most clearly represents 
personal causality, since the attribution assumes that the 
person both foresaw and intended the outcome. Heider relates 
this level to Piaget's notion of 'subjective responsibility'.
An example of this level in law would be criminal 
responsibility.
(5) Justification. Finally, a person is held responsible for 
an action which was intentionally produced, but the 
circumstances were such that most other persons would have 
acted likewise. Clearly, attribution of responsibility is 
particularly contentious at this level. Thus Aristotle, in 
Nichomachean Ethics, argued that a person acting under duress, 
or impulsively because of anger or desire, was not absolved 
from responsibility since, in spite of a situation of 
psychological compulsion, the act was voluntary. Nevertheless, 
in law, defence applications for leniency in view of mitigating 
circumstances are representative of this level.
These five levels are seen by Heider to constitute 
increasingly differentiated reasoning and attribution: 'One may
consider the different forms in which the concept of 
responsibility has been used as successive stages in which
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attribution to the person decreases and attribution to the 
environment increases' (Heider, 1958, p.113). Indeed, for 
judgements of blame, Fincham and Jaspars (1979) found that, by 
reversing the last two levels, Heider's classification 
represented a perfect Guttman scale. This was consistent with 
a suggestion by Fishbein and Ajzen (1973) that the action and 
outcome become increasingly attributed to internal forces if 
the last two levels are reversed. However, it is not clear 
that the Justification level should invariably be placed 
between Foreseeability and Intentionality. As Fishbein and 
Ajzen point out in footnotes (1973, p.150; 1975, p.209), a more
appropriate placing might be between Causality and 
Foreseeability. This matter depends on exactly how the 
Justification level is operationalized (as we shall see in 
Experiments 1 and 3).
Some strengths and weaknesses of Heider's model
Although Heider did not envisage his levels as strictly 
age-related (correspondence cited in Fincham, 1983), his model 
of responsibility has dominated developmental work because it 
takes account of a variety of situations in which causality and 
moral responsibility can be attributed. As Fincham (1983) has 
noted, the levels offer greater refinement than Piaget's (1932) 
distinction between objective and subjective responsibility.
The first level goes further than objective responsibility, and 
the remaining levels make finer distinctions between accident 
and intentionality situations. Specifically, the second and 
third levels distinguish more clearly between foreseeable and 
unforeseeable accidents than did Piaget in his stories of 
clumsiness (Piaget, 1932, ppllôff). The fourth and fifth
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levels distinguish between intentions and motives more 
explicitly than Piaget's stories of well-intentioned acts 
(Piaget, 1 9 3 2, Ch.2) and in some later studies based on Piaget 
(Berndt and Berndt, 1975). At the same time, Piaget offered 
distinctions which are absent in Heider, such as those between 
individual and collective responsibility (Piaget, 1932, pp. 
231-2 5 0 ), practical and theoretical reasoning (ibid., pp. 
1 1 2-1 1 6 ), and attribution to self v. other (ibid., p.lSO).
In spite of its strengths. Holder's model is not without 
deficiencies. As we saw in the last chapter, Heider used the 
term 'responsibility' without clear definition, so that 
attribution in relation to the levels of commission could be 
with respect to causality and/or moral blame and/or liability 
for punishment. His theory thus seems at once to refer to the 
process involved in attributing moral responsibility to people 
for their actions and to attributing causes to the outcome of 
actions. Perhaps because of Heider's vagueness in this 
respect, the earlier developmental studies by M.E.Shaw and his 
associates operationalized 'responsibility' in an ambiguous 
way.
Secondly, although the levels offer greater 
differentiation than Piaget's 'two moralities', further 
refinement would be appropriate at the levels of Foreseeability 
and Justification. The first of these appears to embrace at 
least three notions: (1) misjudgement (Person P thinks about
the consequences, but believes there to be no risk), (2) 
negligence (P does not think about the consequences when any 
reasonable person would have foreseen a risk), (3) recklessness
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(p does think about the consequences and also believes there to 
be some risk, but goes ahead all the same). Defined in these 
terms, one might hypothesize that more responsibility would be 
attributed for negligence than for misjudgement, and more for 
recklessness than for negligence, but no empirical study 
appears to have explored this possibility. In Heider's last 
level, involving the notion of responsibility 'shared' between 
the environment and the perpetrator, distinctions can be made 
between outcomes of acts which are, for instance, the result of 
provocation, coercion (physical, psychological), and altruism. 
The developmental study by Shaw and Sulzer (1964) confounded 
all three of these notions, those by Harris (1977) and Fincham 
and Jaspars (1979) focussed on provocation, whilst Ferguson and 
Rule (1 9 8 0 ) defined a 'justified' act as one which was 
altruistically motivated. Yet clearly (as we shall see in 
Experiment 3 of the series to be reported here) the level of 
attribution can vary in relation to these different reasons for 
action. It could also vary as a function of the foreseeability 
of the outcome: thus greater attribution to a perpetrator
might be expected for a serious, 'justified' outcome which was 
actually foreseen as serious rather than if the outcome turned 
out to be more serious than anticipated. Only one Heiderian 
study (Sedlak, 1979) has reduced the heterogeneity of the 
Justification level: however, since the aim of this
investigation was to demonstrate the importance of 
distinguishing between the waiy subjects understand the stimulus 
stories and the criteria which they use to evaluate actors, it 
is not clear from the results how the sub-levels at 
Justification were differentiated in judgements of blame and 
praise.
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Thirdly, apart from the possibility of sub-levels 
discussed above, additional levels might be appropriate. For 
their developmental study, Fincham and Jaspars (1979) proposed 
a sixth level which they called 'supererogation’. This was 
intended to represent a negative environmental force 
(complementing the facilitative force of Heider's Justification 
level) and was operationalized in terms of intentional 
disobedience. However, whether the actor being judged was self 
or other, the data for neither causal nor moral attribution 
supported the hypothesis that the amount of attribution for 
harm would increase from Intentionality to Supererogation, 
perhaps because, as the authors suggest, the effect is more 
likely when outcomes are neutral or positive.
Developmental studies and levels of commission
Between 1964 and 1 9 8 2, fourteen key empirical studies were 
published dealing with the impact of Heider's levels on 
attributional style. These are listed chronologically in Table 
2.1. They are largely developmental in orientation, but some 
deal with individual differences.
The original developmental study based on Heider's levels 
was by Shaw and Sulzer (1964) in Florida. The measure used was 
a twenty-item questionnaire depicting various incidents 
involving a character named Perry. The results indicated that 
the 6-9 year-olds, who made up the sample of children, were 
less differentiated in their attributions than the adults, 
though at the first level even the children attributed very 
little. Two surprising findings emerged. One was that,
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Table 2.1
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF FOURTEEN KEY STUDIES BASED ON HEIDER'S 
MODEL OF ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY
Study and 
Sample
Independent vari­
ables (apart from 
Heider's levels)
Dependent 
measure(s )
SHAW AND 
(1964)
6-9 . adults
SULZER Age
Outcome valence
* Responsibility' 
for injury/damage
GARCIA-ESTEVE &
SHAW (1968)
7-8,9-11.12-13 
16-19 (Rural Puerto 
Rica, Urban USA)
Age
Residence 
Outcome valence 
Outcome intensity
As above
SHAW (1968)
11-16 (Americans, 
Puerto Ricans)
Culture
Outcome valence 
Outcome intensity
As above
SHAW et al (1 9 6 8 )
7-8,9-10,11-13 16-18 (Cubans, Puerto 
Ricans, Americans)
Culture
Outcome valence 
Outcome intensity
As above
SHAW & REITAN (I9 6 9 ) 
(Lawyers, ministers, 
policemen, military)
Occupation 
Outcome valence 
Outcome intensity
As above
plus 'sanctions'
SHAW & SCHNEIDER
(1969a)
I. 9 samples 
7yrs-adults 
(Negroes, whites)
Outcome valence 
Outcome intensity
'Responsibility', 
for injury/damage. 
Intelligence
II. College students 
(IQ above & below 
7 5th percentile)
Ability
Outcome valence 
Outcome intensity
'Sanctions'
for injury/damage
III.8 samples, 7-19 
(Negroes, whites)
As Expt. I As Expt. II
SHAW & SCHNEIDER 
(1969b)
7-8 ,9-10,11-12 
17-19 (Negroes, 
whites)
Ethnicity 
Outcome intensity 
Outcome valence
'Responsibility' 
for injury/damage
SHAW & IWAWAKI 
9-10,11-13 
(Japanese, 
Americans)
(1 9 7 2 ) Nationality 
Age
Outcome valence 
Outcome intensity
'Responsibility * 
for injury/damage
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Table 2.1 continued
HARRIS (1977)
6-8,8-10,11-13, 
12-14,adults
FINCHAM & JASPARS
(1979)6-7 .8-9 ,10-1 1 , 
12-13,adults
SEDLAK (1979) 
8,11,adults
Age,sex
Age,sex. 
Self/other
Age,
Outcome intensity 
Value of consequences 
Actor child/adult
’Naughtiness' 
'Cause/reason for* 
for damage
'Blame'
* Cause/reason * 
for injury
Actor's plans, 
expectations of
outcome, effort, & 
praise/blame 
(various object 
& person outcomes)
FERGUSON & RULE(1980)
7-9,13-15
FINCHAM (1981)
6 yrs
FINCHAM (1982b)
6,8 yrs (Culturally 
deprived, controls)
Age,sex.
Outcome intensity 
Inferential set
Actor self/other
Cultural deprivation
'Badness', 'blame',
'punishment' 
for injury
'Blame* for injury, 
Qs on perceptions 
of Heider's criteria
'Blame* & 'cause* 
for injury
contrary to Heider's hypothesis, neither the adults nor the 
children attributed much less responsibility for justified acts 
than for those which were premeditated (levels 4 v. 5). The 
other unexpected finding was that the children attributed more 
responsibility for foreseeable but unintentional actions than 
for ones which were both foreseeable and intentional (levels 3 
V . 4). Shaw and Sulzer did not distinguish between causal and
moral attributions, a defect which remained to the last of the 
studies by Shaw and his associates (Shaw and Iwawaki, 1972), 
but was remedied by Harris (1977) in a study based on 
Object-damage. It involved five different age groups from 
children of 6-8 years to adults. The 6-8 year-olds were 
undifferentiated across levels, but the older subjects
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discriminated significantly between adjacent pairs except those 
of Causality and Foreseeability.
An enquiry with similar age groups in Oxford, also 
separating questions about cause and moral responsibility, was 
conducted soon after the Harris study (Fincham and Jaspars, 
1979; Fincham, 1980), but with respect to personal injury. 
Unlike previous results, those from this study demonstrated
discrimination between adjacent levels even amongst the 
youngest subjects. Although differences for both cause and 
blame reached significance for the 6-7 year-olds only in 
relation to Foreseeability v. justification , the first two 
levels of Association and Causality were significantly 
separated for perceptions of cause. However, in a follow-up 
study which concentrated on six year-olds, Fincham (1981) 
obtained significant differences between all adjacent pairs for 
blame. Finally, in Alberta, Canada, Ferguson and Rule (1980) 
compared 7-9 year-olds with 13-15 year-olds, but measured only 
moral attributions; the results of this study indicated that, 
whilst the older children were sensitive to Heider’s levels, 
the younger ones focused more on outcome severity.
Thus, with the exception of the last study, researchers 
have increasingly found that young subjects are capable of 
making differentiated judgements. How can the improved results 
be explained? Shaw and Sulzer (1964) themselves suggested 
that part of the problem lay in the inadequate way in which the 
Foreseeability level was operationalized. The authors did not 
seem to realize, however, that, as we have already seen, the
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1final level confounded ’justified* acts which involved 
provocation, coercion and altruistic motives. In commenting 
that story situations could have influenced the degree of 
attribution, Shaw and Sulzer also implicitly acknowledged the 
impact of failure to control for story context; further, as 
Harris (1977) pointed out, the stories varied not only in 
intentionality information but also in the effort and ability 
of the actor. To get over these problems, Harris (1977) used a 
single theme, whilst Fincham and Jaspars (1979) and Ferguson 
and Rule (1980) used a limited number of contexts in which the 
stimulus levels were systematically varied to generate sets of 
stories in which all possible combinations of themes and 
stories (i.e. levels) were produced.
But there are further factors which may have contributed 
to later studies demonstrating greater differentiation amongst 
the younger subjects. First, the later investigations have 
eschewed large group administration, a feature of the Shaw et 
al studies. Instead, testing has been on an individual or 
small group basis, thus enabling better rapport between 
subjects and investigator, who is also better placed to deal 
with misunderstandings or difficulties in comprehension. 
Secondly, simpler and more precise words have been used to 
operationalize ’responsibility’, which was used raw in the 
items of the Shaw questionnaire. Thirdly, the story contexts 
of the Fincham and Jaspars (1979) and Ferguson & Rule (1980) 
measures featured incidents which were more familiar to young 
children than those of Shaw and his colleagues. As a number of 
studies have shown, the extent to which children use 
intentionality information is markedly affected by contextual
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factors (Rogers, 1978). Fourthly, presentation was more 
appropriate to the youngest subjects: Harris (1977) used a
video film, Fincham and Jaspars (1979) included line drawings 
to illustrate each incident, whilst Fincham (1981) used glove 
puppets. Fifthly, the designs of the Harris and Fincham 
studies enabled subjects to attend more to the intentionality 
information. The previous measures had incorporated items 
which allowed outcome intensity and outcome valence to be 
varied. Although controlling for these factors produced some 
interesting results, the effect of varying the more salient 
features of each item may have been to discourage the younger 
subjects attending to the abstract, intentional information, a 
factor acknowledged by Ferguson and Rule (1980) who manipulated 
mild and severe outcomes within their story themes. This 
effect may have been the more pronounced in the Shaw et al 
studies by the constant repetition of the name Perry from item 
to item; the more recent story measures have used a new name 
for the character for each incident presented. Finally, it is 
worth observing that subjects in the Shaw et al studies were 
invariably judging a male character; but, as Shaver (1970) has 
shown, sex of actor can interact with that of subject to 
produce different amounts of attribution.
Attributional tendencies to self v. other have been 
investigated by Fincham and Jaspars (1979) and Fincham (1981). 
Findings from the first of these studies Indicated that almost 
half the children attributed maximum blame to themselves, but 
not to others, regardless of level. Since this result was at 
variance with Piaget’s (1932) comment that young children’s 
egocentrism enabled them to employ subjective reasoning more
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easily when thinking about their own behaviour, the second 
study employed finger puppets to help represent different 
levels of commission. The results produced no differences 
between actor conditions. The authors suggest that this may be 
because the puppets were inappropriate for the self condition, 
or because the study was based on hypothetical rather than real 
incidents. In a subsequent study, Rotenberg (1 9 8 2 ) included a 
manipulation check to ensure that subjects in the self 
condition had identified the actor as themselves, and found 
that 5-6 years-olds made use of intentions in the self but not 
the other conditions, as Piaget predicted.
Individual differences
In Piagetian terms (Piaget, 1932; 1967), age differences
in attribution of responsibility can be interpreted partly in 
terms of a gradual loss of egocentrism, during which the child 
begins to distinguish his or her own point of view from 
another's and is able to engage in the kind of internal debate 
which is necessary for an understanding of voluntary action. 
With a shift from concrete to formal operations, a level of 
abstract thought becomes possible, enabling features of a 
situation such as motive to become more salient. Additionally, 
through experiences of socialization, the child learns the 
social norms involved in assigning responsibility.
But what factors are likely to be significant in 
determining individual variations in the amounts of 
responsibility assigned to others and the degree to which 
Heider's levels are differentiated? According to Furnham et
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al (1 9 8 3), individual differences in the way subjects attribute 
responsibility to others is a surprisingly neglected area.
This section will deal with eight possibilities: (1) cultural
and sub-cultural variations, (2) sex differences, (3) general 
intelligence, (4) field dependence, (5) subject's 'inferential 
set*, (6) locus of control, (7) level of moral development, and 
(8) dogmatism, the last three being those characteristics of 
the perceiver which Shaver (1975) has suggested might account 
for individual differences in attributional style. The central 
relevant studies are included in Table 2.1 (pp27-8).
(1) Cultural and sub-cultural differences. - The studies by 
Shaw and his associates which investigated cultural differences 
are of interest because of the way this variable interacted 
with outcome intensity and outcome valence. This effect made 
it necessary to qualify the original finding in Shaw and 
Sulzer's (1964) study that more responsibility was attributed 
for negative than for positive outcomes at the higher levels of 
commission. Rural Puerto Rican subjects aged between 7 and 19 
years were found to attribute more than urban Puerto Ricans in 
the same age group. The urban subjects also discriminated more 
between levels and attributed relatively greater amounts of 
responsibility for negative outcomes (Garcia-Esteve and Shaw, 
1 9 6 8). These findings were held to reflect different 
child-rearing practices, the rural sample being characterized 
by unquestioned autocratic paternal authority (hence more focus 
on outcomes than intentionality) combined with a tendency to 
ignore aggressive acts in children (hence less 
differentiation). In a cross-cultural study involving 
adolescents, Shaw (1 9 6 8 ) found that Americans attributed
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greater responsibility than did Puerto Ricans for negative 
outcomes which were intentional. Differences were not great, 
but were held to reflect the greater emphasis in American 
culture on punishing bad behaviour. Comparing Cubans, Puerto 
Ricans and Americans in subjects ranging from 7 to 18 years, 
Shaw et al (1968) found that the most noticeable cultural 
differences occurred with positive outcomes which were low in 
intensity. In all three cultures, sophisticated attribution 
appeared earlier with respect to negative outcomes, but for 
positive outcomes the Latin cultures tended to be more 
differentiated. The reason suggested for this finding is that 
Latin cultures pay more attention to reward and praise compared 
with American culture, thus producing greater sensitivity to 
varying circumstances when attributing positive outcomes.
In a similar study comparing whites and Negro Americans 
from 7-19 years, Shaw and Schneider (1969b) found that, in the 
younger groups, the Negroes were less differentiated across 
levels. The authors’ interpretation of this finding, that a 
deprived cultural background retards the rate of learning 
attributional norms, is consistent with results obtained more 
recently by Fincham (1982b). In a sample of English 
culturally deprived children and controls aged 6 and 8 years, 
the controls made greater use of Heider's criteria, the 
deprived children basing judgements more on whether the actor 
physically produced the outcome and whether the act was 
explicitly prohibited. Finally, Shaw and Iwawaki (1972), 
comparing American and Japanese subjects aged 9-14 years, found 
that, whereas the Americans attributed more responsibility for 
negative than for positive outcomes, no such differences
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emerged amongst the Japanese. The authors argue that the 
difference in attributional style reflects the greater 
commitment of Japanese to family and collateral roles with 
associated humanistic tendencies, Japanese parents being more 
likely than their American counterparts to praise children for 
good deeds.
(2) Sex differences. - Differences in attribution according 
to gender have not featured largely in results of Heiderian 
studies. Because Shaw and Sulzer found no differences between 
males and females in their 1964 study, sex differences were 
unfortunately not investigated in subsequent studies by Shaw 
and his associates. No sex differences were found for 
attribution in relation to object damage by Harris (1977) or in 
relation to personal injury by Fincham and Jaspars (1979). 
However, Ferguson and Rule (1980), comparing 7-9 with 13-15 
year-olds, obtained an age x gender interaction in moral 
evaluations: this was interpreted as indicating that, whilst
the older boys and girls attributed less than the younger 
subjects, the decrease was more marked for girls. This finding 
can be related to those of Walker (1984) who recently reviewed 
the literature on sex differences in Kohlberg-based moral 
reasoning studies. In 4l samples of children aged 5-17 years. 
Walker found only six significant differences, though these 
were all in favour of girls' greater maturity, which would be 
consistent with Ferguson and Rule's finding.
(3) General intelligence. - Shaw and Schneider (1969a) 
hypothesized that, since differentiated attribution of 
responsibility depends upon learning, those with greater
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general ability should evidence a more sophisticated
attributional style at an earlier age. However, the results of
Shaw and Schneider’s study did not support this expectation.
Out of 153 correlations for judgements of responsibility, only 
ten were significant, the equivalent finding for attribution of 
sanctions being seven out of 136. Shaw and Schneider (1969a) 
argue that, in the attribution of responsibility, differences 
in general intelligence may not be important because only 
minimal ability is required to learn the norms involved in 
making differentiated judgements. However, they tested IQ 
against absolute levels of attribution and not against evidence 
of the ability to discriminate between levels. In Piagetian 
studies, Keasey (1977) notes that correlations between IQ and a 
preference for subjective responsibility have been weak (no 
higher than r = .33), if statistically significant. King 
(1971) found that the correlation between the Weschler 
vocabulary test and the ability of 4-9 year-olds to distinguish 
between accident and intention in a series of film sequences 
was only .22 (p <.05); other correlations involving ability 
measures were virtually zero.
(4) Field dependence. - Given that differentiated 
attributions depend on being able to identify the 
distinguishing features of a situation, one might expect field 
dependent people, who are strongly dominated by the overall 
organization of the field (Witkin, 1965; Witkin et al, 1977), 
to be less differentiated in their responsibility judgements. 
The recent finding of Howes and Morgan (1983), that field 
dependence was related to perceptions and use of intentionality 
information, would suggest that a similar result would be
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obtained in relation to Heider's levels. So far this 
possibility does not seem to have been investigated.
(5) Inferential set. - Jones and Thibaut (1958) hypothesized 
that a perceiver's role or inferential set would affect his or 
her sensitivity to intention and outcome information when 
making evaluative judgements. Specifically, they postulated 
that if the attributor is primarily interested in assigning 
responsibility for the purposes of punishment 
('situation-matching set'), as in a jury, then he will be 
mainly concerned with the way the act deviates from situational 
norms. On the other hand, if he is primarily interested in 
furthering his personal goals ('value-maintenance set'), as in 
social interaction, he will focus more on the intentions behind 
the act. Support for this hypothesis was obtained by Farnill 
(1974) in so much as 6-9 year-old boys did differentiate 
between malicious and accidental conditions to a significantly 
greater degree when they adopted the value-matching set (the 
children imagining themselves to be the actor's playmate) 
rather than the situation-matching set (thinking about the 
actor's naughtiness). However, in a later study, this result 
could not be replicated by Ferguson and Rule (1980). A 
follow-up investigation (Ferguson and Rule 1982) was little 
more successful, the 11-12 year-olds being unaffected by 
inferential set, whilst the 6-9 year-olds were affected only 
when the perpetrator caused harm accidentally. Failure to 
support Jones and Thibaut's hypothesis may not mean that it is 
wrong, of course: it could be, as Ferguson and Rule (1982)
suggest, that inferential set is too difficult to
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operationalize with children.
(6) Locus of control. - Locus of control is the first of 
three types of personal characteristics which Shaver (1975) 
suggested might influence attributions of responsibility. It 
is a variable which has received a great deal of attention over 
the last twenty years or so, and research in this area has 
recently been the subject of three volumes edited by Lefcourt 
(1 9 8 1 , 1 9 8 3, 1984). As formulated by Rotter (I9 6 6 ; Rotter et
al, 1 9 7 2; Rotter, 1975), locus of control is a generalized 
expectancy across a range of situations in terms of whether the 
individual perceives that he/she possesses or lacks the power 
to exercise control over what happens to him or her.
Individuals can be represented along a continuum from 
internality to externality:
When a reinforcement is perceived by the subject as 
following some action of his own but not being entirely 
contingent upon his action, then, in our culture, it is 
typically perceived as the result of luck, chance, fate, 
as under the control of powerful others, or as 
unpredictable because of the great complexity of the 
forces surrounding him. When the event is interpreted in 
this way, we have labelled this a belief in external 
control. If the person perceives that the event is 
contingent upon his own behaviour or his own relatively 
permanent characteristics, we have termed this a belief in 
internal control.
(Rotter, 1 9 6 6, p.l).
Locus of control can thus be described as a self appraisal 
of the degree to which a person views him/herself as playing a 
causal role in determining specified events. Rotter (1 9 6 6 , 
p.2) considered that it affected behaviour in various ways: 
'These generalized expectancies will result in characteristic 
differences in behavior in a situation culturally categorized 
as chance determined versus skill determined, and they may act
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to produce individual differences within a specific 
condition*. However, as Rotter (1975, p.72) has emphasized in 
a more recent publication, locus of control is not intended 'to 
allow for very high prediction in some specific situation, such 
as achievement or political behavior, but rather to allow for a 
low degree of prediction across a range of potential 
situations'. Although Nowicki and Strickland (1973) observed 
that measures of locus of control in individuals appear to be 
relatively stable from early in life, recent work has shown how 
an orientation towards externality can be modified in the 
direction of greater internality, with beneficial effects on 
health, education, and social behaviour (Nowicki and Duke,
1 9 8 3; Omizo and Cubberly, 1 9 8 3 ).
The hypothesis which relates locus of control to 
attributional tendencies in relation to others is derived from 
a comment by Heider (1958, Chapter 2) that people often 
egocentrically assume that any conditions which operate upon 
them must also operate upon others. Sosis (1974) argued that a 
person whose locus of control is internal will not only see 
himself in control of and responsible for his own rewards and 
punishments but will extend the same notion to others when 
attributing responsibility to them for an outcome. Conversely, 
a person who is external in locus of control will not only see 
himself as not in control and therefore not responsible for 
events which occur in relation to him, but will also be more 
likely to evaluate others as subject to similar forces of luck, 
fate, or the manipulations of powerful others. DeCharms et al 
(1 9 6 5 ) showed that people perceived others as origins or as 
pawns in relation to the way they saw themselves; by
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extension, it could be argued that self-perception could also 
influence the process by which responsibility is attributed to 
others, assuming there can be no responsibility for an action 
if there is no corresponding identification of the perpetrator 
as a causal agent (deCharms, 1968).
It may be an oversimplification to suggest that 
individuals are consistent in their attributions of control, 
causality and blame (Hayworth, 1982). Nevertheless, in support 
of the hypothesis, locus of control has been found to be 
related to attribution of responsibility to others by Phares 
and Wilson (1972), Sosis (1974), and Kauffman and Ryckman 
(1979), though the direction of relationship appears to vary as 
a function of various situational variables. However, these 
studies (which will be reviewed in Chapter 7) concerned youths 
and adults only, comparable work with children being 
conspicuous by its absence in the literature.
(7) Moral reasoning maturity and (8) dogmatism. - The 
hypotheses which form the bases of Shaver's (1975) other 
suggestions can be briefly related. As regards moral maturity, 
it would be expected that subjects in the higher stages of 
Kohlberg's model would be more likely to take account of 
intention information and mitigating circumstances so that the 
blame is shared between the agent and the environment.^ Thus, 
in term's of Heider's theory, they will be more likely to be 
sensitive to personal causality factors. Dogmatic subjects, 
i.e. those who prefer simple answers when faced with complex 
questions (Rokeach, I960) might be expected to be less 
sensitive to extenuating circumstances and to allow the nature
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of the outcome to determine the level of responsibility 
attributed. Lloyd-Bostock (1979) has also suggested that 
responsibility judgements may be a function of the observer's 
punitive tendencies, citing Sulzer and Burglass (1968) as 
obtaining supportive evidence for this expectation. However, 
the relationship between moral judgement, or dogmatism or 
punitiveness, on the one hand, and sensitivity to Heider's 
levels, on the other, does not seem to have been tested.
Conclusions
In Chapter 1, attention was drawn to the importance of 
distinguishing between dimensions of 'responsibility' in 
attribution research. It was also pointed out that, in 
developmental work, it is important to operationalize the 
concept in terms which young subjects find meaningful. This 
chapter has discussed Heider's model of attribution of 
responsibility in relation to levels of commission, and the 
extent to which studies have shown this to relate to 
developmental and individual differences.
From a consideration of the state of the field at the time 
when work was begun for this thesis, it is clear that research 
into the attribution of personal responsibility by children had 
become increasingly refined methodologically since the seminal 
work of M.E. Shaw and his colleagues in the 1960s. The results 
of the more recent developmental studies suggest that, 
although, with increasing age, children become more 
differentiated in their responsibility judgements, those as 
young as six years are able to discriminate significantly 
between Heider's levels of Association, Causality,
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Foreseeability, Intentionality, and Justification, provided 
that the form of the attribution measure and the arrangements 
for its administration are appropriate in relation to the young 
child's interests and intellectual understanding. It would 
therefore be a mistake, as Fincham and Jaspars (1979) have 
commented in relation to their own results, to regard Heider's 
levels as representing developmental stages in Kohlberg's sense 
of 'structural wholes'.
In spite of these advances in our understanding of 
age-related differences, only one developmental study (Fincham 
and Jaspars, 1979) has involved a sample of English children. 
Since this investigation broke new ground in demonstrating the 
ability of young children to offer differentiated judgements, 
it was considered important to see if the results could be 
replicated with another English sample in a different 
locality. Further, although the Fincham and Jaspars study 
distinguished between attributions of cause and blame, it did 
not incorporate judgements of punishment. Indeed, no 
attribution study with children has involved separate analyses 
of evaluations relating to cause, blame and punishment. If 
this were done, it would also be possible to test the 
relationship between these judgements in terms of the 
entailment model which Shultz et al (198I) had suggested in 
relation to adults. For these reasons, it was considered 
necessary to begin the present investigation with a 
developmental study involving another English sample and 
incorporating all three dimensions of 'responsibility' 
discussed in Chapter 1.
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Compared with work on the impact of age, studies on 
individual differences have yielded less clear-cut results, the 
exception being those concerned with cultural and sub-cultural 
differences. In general, white urban American subjects seem 
more sophisticated in their responsibility judgements for 
negative outcomes than subjects in rural Latin cultures, who 
are more differentiated with respect to positive outcomes. 
Within urban cultures, American Negroes and culturally deprived 
white English children seem less differentiated in comparison 
with non-culturally deprived whites, whilst Japanese children, 
unlike their American counterparts, do not attribute more 
responsibility for negative than for positive outcomes. As we 
have seen, these findings have been interpreted in terms of 
different upbringing practices and opportunities for learning 
social norms. Findings regarding the way differences in gender 
affect attributional styles seem equivocal, whilst those 
concerning intelligence seem at variance with some results 
obtained from studies based on Piaget in which maturity of 
moral reasoning is positively, though weakly, related to 
general ability. However, attribution of responsibility style 
on the Heider model has not been investigated in relation to 
stage of moral reasoning on the Kohlberg model, nor have 
studies been published on attribution of responsibility in 
relation to field dependence, dogmatism, or punitive 
tendencies. Subjects' inferential set has not generally 
emerged as an influencing factor on attributional style, as 
Jones and Thibaut (1958)'s hypothesis would predict, but locus 
of control has been shown to be linked with attribution of 
responsibility in studies with adults.
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At the start of the present investigation, therefore, much 
work remained to be done concerning individual differences in 
children's attributions of personal responsibility to others. 
Amongst the possible variables, sex differences and 
intelligence warranted further exploration, whilst locus of 
control seemed an obvious new candidate for investigation.
With respect to the first of these, the significant age x 
gender interaction by Ferguson and Rule (198O) seemed out of 
keeping with findings of no significant sex differences in 
earlier studies. As regards intelligence, it was considered 
that the lack of association with attribution of responsibility 
(Shaw and Schneider, 1979a) might have emerged because the 
findings were based only on the absolute levels of children's 
attributions at each of Heider's levels, not an ability to 
discriminate between them. As far as locus of control is 
concerned, this variable had been investigated in relation to 
adult subjects (Phares and Wilson, 1972; Sosis, 197Ü; Kauffman 
and Ryckman, 1979), so that comparable work with children was 
clearly needed.
The first four experiments in the present series therefore 
include further work to determine the nature of age-related 
differences, particular reference being paid to the nature of 
attributions relating to different dimensions of 
'responsibility' (cause, blame and punishment) and the degree 
of differentiated judgement demonstrated by the younger 
subjects. Individual differences are examined in relation to 
sex, intelligence and, in particular, locus of control.
Problems of research design in establishing a link between the 
latter variable and attribution of responsibility to others is
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further discussed in Chapter 7. in which children's 
attributions to a victim, an issue not so far discussed, is 
also considered. These two issues then constitute the subjects 
of investigation in the later experiments.
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Chapter 3
Experiment 1
LEVELS OF RESPONSIBILITY ATTRIBUTION - PILOT STUDY
INTRODUCTION
The pilot work reported in this chapter, together with the 
main investigation described in Chapter 5 (Experiment 3), is a 
partial replication of a Canadian study, conducted by Ferguson 
and Rule (1 9 8 0 ), into developmental differences in attribution 
of responsibility (AR) for personal injury. However, in 
addition to hypotheses concerning age-related differences, 
consideration is also given to individual differences within age 
groups.
In the last chapter, attention was drawn to a number of 
studies concerning AR in non-academic settings by children in 
various cultures and sub-cultures. These studies were based on 
the attribution theory of Heider (1958) whose interest in the 
relative weight which an observer would attach to the roles of 
personal and impersonal causality led him to postulate five 
levels of commission in which AR to a person decreases as 
attribution to the environment increases. These levels, 
detailed definitions of which were given in Chapter 2 (pp20-22), 
distinguish between a person being held responsible for an 
outcome (1) in which he/she is in any way associated
-  46 -
(Association) or (2) which he/she produced but was not foreseen 
(Causality) or (3) which, although foreseeable, was not 
intentionally produced (Foreseeability) or (U) which was the 
result of purposeful, goal-directed behaviour (Intentionality),or
(5) which was intentionally produced, but the source of the 
motivation was in the environment (Justifiability) [Note 1].
The studies cited in the previous chapter have provided 
evidence, under various experimental conditions, that, as they 
become older, subjects discriminate increasingly between the 
various levels of commission whilst also attributing less 
responsibility overall.
The decision to base the present investigation on the AR
measure developed by Ferguson and Rule (19 8O), in preference to
those used by the other investigators, was made for the
following reasons. Firstly, the study was to be concerned with
attributions in situations involving personal injury rather than
object damage. The former is held to be of greater human
importance, and is therefore of greater interest in
developmental research. The Harris (1977) measure was therefore
ruled out on the grounds that it entails outcomes of actions
which are concerned with damage to property only. Secondly, as
discussed in the last chapter, the measures used by Shaw et al
were not considered appropriate since these did not control for
(da wiq qe/ )certain factors, principally type of outcome^and story content. 
This left a choice between the measures developed by Ferguson 
and Rule (198O), with a sample in Edmonton, Alberta, and by 
Fincham and Jaspars (1979) in Oxford. The former was preferred 
because the stories contained a greater variety of interests 
than those used in the latter study, in which sports and outdoor
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pursuits seemed to predominate. Surprisingly, the Ferguson and 
Rule study has not featured in the most recent review on 
children's attributional tendencies (Fincham, 1983), and may 
have been published too late for inclusion in reviews on 
children's attributions by Kassin (1 98I), Ruble and Rholes
(1 9 8 1 ) and Sedlak and Kurtz (I98I).
At the same time, it was decided that the design should 
differ from that of Ferguson and Rule (198O) in a number of 
respects. First, it was decided not to manipulate 'inferential 
set'. This concept relates to a hypothesis, formulated by Jones 
and Thibaut (1958), that an observer's judgements of 
responsibility will be affected by whether he or she is 
primarily interested in weighing up the justice of punishment 
('situation matching set') or in deciding whether the target 
characters in the stories would make acceptable friends 
('value-matching set'). However, in both the 198O study and a 
follow-up investigation in 1982, Ferguson and Rule found that 
inferential set did not have a marked impact on children's 
judgements. The authors concluded that further pursual of the 
concept would probably not be fruitful (Ferguson and Rule,
1982 ) ,
Secondly, it was decided that the questioning should allow 
for attributions of both causality and moral responsibility.
The distinction between these two ideas was discussed in Chapter 
1, but is briefly this. Causality can be attributed to a person 
who is held to have produced an outcome (Houston and Chambers, 
1 9 8 1) - 'event generation', as Shultz and Schleifer (1 9 8 3, p.60) 
put it. This is concerned with perceptions of a causal link
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between what a person did and what happened. Moral 
responsibility, on the other hand, carries notions of 
culpability and answerability, and thus goes further than 
attributions of causality. It was also decided to make 
distinctions between two dimensions of moral responsibility, 
those of blameworthiness and desert of punishment. Of these, 
Fincham and Jaspars (1979) tested only for blame, whilst 
Ferguson and Rule (198O) tested for 'badness', blame and 
punishment and then averaged the results on the grounds that 
these were significantly correlated (.85 or better, p < .001). 
However, since significantly correlated scores can yield 
significantly different means, it was decided to analyse 
separately for the two dimensions. The present study (and the 
main investigation, Experiment 3) thus tests for three 
dimensions of attribution of responsibility - causality, blame 
and punishment.
Thirdly, consequence severity is not manipulated in the 
present study since a consistent finding from work with children 
has been that subjects assign greater responsibility for severe 
negative than for mild negative outcomes when the situation is 
carefully structured (Armsby, 1971; Ferguson and Rule, 198O;
Shaw and Sulzer, 196U). Instead, it was decided to keep the 
effects mild in view of Heider's hypothesis that severe 
consequences may 'engulf the field' of the observer and might 
therefore override the impact of intent information. Rotenberg
(1 9 8 2) has produced evidence to show that children discriminate 
less successfully between purposive and accidental situations in 
judgements of badness when the outcomes are serious, whilst 
Ferguson and Rule (1980) suspected that the presence of serious
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outcomes in their* stories prevented the younger subjects 
responding in a more mature fashion.
Fourthly, it was considered that the intent information in
the AR measure should be more explicit in order to distinguish
more clearly between unpredictable, accidental outcomes at the 
Causality level and predictable yet unintended outcomes at the 
Foreseeability level. Ferguson and Rule (19S0 ) failed to find 
significant differences between the mean scores for these 
stimulus levels in the case of 7~9 year-olds, as did Fincham and 
Jaspars (1979) for six and eight year-olds. These findings 
replicated those of Shaw and Sulzer (196Ü), However, it could 
be that in these studies the younger groups were penalized 
because the accidental or foreseeable nature of the event was 
not sufficiently clear. Since some other studies (e.g. 
Berg-Cross, 1975) had found that very young children are more 
discriminating in their moral evaluations when the motive for an 
act is made explicit, it was decided to re-word the phrases at 
the Causality and Foreseeability levels in those parts of the 
measure which seemed to place undue reliance on inference. Thus 
at the Causality level, the accidental and unforeseeable nature
of the outcome was conveyed by the use of such phrases as 'John
did not see Bob suddenly run back', while at the Foreseeability 
level a phrase such as 'He didn't look to see where he was 
going' was used.
A fifth decision was to investigate individual differences 
in attribution of responsibility by including two further 
measures. The first of these concerned general intelligence.
The evidence concerning the relationship between intelligence
50 -
and the ability to make judgements which take account of 
intentions and motives is equivocal, as was noted in the last 
chapter. In the main attribution study which investigated the 
association between AR and intelligence, Shaw and Schneider 
(1969a) found no consistent link. However, these authors 
analysed only the general association between the two variables 
rather than the ability to discriminate clearly between the 
stimulus levels. It was thought that links might be found 
using the second, more exacting, criterion. The other line of 
enquiry which it was decided to pursue related to
internal-external locus of control. A link was expected between 
internality (reflecting subjects' beliefs that outcomes of their 
behaviour are within their own control rather than dependent on 
external factors) and AR, for reasons outlined in the last 
chapter. Heiderian studies with children have not so far 
investigated the relationships between these two variables, 
though some studies in moral maturity have done so. Of these, 
Maqsud (1980b) and Guttman et al (I98I) found no association, 
but other evidence has suggested that children whose beliefs 
about causality were perceived as internal were more able to 
deal with moral dilemmas (Bloomberg and Soneson, 1976), have a 
more developed sense of 'right' and 'wrong' (Adams-Webber, 1969)
and a higher regard for social norms (Maqsud, 1980a).
Finally, whereas the Ferguson and Rule study was concerned 
with 7-9 and 13-15 year-olds, it was decided that the present 
studies should look at two ages at Primary school level (8 years 
and 11 years) plus a group of adults whose attributional styles 
would act as base-line material to which children's evaluations 
could be compared. For the initial, pilot study, however, only
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11 year* olds were involved.
EXPERIMENTAL OVERVIEW AND PREDICTIONS
The first purpose of this study was to determine whether 
the instruments were viable in terms of administration, scoring 
and reliability. A second purpose was to test the expectation 
that, in their judgements of moral responsibility, 11 year-olds 
will give higher attributional ratings for personal injury 
which, though not intended, could have been foreseen 
(Foreseeabilty) than for those which were neither intended not 
foreseeable (Causality); in turn, outcomes which were the result 
of malicious intention (Intentionality) would be expected to be 
reflected in higher ratings, but responsibility attributions 
would fall when the perpetrator's action was seen as intentional 
but in keeping with the way most other similar persons would 
have behaved (Justification) [Note 2]. Ferguson and Rule (1980) 
did not include subjects at or near 11 years, but, as detailed 
in the previous chapter, the expectation concerning 
discrimination between the stimulus levels at 11 years or 
thereabouts is consistent with findings by Shaw, Briscoe and 
Garcia-Esteve (1 9 6 8 ) and Fincham and Jaspars (1979) - though for 
judgements of 'naughtiness' in relation to object damage, Harris 
(1 9 7 7 ) found significant differences at the relevant age only 
between purposeful and justified commission. In contrast to 
attributions of moral responsibility, causal attributions were 
expected to be uniformly high across the stimulus levels, and 
also less discriminatory, since people are physically involved 
in the occurrence of even non-intentional events. Evidence of
— 52 —
less discrimination would be consistent with the findings of 
Fincham and Jaspars (1979); for the relevant age group Harris 
(1977) found no significant differences between any adjacent 
means for attributions of causality.
The third purpose of the study was to assess individual 
differences. Apart from sex differences, these would involve 
intelligence and locus of control, as explained in the 
Introduction section. For the 11 year-olds in the pilot study, 
no significant differences were anticipated between the 
attributions of boys and girls because sex did not emerge as a
significant effect in results obtained by Shaw and Sulzer
(196%), Harris (1977), and Fincham and Jaspars (1979).
Ferguson and Rule (1 9 8 0 ) found that sex differences, evident at
7-9 years, were not present in adolescents. As regards 
intelligence, it was thought possible that the more able 
subjects would be more likely to make clear distinctions 
(defined as one full point in a four-point rating scale) between 
the stimulus levels. Finally, locus of control was expected to 
correlate positively with AR since those who believe that 
outcomes of their own behaviour are within their own control are 
more likely to believe that others should also accept 
responsibility for the outcomes of their actions (Phares and 
Wilson, 1972; Shaver, 1975: Sosis, 197%).
METHOD
Subjects. - The pilot sample consisted of thirty-two 
subjects aged 10 years 11 months to 11 years 9 months (M = 11,5;
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SD * .27) drawn randomly from two classes in a Surrey Primary 
school. The children came from a catchment area comprising both 
local authority and private dwellings; all subjects were white. 
The number of subjects in each of the five grades for verbal 
ability, based on the AH2 test (long-term limit), were A:8, B:6,
C:l%, D : 2 and E;2. These frequencies represent, respectively, 
percentages of 2 5 , 1 9 , %%, 6 and 6 where 10, 20, %0, 20, and 10
are the norms. It would thus appear that the sample was 
over-represented at the top and under-represented at the bottom 
of the ability range.
Materials. - Three sets of measures were used:
(1) For AR, the stories devised by Ferguson and Rule (1 9 8 0 ), 
adapted as described below.
(2) For intelligence, the verbal ability grades from the AH2 
Group Test of General Ability (short-term limit), made available 
by the school.
(3) The original and reverse form of the Bialer-Cromwell Locus 
of Control Scale for Children (Bialer, 196I).
The AR stories constructed by Ferguson and Rule (1 9 8 0 ) 
(kindly made available by the authors) describe a boy or girl 
(matching the subject’s gender) involved in aggression against 
another child of the same sex. The eight story themes were 
adapted in the following respects. First, the stories were made 
more acceptable for an English sample by re-naming most of the 
characters and re-wording certain phrases (e.g. substituting 
'pound note' for 'dollar bill'). Secondly, stories representing 
the first and second stimulus levels were re-worded if necessary 
in order that the foreseeable nature of the outcome was more
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explicit. Finally, since outcome severity was not being 
manipulated, only mild outcomes were used. Four levels of 
commission (Causality, Foreseeability, Intentionality and 
Justification) were manipulated within each of eight themes to 
generate thirty-two stories, the stimulus level being produced 
by changing the wording of one or two key phrases.
An example of one of the revised eight themes for boy (and 
girl) subjects is given below:
Jim (Joy) and Peter (Pat) were up in a tree house.
While they were playing, Jim (Joy) lost his (her) 
balance and knocked Peter (Pat) out of the tree 
house. (Causality level)
While they were playing, Jim (Joy) didn't look to see 
where Peter (Pat) was standing and pushed a table 
against Peter (Pat), who fell out of the tree house. 
(Foreseeability level)
While they were playing, Jim (Joy) pushed Peter (Pat) 
out of the tree house because he (she) wanted Peter 
(Pat) to go home. (Intentionality level)
While they were playing, Jim (Joy) saw the tree house 
catch fire. He (she) pushed Peter (Pat) out of the 
tree house as they both had to get out quickly. 
(Justification level)
When Peter (Pat) hit the ground, he (she) sprained his
(her) arm.
For each story, subjects were asked to respond on a 
four-point scale (as used in the Ferguson and Rule study) to 
three questions in the following manner, emphasis being given to 
the words underlined:
(1) How much do you think that Jim (Joy) caused Peter (Pat) to 
get a sprained ankle?
(2) How much do you think that Jim (Joy) should be blamed for 
Peter (Pat) getting a sprained ankle?
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(3) How much do you think that Jim (Joy) deserved to be punished 
for Peter (Pat) getting a sprained ankle?
The full set of stories appears in Appendix A1.
The validity of assigning each of the revised stories to a 
particular level of commission was estimated by asking six 
assessors (experienced teachers and lecturers in Education), 
working independently and blind to the hypothesis, to sort the 
thirty-two items (arranged in random order) into categories so 
that stories within each category represented a unique kind of 
circumstance which led one of the characters to act in such a 
way that the other character was injured. The number of 
categories was left to each assessor’s judgement, but in the 
event each used only four. Further, the labels suggested were 
consistent with the levels of commission to which the stories 
had been assigned, though obviously the words used were not 
identical (e.g. the Foreseeability level was described variously 
in terms of 'thoughtless*, 'careless' and 'inconsiderate' 
behaviour).
Of the locus of control measures suitable for use with 
children as young as eight years, that developed by Bialer and 
Cromwell (Bialer, 1 96I) was judged to be the most appropriate 
for the present study. This was largely because all the items 
are concerned with social behaviour rather than school 
attainment (Note 3). The scale 'was designed to measure the 
extent to which a given child characteristically construes event 
outcomes (both positive and negative) as being consequential to 
his own actions (i.e. internally controlled) rather than due to 
the whims and/or manipulations of fate, chance, objects, or
-  56 -
other people (i.e. externally controlled)' (from the 
Instructions, kindly supplied by the author). The twenty-three 
items are so worded that for some a 'yes' answer indicates 
internality while for others it indicates externality. The 
higher the total score, the more internal the subject's 
orientation. A reverse form of the scale (Gozali and Bialer, 
1 9 6 8 ) was also developed. For the original form, a split-half 
reliability coefficient of .86 was obtained by Bialer (196I) 
from the standardization sample consisting of mentally retarded 
and normal children aged %-l6. Later studies have yielded a 
test-retest reliability of .73 (McMconnell, 1962), and of .8% 
(original form) and .87 (reverse form) (Gozali and Bialer,
1 9 6 8 ). Early demonstrations of validity of the measure, 
reviewed by Cromwell (I9 6 3 ), Lefcourt (I9 6 6 ), and McConnell 
(1 9 6 5 ), were based upon significant correlations with mental and 
chronological age, delay of gratification, and response to 
success and failure cues. For the present study, each form of 
the scale was anglicized (Appendix A2) and both were 
administered to all subjects.
Procedure. - To control for story context, the four levels of 
commission were manipulated within the context of each of the 
eight story themes, so that each subject was presented with one 
story from each of the eight themes, two stories representing 
each of the stimulus levels. The selection of stories from 
themes and the order of presentation for each child were 
determined randomly.
Each subject was individually tested on two occasions by 
the investigator in a room near the classrooms. During the
- 57 -
first session, each subject responded to four of the AR
stories. Half the boys and half the girls received the original
form of the locus of control scale, the remainder receiving the 
reverse form. A fortnight later, the remaining four AR stories 
were administered, and each child received the alternative form 
of the locus of control scale to the one previously 
administered.
The children were told that they would hear some stories, 
would be asked two or three questions to make sure that the
events related had been understood, and then asked their
opinions of the main character's actions. It was emphasized 
that the exercise was not a test and that there were no right or 
wrong answers. At the conclusion of each story (which was read 
twice), subjects were asked some prepared questions to test 
understanding; in only a few cases was it necessary to review 
any of the stories as a consequence. Subjects were then 
requested to assign responsibility to the central character by 
answering the questions relating to each attribution measure; 
using a four-point scale represented on A3 cards, they pointed 
either to a line labelled 'not at all' or to one of three boxes 
arranged in increasing order of height and labelled 'a little', 
'quite a lot', and 'very much'. In order to minimize the risk 
of response set, the order of choice answers was reversed for 
the blame question. Separate cards of different colours were 
used for each measure to help emphasize the different nature of 
the questions. At the conclusion of the last session, the 
investigator invited subjects to ask questions or make comments 
on the exercises, and then thanked them for participating.
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RESULTS
Scoring and internal consistency estimates. - Subjects' AR 
scores were obtained by assigning a value of 1 - % to each 
rating, with % representing the greatest amount of 
attribution. Scores in relation to the two stories 
representing each stimulus level were averaged to give the 
final score for that level. The assumption here was that, 
since consensus had been achieved amongst the assessors in the 
validity exercise, as reported in the Methods section, 
significant split-half correlations (corrected by the 
Spearman-Brown formula) would be obtained for the first and 
second scores at each stimulus level. As can be seen from 
Table 3.1, this was achieved at each level for the punishment 
question, but not at the second level for perceptions of 
causality, and only at the first level for attributions of 
blame. Thus results for cause and blame should be treated with 
caution.
The correlation (r) between the parallel forms of the 
locus of control measure was .56 (p < .05). However, since the
internal consistency of the original form (.6 9 , p < .01) was 
clearly superior to that obtained for the reverse form (.32, p
< .0 5 ), only scores from the original form were utilized in
further analysis.
In short, reliability estimates for the AR measure, though 
moderately high and significant for the punishment question, 
were not satisfactory for all levels of the cause and blame
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questions. This matter will be taken up in the Discussion. The 
internal consistency of the original form of the locus of 
control measure was moderately high and significant.
Table 3.1
SPLIT-HALF RELIABIITY COEFFICIENTS OF ATTRIBUTION OF 
RESPONSIBILITY AND LOCUS OF CONTROL MEASURES
(a) Attribution of Responsibility
Stimulus Level Cause Blame Punishment
Causality . 56** . 62** . 6%**
Foreseeability . 06 - . 02 . %9**
Intentionality . %8** -. 06 . 72**
Justification . %5** , 23 . %%**
(b) Locus of Control
Original Form: 
Reverse Form;
. 69** 
. 32*
*p < .05 **p < .01
Attribution of responsibility. - Results for each of the 
attribution questions are presented in Fig. 3.1. (Mean scores 
and standard deviations for the AR measures are given in 
Appendix Bl.l.) The data pattern reveals the predicted effects 
for judgements of blame and punishment, i.e. that attributions 
would increase from Causality through Foreseeability to 
Intentionality, and fall off at Justification. However, the 
configuration of data for the cause question reveals an 
unexpectedly similar pattern which does not reflect the 
anticipated high and less discriminating evaluations for this AR 
dimension - although, as expected, attributions were greater for 
cause than for blame, and greater for blame than for punishment.
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Fia. 3.1
MEAN ATTRIBUTIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY
4-
LÜ
cause
2 -
♦  punishment
C ausa l i ty  Foreseeabil i ty  In tent ional i ty  Justi f ication
To test the results for statistical significance, the 
scores for each attribution measure were submitted to a 2 (sex)
X U (stimulus levels) mixed analysis of variance, with repeated 
measures on the second factor (tables in Appendix B1.2). As the 
data patterns had indicated, highly significant main effects 
emerged for the stimulus levels with respect to each AR measure, 
viz. cause (F [3.90] = &2.Ü2, p < .001), blame (F [3.90] =
70.95. P < .001) and punishment (F [3.90] = 39.77, p < .001).
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The sex factor did not emerge as a significant main effect or in 
interaction with the stimulus levels. Since the result for the 
cause question showed more discrimination between levels than 
anticipated, the percentage of total variance attributable to 
the stimulus levels was calculated, following the procedure in 
Winer (1971, PP. Ü28-Ü30). The results were; cause 50%, blame 
63%, punishment &8%. Thus, although a smaller proportion of the 
total variance was attributed to the stimulus levels for cause 
than for blame, the percentage was high and about the same as 
that for punishment.
To test further the predicted effects for levels, a priori 
t-tests were calculated to compare adjacent means, following the 
procedure recommended by Kirk (1968, pp. 266-268), with p set at 
.0 5 . The conservative test was used to estimate the the 
critical value of t, as recommended by Kirk (I9 6 8) for 
situations in which different sources of variability are 
pooled. The results revealed that all differences between each 
pair of adjacent means for each attribution measure reached 
significance beyond the .01 level, thus giving strong support to 
the predictions regarding attributions of moral responsibility 
but not causality, where significant differences were expected 
only in relation to the Intentionality level.
Intelligence and Locus of Control. - To test the association 
between general intelligence and AR, note was taken of the 
number of subjects in each of the verbal ability grades who 
discriminated between adjacent levels by at least one full 
rating. The results for blame, set out in Table 3.2, give 
marginal support for the expectation that the more able children
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would be more likely to offer sophisticated attributions. 
However, this is clearly not the case for the punishment 
question, and chi-square tests (combining ability grades A-B and 
C-D-E to deal with small expected frequencies at the extreme 
levels) revealed no significant differences for blame.
Table 3.2
PROPORTIONS OF SUBJECTS IN EACH ABILITY GRADE WHO DISCRIMINATED 
BETWEEN AR LEVELS IN THE PREDICTED DIRECTION*
Verbal Ability Grade (AH2)
Stimulus Level A B C  D E  Total
(N=8)(N=6)(N=l%)(N=2)(N=2) (N=32)
Blame
Causality < Foreseeability . 75 . 50 . 50 50 . 50 . 57
Foreseeability < Intentionality . 88 . 8k . 50 50 . 50 . k7
Intentionality > Justification 1 . 00 1. 00 . 86 50 - . 8k
Causality < Intentionality . 25 . 8k . 50 50 . 50 . 50
Punishment
Causality < Foreseeability . 50 . 33 . 50 - . 50 . kk
Foreseeability < Intentionality . 25 . 50 . k3 50 . 50 . kl
Intentionality > Justification . 50 . 50 . 76 50 . 50 . 63
Causality < Intentionality . 33 . 56 50 . 31
* Criterion of discrimination is at least 1 point (2 points in
the case of Causality < Intentionality).
To test the prediction that AR would be positively 
associated with internal locus of control, Pearson product 
moment correlations were computed between the two variables with 
respect to each attribution measure and stimulus level. The 
results (Table 3.3) show that, contrary to the expectation, only 
two of the twelve coefficients, both in relation to the cause 
question, are significant, but even these indicate that only 
between 11 and 17 per cent of the variance in the scores for 
perceptions of causality could be predicted from locus of
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control. 
low.
The remaining correlations are near zero or extremely
Table 3.3
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN AR AND LOCUS OF CONTROL
AR dimension Level of commision r (df=3 0 )
Cause
Blame
Punishment
p < . 05
Causality
Foreseeability
Intentionality
Justification
Causality
Foreseeability
Intentionality
Justification
Causality
Foreseeability
Intentionality
Justification
. Ü1**
-. 13 
-. 08 
. 33*
16 
-.26 
. 05 
. 05
—  .08
- . 1 3  
- .  oa
15
** p < .01 (one-tailed tests)
DISCUSSION
The first purpose of this study was partially achieved.
The adapted AR measure proved to be a viable instrument in so 
far as it was straight-forward to administer and score. It also 
attracted favourable comment from the subjects. However, in 
spite of the content validity which had been demonstrated before 
the measure was used, the internal consistency estimates were 
consistently satisfactory only for the punishment question.
Given the other acceptable levels of reliability, together with 
the validity results from six independent assessors, it was 
assumed that the problem regarding the cause and blame questions 
was not a statistical but a conceptual one. Specifically, it
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appeared that consensus was lacking in the waty the terms 'cause* 
and 'blame* were understood. It is possible, for instance, 
that the marked differentiation for causality perceptions arose 
because some children interpreted 'cause' in a moral sense, 
perhaps associating it with their experience of reprimands and 
punishment. It was concluded that further work needed to be 
done to operationalize 'cause' and 'blame* adequately. This 
will be taken up in Experiment 3.
As regards the locus of control measure, the internal 
consistency estimate of the original form (.6 9 » P < .01) was 
judged acceptable. Subjects were able to respond to all 
questions. However, some expressed a desire to qualify their 
answers, a matter to which we return at the end of this 
Discussion.
The second purpose of the study was to test children's 
attributions in terms of Heider's levels, and to compare the 
results with other recent findings. Whilst a note of caution is 
therefore required in interpreting the results, at any rate for 
the cause and blame questions, subjects did, as expected, 
discriminate significantly between the stimulus levels in their 
judgements of blame and punishment. To this extent the findings 
are in keeping with the predictions generated by Heider's (1958) 
attribution theory, and extend the evidence provided by Ferguson 
and Rule whose subjects were younger and older. The results of 
the present study would suggest that the 11 year-olds in this 
English sample were behaving more like the 13-15 year-olds than 
the 7-9 year olds in the Canadian sample. Of particular 
interest here is the way in which the children clearly separated
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the first two levels, representing foreseeable and unforeseeable 
accidents. This could be a reflection of the re-wording at 
these two levels, making the nature of the the attributional 
situations more salient.
Equally interesting is the way subjects attributed
significantly less responsibility when circumstances seemed to
justify the action at the fourth level. It is important to note
here that Ferguson and Rule operationalized the concept of
justified commission in terms of the altruistic motives which
lay behind the actor’s aggression. For instance, in one story
the main character tries to save a friend’s life by pushing
him/her out of a tree house which is on fire, while in another a
friend is knocked over in an attempt to prevent him/her stepping
in a puddle. In contrast, Heider construed the concept more in
terms of provocation:
We may say about an action of p ’s, ’It’s not his fault that 
he behaves like that. He has been provoked’ (Heider, 1958, 
p.114).
This was the sense in which Fincham and Jaspars (1979) 
operationalized the Justification level, though in the original 
attribution measure for children Shaw and Sulzer (1964) 
confounded the notions of provocation, coercion and altruism. 
This difference in definition may help to explain why the 
ratings given by subjects at the Justification level in the 
present study and in Ferguson and Rule’s (for the adolescent 
subjects) are so low (close to those for simple accidents) 
compared with the results in other studies.
The final purpose of the study was to explore individual 
differences with respect to sex, intelligence, and locus of
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control. As anticipated, no significant sex differences 
emerged. The failure to explain individual differences in terms 
of general intelligence could be because only minimal ability is 
required to learn the norms concerning the appropriate criteria 
involved in the attribution process (Shaw and Schneider, 1969a).
Assuming that the hypothesis concerning AR and internality 
is valid, the lack of correlation between these two factors 
could be a reflection of the inadequacy of one or other of the 
measures. Comments by some of the children during the informal 
exchanges after their interviews suggested that the generality 
of the locus of control items was frustrating for some subjects, 
who would have preferred in their answers to have distinguished 
between their friends and those they like less, and between 
other children and adults. It was concluded that a more refined 
locus of control measure might reveal individual differences in 
attributions to others. Since a principal aim of this thesis is 
to examine the association between locus of control and 
attributional style in children, the question of an appropriate 
internality measure for prediction in social situations will be 
the subject of the next Experiment.
Note 1 . Heider did not give labels to his levels. Ferguson and 
Rule (1 9 8 0) use three sets of terminology in their paper (cf. 
footnote on p. 142, Procedure on p. 143, and the table on p. 
144)! The labels supplied in the present studies are those 
suggested by Shaver, 1975.
Note 2 . In this study, as in Ferguson and Rule's, Heider's 
first level is not included since previous studies have shown 
that even very young children attribute very little 
responsibility for 'global* association.
Note 3 . Since the present investigations were begun, a new 
48-item locus of control scale for children, dealing 
specifically with social interaction, has been developed by 
Dahlquist and Ottinger (1983).
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Chapter* 4
Experiment 2
CAUSAL ATTRIBUTION TO SELF IN INTER-PERSONAL SETTINGS
INTRODUCTION
One of the problems which emerged from the pilot study 
(Experiment 1) was the failure to explain individual 
differences within the age-range in terms of internal-external 
locus of control. For this purpose, the Bialer-Cromwell locus 
of control scale for children had been adopted because this 
measure deals mainly with social rather than academic 
achievement. However, although the adapted original form of 
this measure was found to be internally consistent with the 
sample at a moderately high level (r = .69)» only two of the 
twelve correlations with attribution of responsibility reached 
statistical significance.
Unless the expected association between locus of control 
and attributions to others was not revealed by chance in the 
pilot sample, the paucity of significant correlations could be 
explained in one of two ways. One possibility was that no 
genuine association existed. The other possibility was that a 
theoretical association existed but was not revealed because of 
Inadequate operationalization. Before accepting the first 
explanation, it was decided that the second should be explored
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since the Bialer scale was seen to contain certain 
shortcomings.
One criticism which could be made of the Bialer measure is 
that successful and unsuccessful behaviour are confounded: 
there are no separate sub-scales for success and failure items 
as there are in some achievement locus of control scales for 
children (e.g. Crandall et al, 1 9 6 5 ).
A second limitation of the scale is the lack of facility 
for respondents to distinguish between different kinds of 
social target. It is assumed that subjects can meaningfully 
account for the outcome of social encounters without 
distinguishing between incidents with other children and those 
with adults, or between incidents with those who are liked and 
those who are less liked. (The same shortcoming appears to be 
a feature of Seligman’s attributional style scale in which some 
interpersonal items refer to a friend whilst others are 
unspecific (Seligman et al, 1979: Abramson and Martin, 1 9 8 1.)) 
Of course, as Rotter (1975) has emphasized, instruments 
measuring generalized expectancies are not intended to allow 
for very high predictions in specific situations, but rather 
for a low level of prediction across a variety of potential 
situations. Nevertheless, an explanation for the outcome of 
one's interpersonal encounters is likely to depend upon the 
regard which one has for the other person. Indeed, some 
subjects effectively pointed this out during the interviews for 
the pilot study. As one child put it, *It depends whether 
you're talking about my mum or my aunty* (whom she didn't 
like). Imamoglu's (198O) finding that children show a
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significant tendency to interpret a bad outcome caused by a 
liked actor as being accidental, but that caused by a disliked 
actor as being intentional, illustrates the importance of 
target actor x outcome interactions.
A further shortcoming of the Bialer scale concerns the 
wording of some items which are phrased in a rather general way 
so that the meaning could be ambiguous, especially for younger 
subjects (e.g. 'Is it hard for you to know why some people do 
certain things?'). Milgram and Milgram (1975) cite evidence 
which indicates how children of nine or ten years and of low 
average ability have difficulty in understanding the Bialer 
items. As Weiner et al (1976, PP 5^-56) have pointed out, 'the 
absence of confirmatory results in correlation studies may 
merely indicate shortcomings in the assessment instrument, 
particularly its lack of situation specificity'. Also, as 
Nowicki and Strickland (1973. P.1&9) have noticed, almost half 
the items in the Bialer scale are 'consecutively keyed in one 
direction ~ an open instrument for response styles to 
significantly affect scores'.
Finally, it is worth noting that the Bialer scale, in 
common with most locus of control instruments, confounds 
externality in terms of other people, on the one hand, and luck 
or fate on the other. Yet presumably a belief that the 
outcomes of one's actions are largely controlled by other 
people's behaviour is not inextricably linked to the belief 
that one's experiences are in the hands of fate. Weisz and 
Stipek (1 9 8 2 ) have even suggested that younger children might 
construe chance outcomes as controllable and regard luck as
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internal (I'm a lucky person').
In the light of these considerations, it was decided to 
develop a measure which, like the Bialer scale, involved locus 
of control in social rather than academic achievement contexts, 
but in which questions were more specific. In particular, the 
possibility that internality in interpersonal behaviour is not 
a unidimensional construct would be investigated by separating 
scores for successful and unsuccessful social encounters and 
also for different categories of stimulus person. The 
intention was then to employ the new scale in the main AR 
investigation (Experiment 3) in order to see if a more specific 
measure of locus of control would help to explain individual 
differences in the way children attribute responsibility to 
others.
Besides locus of control, it was also thought appropriate 
to incorporate the notion of stability as a possible causal 
dimension. Weiner et al (1971, 1976) have developed a variant
of attributional theory which postulates that, in achievement 
situations, both internal and external causes may be either 
stable (e.g. ability if internal, or task difficulty if 
external) or relatively unstable, being subject to 
moment-by-moment or periodic fluctuations (e.g. effort or mood 
if internal, or luck if external). Weiner thus questions the 
assumptions of locus of control theorists that the stability of 
causal attribution can be assumed. It seems likely that 
similar distinctions can be made in the kinds of explanations 
given for interpersonal behaviour. However, in the Bialer 
scale, stable and unstable items are confounded. For instance.
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the first item ('When somebody gets mad at you, do you usually 
feel that there is nothing you can do about it?') relates to 
stable factors, perhaps ability or task difficulty, whereas the 
third item seems to relate to unstable factors, perhaps a bad 
mood ('When people are unkind to you, could it be because you 
did something to make them be unkind?'). In the Pilot Study, 
subjects would sometimes say, 'It depends on what mood I'm 
in'. This suggested a need to distinguish between stable and 
unstable causes as well as status of target person.
Several studies have supported Weiner's hypothesis that 
changes in expectancy are related to the stability of causal 
attribution rather than to its locus of control (e.g. Fontaine, 
197Ü; McMahan, 1973; Valle and Frieze, 1 9 7 6 ; Weiner et al, 
1 9 7 6 ). It seems that perception of change in the future depends 
on the degree to which attribution, whether internal or 
external, reflects factors which are temporally stable. 
According to Weiner's model, attributions in terms of stable 
causes produce expectancies that outcomes from comparable 
situations in the future will be the same, while unstable 
attributions produce expectancy shifts. Investigation of 
repeats-expectancies will also be a feature of the present 
study.
More recently, Weiner (1979, 1980, 198U) has suggested two
more dimensions of causal attribution: controllability and
intentionality. As regards controllability, effort and paying 
attention may be considered under a person's volitional 
control, but mood and luck would be different in this respect. 
Controllability extends the model to eight cells (2
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[internality] x 2 [stability] x 2 [controllability]). 
Controllability in turn can interact with intentionality: thus
negligence may be highly controllable but not intentional, 
whilst a psycopathic killer may intend to murder but be unable 
to control his actions. Still another attributional dimension 
which has been suggested by Abramson et al (1978) and Abramson 
and Martin (1 9 8 1 ) is *global-specificity'. This further 
refinement is judged to be necessary to specify attributions 
which are made by individuals who find themselves helpless, 
apparently learning that outcomes are uncontrollable and 
attributing them either to internal factors (’personal 
helplessness') or to external factors ('universal 
helplessness'). The term 'specific' is used by Abramson et al. 
to denote stable attributions for the same situation over time; 
'global' factors, however, are generalizable across other 
related situations. Thus, while Abramson et al. agree with 
Weiner that internal and external attributions might refer to 
either stable or unstable factors, they go further in 
suggesting that the stability of an attribution may be either 
generalizable or specific. The developmental nature of learned 
helplessness has been examined by Rholes et al (198O).
In short, Weiner and others have demonstrated the range 
and complexity of commonsense beliefs which we use in making 
causal attributions. In a recent formulation, Weiner (198&) 
suggests that the five dimensions outlined above be grouped as 
follows: (1) locus of control; (2) constancy, comprising (a)
stability and (b) glob&lity; (3) responsibility, comprising (a) 
controllability and (b) intentionality. Apart from locus of 
control, the present study takes account of the stability
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dimension, since subjects in the pilot study seemed to want to 
distinguish between stable and unstable factors, which were 
confounded in the Bialer scale. Other factors taken into 
account are the status/familiarity of the target person and the 
nature of the outcome.
EXPERIMENTAL OVERVIEW AND HYPOTHESES
The aim of the study was to devise a measure, suitable for 
experimental use with subjects as young as eight years, 
concerning locus of control and stability of causal attribution 
to self. The assessment procedure was designed to permit 
distinctions not only between internality and stability but 
also between different categories of social target and between 
successful and unsuccessful outcomes. The new measure thus 
attempted to meet what were seen as possible shortcomings in 
the Bialer children's locus of control scale, as outlined in 
the previous section.
In the first place, subjects were asked to distinguish 
between four stimulus persons, referred to as targets, defined 
and coded as follows: a child (Ch+) and an adult (Ad+) with
whom relationships were especially good ('liked' targets), and 
a child (Ch-) and an adult (Ad-) with whom no specially good 
relationship existed ('less-liked' targets). Secondly, in 
respect of each target, separate scores were obtained for items 
dealing with successful and unsuccessful encounters. Thirdly, 
the assessment included the stability of causal factors as well 
as their locus of control. A fourth characteristic of the
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measure was that questions referred to specific incidents 
relevant to the experience of Primary school children rather 
than to generalities. Finally, choice responses concerning 
externality referred to other persons (the targets) as causal 
factors but not to luck or fate.
Various hypotheses were tested in relation to the 
characteristics of the measure. The first prediction concerned 
relationships between internality scores and outcome 
condition. A review by Zuckerman (1979) on attributions for 
successes and failures showed that the former are usually 
internal whilst the latter are usually external. In 
achievement contexts, findings with children on this matter 
have been inconsistent. A number of studies (e.g. Arkin and 
Maruyama, 1979; Davis and Stephan, 198O; Frieze and Weiner, 
19 7I; Nicholls, 1975 ; Miller; 1 9 7 6 ) have found that subjects 
tend to take greater credit for their academic successes than 
for their failures. One explanation is that, by internalizing 
responsibility for positive outcomes and externalizing 
responsibility for negative outcomes, people can maintain 
positive self-esteem (Arkin et al, 1976; Arkin and Maruyama, 
1979; Bradley, 1978; Nicholls, 1975). In a classroom setting, 
however, Bar-Tal and Darom (1979) found the opposite tendency. 
The authors interpret this by pointing out how, through 
teachers' remarks, pupils may be socialized into taking blame 
for bad work and attributing their successes to 'good 
teaching'. However, in interpersonal behaviour which is not 
tied to school contexts, it was assumed that the dominant 
factors operating would be the children's wish to enhance 
feelings of pride and to avoid feelings of shame. As Heider
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(1976, p. 16) put it, ’One is inclined to attribute to oneself 
good things, but one suffers when one has to attribute to 
oneself something that is not so good’. Accordingly, it was 
anticipated that subjects’ scores would reflect greater 
internality for successful than for unsuccessful encounters.
The second hypothesis related the stability factor to 
target person and outcome. Following Valle and Frieze (1976) 
and Frieze (1981), it was anticipated that the initial 
expectancy for success would be an important determinant of 
whether a stable or unstable attribution was made. Subjects 
would tend to attribute the success or failure of an incident 
to stable factors in cases where the outcome would, in normal 
circumstances, be expected. Conversely, where success or 
failure would be regarded as the exception rather than the 
rule, subjects would be more likely to attribute the outcome to 
unstable factors. In short, outcomes consistent with what is 
expected would be more attributable to stable causes. Since 
both targets Ch+ and Ad+ had been identified on the grounds 
that relationships with the subject were especially good, and 
since the opposite situation existed as regards Ch- and Ad-, it 
was anticipated that subjects would be more likely to regard 
successful encounters as typical, and therefore expected, when 
making attributions with respect to liked rather than 
less-liked targets; conversely, they would tend to regard 
unsuccessful encounters as typical and expected with respect to 
less-liked rather than liked targets. The diagram below 
attempts to summarize this position:
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Liked Targets 
(Ch+ & Ad+)
Less—liked Targets 
(Ch- & Ad-)
Successful TYPICAL EXCEPTIONAL
outcomes (and therefore (and therefore
expected) unexpected)
Unsuccessful EXCEPTIONAL TYPICAL
outcomes (and therefore (and therefore
unexpected) expected)
Given these assumptions, the results for stability were 
expected to reveal an interaction between target and outcome 
conditions. For success items with respect to liked targets, 
subjects would be more likely to explain outcomes in terms of 
stable dispositions (IS or ES responses); with respect to 
less-liked targets, subjects would refer more to unstable 
factors (lU or EU). Conversely, for failure items with respect 
to liked targets, subjects would tend to explain outcomes in 
terms of unstable factors (lU or EU responses); with respect to 
less-liked targets, subjects would refer more to stable factors 
(IS or ES).
The third prediction concerned expectancies of repeats of 
incidents and followed the same model. It was anticipated 
that, with liked targets, subjects would expect successful 
incidents to occur again and failure incidents to be 
exceptional; conversely, with less liked targets, subjects 
would tend to expect repeats of failure incidents but not 
successful ones. In terms of Weiner’s theory regarding 
expectancy shifts (Weiner et al, 1976), it was predicted that 
repeats would be expected more often when the original incident
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had been attributed to stable factors, whether these were with 
regard to self (internal) or other (the target, external).
This is based on the assumption that the kinds of conditions 
held responsible for further occurrences of the same event 
(e.g. social skill) remain constant over time.
The fourth expectation was that the association between 
subjects' scores for success and failure items would be weak 
and insignificant, commensurable with previous research 
findings on locus of control in achievement situations (e.g. 
Crandall et al, 1965).
The final prediction related to correlations between 
targets and was based on the commonsense observation that 
people will often produce different kinds of explanation for 
similar social incidents, depending on the status of the person 
concerned. As Bar-Tal and Bar-Zohar (1977, P 193) have pointed 
out, perception of locus of control may be dependent on 
situational cues so that consistent reactions will occur only 
if the person feels that similar behaviours lead to similar 
consequences across the situations. Accordingly, the scores 
for each target for success and failure items, were not 
expected to be strongly associated.
It was also considered that, across targets and outcomes, 
ratings of response categories (i.e. IS, lU, ES, EU) might vary 
as a function of age and sex. However, previous research did 
not seem to provide any clear basis for making specific 
predictions. In a survey of developmental studies involving 
twelve locus of control scales, Weisz and Stipek (1982) found
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that roughly half the Investigations showed consistent 
developmental increases whilst the remainder revealed mixed 
results, no significant differences, or even developmental 
declines in perceived control. Moreover, the authors argue 
that some developmental findings may be artifacts of scale 
characteristics. In another recent review of the literature, 
Findley and Cooper (1983) concluded that, whilst more internal 
than external beliefs were associated with academic 
achievement, the size of this relationship is small to medium 
and tends to be stronger for adolescents than for adults or 
children. Again, Bialer (196I) found that chronological age 
carried no significant weight when effects of mental age were 
partialled out. However, a recent longitudinal study involving 
97 children aged 8-13 over three years (Sherman, 198%) 
demonstrated significant increases in internal perceptions over 
each succeeding year. In the light of the inconsistency of 
findings, no particular predictions were made as regards 
developmental changes in view of possible variations which 
could arise in relation to interaction between locus of control 
and stability.
Findings regarding sex differences in relation to locus of 
control have also been inconsistent. A recent cross-sectional 
and longitudinal study by (Sherman, 198%) reported no sex 
differences. However, earlier writers on locus of control in 
intellectual achievement settings have suggested that boys 
demonstrate greater internality than girls in relation to their 
successes (Crandall et al, 1 965; Frieze, 1975; Lefcourt, 1976; 
Bar-Tal and Darom, 1979). Dweck et al (1978) found that boys 
tend to attribute their classroom successes to internal and
- 79 -
stable factors and to attribute their failures either to 
external and stable factors (e.g. the teacher's inappropriate 
attitude) or to internal and unstable factors (their own 
effort); girls, in contrast, attribute their academic successes 
to external-stable or internal-unstable factors and their 
failures to internal-stable factors. Sex differences such as 
these may be due to social desirability effects (Stipek and 
Weisz, 1 9 8 1 ), to the different ways in which boys and girls 
strive to maintain feelings of competence, confidence, and 
pride (Phares, 1976; Weiner et al, 1978), or to social 
conditioning (Dweck et al, 1978). The argument is that, as a 
result of children's perceived expectations of themselves, 
girls more than boys come to believe that they cannot succeed 
in academic work, and this in turn leads them to value high 
academic attainment less than boys (Lochel, 1983; Nicholls, 
1975; Dweck et al, 1978). However, in interpersonal 
relationships, girls might be more likely to attribute their 
successes to internal and stable factors. This is because 
their upbringing practices may serve to emphasize the special 
significance for the female gender in developing the skills of 
making and maintaining social relationships, being aware of 
others' feelings, acting tactfully, etc., which may be of less 
importance for boys (Broverman et al, 1970; Rosenkrantz et al, 
1 9 6 8 ). However, there seemed no clear basis on which specific 
predictions could be regarding sex differences.
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METHOD
Subjects. - Sixty children took part in the study, thirty 
aged 8 years (M = 8.%5, SD = .27) and thirty aged 11 years (M = 
11.%S, S^ = .28). (The original intention to involve 32 
subjects at each age was modified since one boy and one girl in 
the younger group failed to complete the measure.) They were 
drawn randomly from two First and Middle schools in a socially 
mixed residential area of a Surrey suburb. Boys and girls were 
equally represented at each age level. It was ensured that all 
subjects were white since some evidence suggests that ethnicity 
affects attributions for successes and failures (Fry and Ghosh, 
1 9 8 0 ). Amongst the younger children, general intelligence 
averaged 107-71 (SD = 10.5 6 ) on Young's Non-Reader's 
Intelligence Test; amongst the older children, the percentages 
falling in each of the five grades for verbal ability provided 
by the AH2 Group Test of General Ability (long-term limit) were 
A:22, B:28, C:37. D:13, E;0, where 10. 20, %0, 20, and 10 per
cent respectively are the norms. These statistics suggest that 
each age group was rather above the national average.
Measure. - The measure consists of sixteen items (arranged
randomly), each of which describes an imaginary interpersonal 
encounter which is relevant to children's experiences (e.g. 
playing games, going on outings). Half the items describe 
successful incidents and half unsuccessful ones; these will be 
referred to as success and failure items respectively. For 
each item, subjects are asked to account for the outcome of the 
situation by selecting one of four responses which were
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designed to reflect both locus of control (internal v. 
external) and the stability of the causal factor. Subjects 
therefore choose between answers which are internal—stable 
(IS), internal-unstable (lU), external-stable (ES) and 
external-unstable (EU). Order of presentation of these choices 
is counterbalanced between items. Each question is answered 
with respect to four targets, described to subjects as follows: 
Ch+: 'Someone about your age with whom you get on really
well '
Ch-; 'Someone about your age with whom you do not get on 
especially well'
Ad+: 'A grown-up with whom you get on really well'
Ad-: 'A grown-up with whom you do not get on especially
well '
Pilot work with three boys and three girls from each age 
group led to minor changes in the wording of some items. The 
final version of the measure appears in Appendix A3-
Procedure for 8 year-olds. - The measure was administered 
individually to each child, who sat at a table with the 
researcher. Interviews were spread over two 25-minute 
sessions, separated by three or four days. This arrangement 
had been found necessary in pilot work in view of the 
children's limited ability to sustain concentration for the 
total number of items on a single occasion. Half the subjects
received the first eight items in Session 1 and the rest in
Session 2, with the order of presentation reversed for the 
other subjects.
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At the start of the first session, the child was told that
he or she would be asked some questions about 'things that
might happen to you when you are with other people'.
Assurances were given that the exercise was not a formal test 
and that there no right or wrong answers. The subject was then 
asked to think of someone familiar to him or her in each of the 
four target categories. Most subjects in this age group took a
little time in Session 1 to do this and wanted to discuss the
appropriateness of some persons identified. This was welcomed 
since it helped to focus the subject's mind on the target as 
well as to confirm the appropriateness of the person chosen.
In order to preserve confidentiality and to minimize 
embarrassment (as well as to avoid criticism from parents), 
subjects were asked to keep the names of targets private - 
though some chose not to do so.
The subject was told that, for each question, he/she would 
be asked to think of one of the four target persons and would 
then be told of an imaginary happening which involved the 
subject and that target. Some of the happenings would 'turn 
out well' and some would 'turn out badly'. It was explained 
that, for each outcome, four possible reasons would be 
suggested, and that as each reason was given a card would be 
placed on the table. Two of these reasons would be 'something 
to do with you' (internal locus of control) and two 'something 
to do with the other person you're thinking about' (external). 
These were represented by cards bearing orange and brown 
characters respectively. (The drawings were bold, unisex 
outlines with no facial features. The backgrounds were either 
blue or yellow to distinguish between stable and unstable
— 83 —
causes within each locus of control category.)
The subject was then asked to think of the Ch+ target 
while the first of the imaginary incidents (item 1) was 
related. For motivational reasons, the subject was allowed to 
make comments (e.g. by describing a similar event actually 
experienced). As each of the four possible reasons for the 
outcome were read, the card symbolizing that reason was placed 
on the table. When all cards had been placed, the reasons were 
repeated while the investigator pointed to the appropriate 
card. The subject was then asked to place a counter on the 
card which represented the preferred answer, which was 
confirmed verbally to test understanding. The subject was also 
asked to say whether the happening would be likely to turn out 
the same way another time. This procedure was then repeated 
with respect to each of the other targets. The order of 
presentation of the four types of answers were counterbalanced 
across items to minimize the risk of response set.
Procedure for 11 year-olds. - For the older subjects, the 
measure was administered to groups of five in a single session 
of about %5 minutes. The introductory remarks were the same as 
those made to the younger group, after which each subject was 
given a card 5 inches by 3 inches, divided into four boxes 
marked ’A' to 'D ', and asked to write in these the names of 
people representing the four targets. In order to preserve 
confidentiality, subjects were told that the names they would 
enter would be used just for reference purposes during the 
exercise and that they would be destroying the card at the 
conclusion of the session. Booklets consisting of sixteen A%
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yellow sheets, each listing the four* choice responses for an 
item, were then distributed. The order of responses was 
counterbalanced across items.
For each item, the investigator explained that he would be 
asking subjects to think of one of the targets (e.g. 'I might 
say to you, "Now think of Person C"’) and that he would read a 
short description of an imaginary happening involving that 
target and the subject. Subjects would then be asked to read 
the four possible reasons for the outcome of the incident and 
decide which one seemed most appropriate in relation to the 
target, the letter representing the target being entered in the 
box by the chosen answer. The procedure would then be repeated 
in relation to each of the remaining targets. It was 
emphasized that each question was to be evaluated independently 
in relation to the target under consideration, and that the 
same response could be chosen for more than one target, if 
desired. Thus a box by a chosen response could contain one, 
two, three or even four letters inserted by the subject. A 
practice item was illustrated on the blackboard and questions 
about the procedure were invited and answered.
In order to control for effects that might inadvertently 
occur if subjects were to make their own responses in relation 
to each target in the same order each time, the order of 
targets was randomized for each item.
The purpose of reading out the descriptions, rather than 
presenting them in written form with the choice answers, was 
three-fold. First, it would reduce the amount of reading which
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subjects were required to undertake. Secondly, it would 
control the pace of the administration and the order in which 
targets were identified. Thirdly, it would allow opportunity 
for subjects to ask questions if they did not understand the 
description or the procedure.
Repeat expectancies were, not elicited from the older 
subjects since the younger group had found the constant 
repetition of this question tedious (and, perhaps as a 
consequence, reliabilities were not high). This did not matter 
very much since the hypothesis concerning repeat expectancies 
was not central to the study.
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RESULTS
Scoring. “ With respect to each of the four targets, subjects 
had responded to eight success and eight failure items. Each 
answer was an endorsement of one of the internality-stability 
combinations (IS, ES, lU or EU) and scored one point for that 
category. For each response category, each subject thus 
generated a matrix of eight scores, enabling eight sub-scales 
to be produced, as follows:
Ch + Ch- Ad + Ad-
Success items
Failure items
Mean scores and their standard deviations are given in Appendix 
B2.1.
Descriptive statistics. - Split-half (Spearman Brown) 
reliability coefficients for IS, lU, ES and EU scores were 
computed separately with respect to each target and outcome. 
From the results presented in Table Ü.1, it can be seen that 
all correlations were significant at the five per cent level or 
better on a one-tailed test, falling within the range .31 to 
.9 0 . The fact that each sub-scale contains only eight items 
militates against high internal consistency indices, and it 
would seem that within sub-scales the items are somewhat 
heterogeneous. At each age, reliability is higher for external
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Table IX . 1
SPLIT-HALF CORRELATIONS FOR SUCCESS AND FAILURE ITEMS 
WITH RESPECT TO EACH TARGET PERSON
Ch +
Target
Ch-
Person 
Ad + Ad-
(a) 8 years
IS - success . 49** . 66** . 46** . 36*
IS - failure . 43** . 49** . 58** . 66**
lU - success . 56** . 45** . 48** . 58**
lU - failure . 39* . 53** . 59** . 58**
ES - success . 70** . 56** .49** . 51**
ES - failure . 77** . 63** . 55** . 59**
EU - success . 77** . 43** . 54** . 39*
EU - failure . 64** , 64** . 68** I 86**
REIS - success . 66** . 51** . 50** . 49**
REIS - failure . 50** . 44** . 35 . 64**REIU - success . 39* . 41** . 37* . 36*
REIU - failure . 33* . 30* . 21 . 25REES - success . 33* . 19 . 42** . 60**
REES - failure . 39* . 67** . 25 . 33*REEU - success . 19 . 24 . 27 . 35*REEU - failure . 3Ü* . 40* . 18 . 23
(b) 11 years
IS - success . 49** . 47** . 58** . 33*
IS - failure . 31* . 50** . 56** . 33*lU - success . 40* . 53** . 64** . 40*
lU - failure . 63** . 71** . 35* . 35*
ES - success . 71** . 79** . 72** . 52**
ES - failure . 48* . 43** . 55** . 41**EU - success . 90** . 77** . 78** . 50**
EU - failure . 45** . 40* . 50** . 39*
Key; IS1 = internal -stable lU = internal -unstable
ESi = external -stable EU = external -unstable
REIS = repeat-expectancies for internal-stable scores 
REIU = repeat-exectancies for internal-unstable scores 
REES = repeat-expectancies for external-stable scores 
REEU = repeat-expectancies for external un-stable scores
* P < .05 ** p < .01 (one-tailed)
responses, suggesting that children of this age may be more 
certain of their external attributions. At 11 years, the 
estimates in relation to adult targets are generally higher 
with respect to liked others, suggesting that at this age 
subjects are less sure of their reasons for successes and
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failures with less-liked adults. Table 4.1 also gives the 
internal consistency estimates for repeat-expectancies in the 
case of the eight year-olds. Here reliability turned out to be 
weaker, coefficients ranging from .18 to .6 7 , with ten of the 
thirty-two results failing to reach significance.
In short, it would appear that the internal consistencies 
of the internality-stability responses in the new measure were 
generally moderate and significant, whilst those of the 
repeat-expectancies (younger subjects) were low.
Content validity had been tested by asking two judges 
(final year undergraduates in Education) to assign items to 
success-failure categories and to assign the choice responses 
to locus of control-stability categories. Agreement was 100 
per cent. In order to make an estimate of the concurrent 
validity of the measure, the older subjects had also been given 
the Bialer scale to complete in a separate session. The 
questions were read out to groups of five, subjects completing 
response sheets by ringing 'yes' or 'no' (negative choice 
preceding positive choice for half the items). Half the 
subjects received this scale two weeks before the new measure 
and half two weeks later. The thirty-two correlations computed 
between total Bialer scores and scores in the new tests ranged 
from .27 to .41. Although low, twenty reached significance 
beyond the five per cent level. This was regarded as 
acceptable since, given the very different natures of the two 
measures, high association could not be expected.
Hypotheses. - For each of the dependent variables, a 2 (age)
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X 2 (sex) X 4 (target person) x 2 (outcome quality) ANOVA was 
computed, with repeated measures on the last two factors. A 
summary of significant effects is provided in Table 4.2 (full 
tables in Appendix B2.2).
Table 4.2 
SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT EFFECTS
Effect IS 
P <
lU 
P <
ES 
P <
EU 
P <
Age
Sex
Age X  sex 
Target
Age X target 
Sex X target 
Age X sex x target
Outcome
Age X outcome
Sex X outcome
Age X  sex x outcome
Target x outcome 
Age X  target x outcome 
Sex X target x outcome 
Age X  sex x  target 
X outcome
. 001
001
001
0501
05
001
001
. 001
. 01 
. 025 
. 025
. 001 
. 025
. 01
. 001
. 001 . 01
. 025
. 001
. 05
To investigate the significant results further, various 
tests for simple effects were computed, whilst planned 
comparisons of means were made using a priori t-tests, 
following the procedure in Kirk (1968, pp 266-268 and 303-306), 
with p set at .05. Taking each hypothesis in turn, the results 
were as follows;
(1) Across targets, more internality was expected for success 
than for failure items. The results are presented in Fig. 4.1, 
from which it appears that the differences were as anticipated
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Fia.a.i
MEAN INTERNALITY SCORES FOR SUCCESS V. FAILURE 
ITEMS ACROSS TARGET PERSONS
(a) Stable causes (IS)
8
7
6
5
3
2
1
0
girlsboysgirlsboys
8 years 11 years
(b) Unstable causes (lU)
8
7
6
5
h
3
2
1
0
girlsboysgirlsboys
\ I
\success items N
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failure items
for the IS scores but not consistently for lU. Analysis of 
variance demonstrated that, consistent with the prediction, the 
effect for outcome in the case of IS was highly significant (F 
[1,563 = 6Ü-.88, p < .001). This was qualified by significant
interactions with age (F [1,56] = Ü.59, P < .05), with sex (F 
[1,56] = 10.05, P < .01), and with age x sex (F [1,56] = Ü.23,
p < .05). Follow-up tests showed that differences were 
significantly greater among the younger subjects and among the 
girls, those for the older boys not reaching significance. 
However, for the lU scores, no relevant significant effects 
emerged, although differences for the younger boys approached 
significance (F [1,56] for age x sex x outcome interaction = 
3.48, p < .10).
(2) For successful outcomes, IS and ES attributions would be 
more likely with respect to liked targets, and lU and EU 
attributions would be more likely with respect to less-liked 
targets. For failure items, the situation would be the 
reverse. As can be seen from Fig. 4.JL, the pattern of results
across age and sex groups gives consistent support for the 
hypothesis, with the exception of IS scores for unsuccessful 
outcomes where attributions were very low for both liked and 
less-liked target persons. The trend is more clear for 
attributions in relation to successful outcomes. For all 
response categories, the target x outcome interactions were 
significant, as expected (F [3,168] = 11.51, P < ,001 for IS;
29.80, p < .001 for ES; 5.35, P < .01 for lU; 28.68, p < .001 
for EU).
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F i e .  4 . 2
MEAN SCORES FOR LIKED V. LESS-LIKED TARGET PERSONS
(a) Successes
3
2
1
0
IS ES lU EU
Stable causes Unstable causes
(b) Failures
3
2
1
0
IS ES EU
Stable causes Unstable causes
Liked others \\
\  \
Less-liked others
However, these interactions were sienificantly qualified 
for each dependent variable, as indicated below.
Detailed data profiles with respect to each dependent 
variable are given in Figs. U.3 to Ü.6. From these, it seems 
that the trend predicted by the hypothesis is clearest in
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relation to ES scores (Fie. Ü./i ) . Where exceptions to the 
pattern occur, differentiation tends to be slight.
For IS (Fig. Ü.3), the interaction was significantly 
qualified in a four-way interaction involving age and sex (F 
[3,168] = 6 .9 6 , p < .001). Comparison of means using t-tests 
showed that differences between liked and less-liked targets 
were significant for successes except for adult targets amongst 
the older boys and younger girls; for failure items, however, 
differences between targets were insignificant.
For ES (Fig. H.k), the significant target x outcome 
interaction was significantly qualified in a three-way 
interaction involving age (F [3,168] = 3.51, p < .025).
However, the configuration of data is much the same at each 
age, though it is less pronounced for the younger subjects, 
especially with respect to adult targets for failure incidents.
For lU (Fig. U.5), the target x outcome interaction was 
qualified by significant interactions with age (F [3,168] =
3.43, P < .025) and with sex (F [3,168] = 3.12, P < .025). As 
can be seen in Fig. Ü . 5*, the outcome x target interaction 
applied only to the older children, amongst whom tests for 
simple effects showed it to be significant for boys only; but 
clearly, as the histograms reveal, the pattern is essentially 
the same amongst girls at that age.
For EU (Fig. /I. 6), the target x outcome interaction was 
qualified in a moderately significant four-way interaction 
involving age and sex (F [3,168] = 2.98, p < .05). Comparison
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of means using t-tests showed that differences between liked 
and less-liked targets were significant for successful 
incidents with the exception of the younger girls* attributions 
in relation to adult targets; for failures, the differences 
were significant only for the younger boys in relation to adult 
targets. However, the trend was consistent with the hypothesis 
in all other failure cases except for the younger girls where 
differences were virtually nil.
In short, the general pattern of results supports the 
hypothesis. The main exceptions occur in the IS scores in 
relation to failure incidents, and in the lU scores among the 
younger subjects. In these cases, differentiation between 
targets is slight, and attributions are relatively low.
(3) Repeats of successful incidents were expected with regard 
to Ch+ and Ad+ rather than Ch- and Ad-; repeats of failure 
incidents were expected with regards to Ch- and Ad- rather than 
Ch+ and Ad+. Additionally, repeats were expected to be 
associated with stable causes attributed to the original 
outcome. For each item, and with respect to each target, the 
younger subjects were asked to indicate whether they would 
expect the incident to have the same outcome ’another time*.
The percentage of positive responses in relation to each 
dependent variable is given in Table &.3. Consistent with the 
hypothesis, expectancy shifts were related to outcome and 
target category, as a comparison between the two horizontal 
groupings in Table Ü.3 shows. The average percentage for 
repeats-expectancies was 7U in cases of unsurprising outcomes 
(i.e. successful incidents with Ch+ and Ad+ and failures with
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Fig. a.6
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Ch- and Ad-) compared with U5 per cent for surprising outcomes 
(i.e. successes with Ch- and Ad- and failures with Ch+ and Ad+ 
(Table Ü.3, col. 2)). Further, a consistent pattern of 
repeat-expectancies emerged in relation to category of 
explanation for the original event. As anticipated, when 
subjects expected an incident to occur with the same outcome 
another time, the cause of the original event was more often 
seen as stable (IS or ES), as a comparison of columns 3 & & 
with IX & 3 of Table Ü.3 reveals. Using McNemar's formula for 
differences between correlated proportions (Guilford and 
Fruchter, 1973, pp.164-165), differences between the 
percentages of repeat-expectancies in cases of stable v, 
unstable responses were generally significant, but in no case 
were they so for responses in the same stability category 
(Table 4.3, right-hand columns). However, since, as we have 
seen, the internal consistency of the repeat-expectancy scores 
were rather low, these results must be treated with caution.
(4) Success and failure scores were not expected to be 
significantly associated. The statistics presented in Table 
4.4 give support to this prediction, correlations between 
success and failure items ranging from -.28 to +.40, with only 
one of the thirty-two results significant.
(5) Correlations between targets were not expected to be high, 
any significant links being between targets in the same 
'relationship* category. The results presented in Table 4.5 
show that correlations between targets ranged between -.46 and 
+.57, but were within two points of zero in the majority of 
cases. Only nine of the 96 correlations are significant; of
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Table 4.4
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SUCCESS AND FAILURE
Target Person 
Ch+ Ch- Ad+
ITEMS
Ad-
IS 8 years . 09 -. 40* . 04 . 07
11 years . 13 -.15 20 . 04
lU 8 years . 30 -. 24 . 06 -. 19
11 years -.15 .12 . 17 . 24
ES 8 years -.16 . 18 . 18 . 16
11 years — .28 -. 28 . 17 . 00
EU 8 years . 11 — .02 — . 14 . 21
11 years . 00 — .02 —. 24 -. 11
* p < .05 (two-tailed test)
Table 4.5
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN TARGETS
Ch+/Ch- Ch+/Ad+ Ch+/Ad- Ch-/Ad+ Ch-/Ad- Ad+/Ad-
8 years - success items
IS . 01 . OS -.46** .08 . 15 -.37*
lU . 06 — .06 .02 -.37 -. 09 . 25ES . 05 -.30 -.19 -.21 -.07 . 00
EU -.29 - . 02 .11 -.28 -. 10 15
8 years - failure items
IS . 12 . 23 .02 .28 -. 01 . 14
lU -. 24 . 22 .00 .24 . 06 . 18
ES -.46** . 10 — .11 — .11 . 57** -.17
EU -.50** . 25 .00 .00 . 27 . 00
11 years - success items
IS . 00 . 25 .07 -.12 -. 22 -. o6
lU . 06 -. 06 .02 -.07 . 01 . 25
ES . 04 . 21 -.07 -.46** . 11 -. 20
EU -. 32* . 27 -.20 .22 -. 16 -. 32
11 years - failure items
IS .29 . 42* .00 .22 . 30 . 12
lU -. 12 . 57** -.15 .09 . 16 -. 21
ES -.16 . 19 -.21 -.22 -. 19 - . 14
EU . 00 . 15 .00 -.25 . 02 . 00
* P < .05 ** P < .01 (two-tailed tests)
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these, the three positive links are in relation to targets in 
similar 'relationship* categories (i.e. between liked or 
between less-liked targets) whilst the six negative links are 
between targets in dissimilar 'relationship* categories. The 
results were thus consistent with the hypothesis.
AGE DIFFERENCES FOR EACH RESPONSE CATEGORY 
ACROSS TARGETS AND OUTCOMES
20
10
EUESlUIS
11 years8 years
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Age and sex differences. - The mean score of each locus of 
control-stability category is shown in Fig. il. 7. As the figure 
shows, subjects at each age made more external than internal 
attributions. For age, the increase in lU attributions was 
highly significant (F [1,50] = 17.12, p < .001), and the
decrease in EU attributions was also significant (F [l,s6] =
6.02, p < .01). No significant main effects for age arose for 
IS or ES attributions. Significant age-related differences 
were thus confined to attributions when linked to perceptions 
of unstable causes. No significant effects emerged for sex or 
sex X  age.
DISCUSSION
The internality and stability measure for social behaviour 
yielded mainly moderate internal consistency estimates, 
external attributions emerging as the more reliable. The range 
of the split-half correlations (.31 to .90) seems consistent 
with comparable statistics reported for children’s locus of 
control measures in academic achievement (Crandall et al, 1965, 
Halpin and Ottinger, 1983). Nevertheless, the incidence of 
limited internal consistency estimates suggests that the 
measure needs further refinement. It was thought that children 
would relate more easily to specific events than to 
generalities, but the wording of items in this way may have 
held down the internal consistency estimates since a particular 
incident could be real for some children but not for others.
For instance, the item concerning being cheered up when ill in 
bed provoked a few of the eight year-olds to remark that they
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had never been so confined! Undoubtedly, reliability would be 
improved through the elimination of non-discriminating items by 
means of larger-scale sampling and item analysis. An increase 
in the number of items might also be expected to improve 
reliability, but any potential benefits might be outweighed by 
effects of loss in children's concentration.
The correlations between scores for the new measure and 
the Bialer scale (r's = .27 to .Hi) were low or very modest, 
though almost two-thirds were significant. However, a high 
association would be surprising in view of the different nature 
of the items and the different response procedures. The 
highest correlation obtained is comparable to that found 
between the Bialer and Nowicki-Strickland scale (r = .Ul) with 
a sample of twenty-nine 9-11 year-olds (Nowicki and Strickland, 
1973).
The large measure of support which was received for the 
hypotheses throw some doubt on the notion that locus of control 
is a unidimensional construct, even in the limited context of 
social behaviour involving children. The experiment 
demonstrated the utility of distinguishing between categories 
of stimulus person, between successful and unsuccessful 
outcomes, and between attributions of causes to stable and 
unstable factors.
The expectation that, across targets, subjects would take 
credit for their successes rather than their failures received 
clear support where the cause of outcome was perceived as 
stable over time (i.e. the subject's ability or skill in
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maintaining harmonious social relationships), though 
differences were greater amongst the younger children and 
girls. However, discrimination between outcome conditions did 
not seem to occur when the cause of outcome was seen as 
unstable (e.g. the subject's mood). These variations in 
findings can be interpreted in terms of the significance of the 
attributions for the maintenance of self-esteem (Nicholls,
1975: Arkin et al, 1976; Bradley, 1978; Zuckerman, 1979:
Whitley & Frieze, I9 8 5). When the cause of outcome is seen as 
contingent upon one's social skill, then feelings of pride are 
enhanced and those of shame minimized if successes but not 
failures are attributed to self. When the cause is seen as 
unstable, less is at stake in terms of self-esteem, since 
occasional changes in mood are not seen as reprehensible. The 
fact that, for internal-stable scores, differences in 
attributions between outcomes were greater in the case of the 
eight year-olds suggests that younger children may be less 
confident in social situations of the kind depicted, and 
therefore feel a greater need to discriminate in their 
attributions for successes and failures in order to preserve 
self-esteem.
The predictive value of the model of typical and 
exceptional incidents, outlined in the Experimental Overview 
section, was generally supported in the results, though with 
certain exceptions. With respect to liked others, the causes 
of successful events, whether attributed internally or 
externally, were more likely to be perceived as stable, 
presumably because they were regarded as typical and therefore 
expected. With respect to less-liked others, causes of
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successful events were more likely to be seen as unstable, 
presumably because they were regarded as untypical and 
therefore unexpected. This pattern of differentiation in 
relation to successful outcomes was as much less evident, 
however, when the attribution was internal and the perceived 
cause was unstable. In the case of unsuccessful incidents, the 
data pattern was generally reversed, as anticipated, but less 
marked. Children seem generally clearer about reasons for 
their successes than their failures. The expected pattern for 
unsuccessful incidents was most clearly demonstrated in 
relation to external-stable responses, and least clearly in the 
case of internal-stable responses. The fact that the 
reliability estimates were higher for external than for 
internal responses at each age (Table H.l) no doubt contributed 
to the more consistent pattern in the case of external scores. 
With internal-stable scores, the low amounts of attribution for 
failure incidents left little room for differentiation between 
targets. It is difficult to attribute unsuccessful 
interpersonal encounters to self, and especially so to one’s 
lack of social ability (the stable factor).
The model of typical and untypical incidents also received 
support in relation to expectancies of repeats of incidents.
The younger subjects, with whom the prediction was tested, were 
more likely to anticipate repeats of successful incidents in 
relation to liked targets and to anticipate repeats of failures 
in relation to less-liked targets. In addition, the theory of 
expectancy shifts proposed by Weiner et al (1976) in relation 
to academic achievements received support in the present 
context of social behaviour. It was found that subjects were
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more likely to expect an event to be successful or unsuccessful 
another time if they had attributed the outcome to stable 
rather than to unstable factors, regardless of their locus of 
control tendencies. It was the stability of causal attribution 
rather than the locus of control which was significant in 
expectancy shifts. Presumably, attributions of outcomes to 
stable factors encourages a belief that the incident in 
question will have the same outcome on future occasions (Valle 
and Frieze, 1976; Weiner et al, 1976; Frieze, igSl). The 
exception to this was in relation to liked targets: here, not
surprisingly, repeats of successful (though not failure) 
incidents were generally anticipated by subjects.
With the exception of just one of the thirty-two 
correlations computed, the association between scores for 
successes and failures was, as expected, weak and 
insignificant, regardless of the internality and stability of 
response. This replicates the findings of Crandall et al 
(1 9 6 5 ) in academic achievement settings. Also as predicted, 
the association between targets was usually weak, the few 
significant correlations being positive when both targets were 
in the same status category (i.e. either the liked or 
less-liked) and negative when targets were of different status.
Developmental differences emerged in various ways.
Although there was a general tendency for internality to 
increase with age and externality to decline, the differences 
reached statistical significance only when the cause of outcome 
was seen as unstable. This finding may help to explain the 
inconsistency of age differences in the literature (Weisz and
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Stipek, 1 9 8 2) since results for general internality scores 
could mask different emphases in the stability factor. Age 
differences also occurred in relation to sex, target, and 
outcome quality. Higher internality ratings for success rather 
than failure items occurred amongst the younger subjects, 
presumably a reflection of their lack of maturity in dealing 
with situations which go against them. At the same time, older 
children were generally more likely to discriminate between 
targets in their ratings for successful and unsuccessful 
incidents, an indication of their greater sensitivity to the 
status of the other person.
Finally, a word about the administration of the measure. 
Although the group arrangements for the older subjects were 
easy to manage, more imaginative procedures which make less 
demand on attention and memory could be devised for younger 
children. One effect of providing the older subjects with 
written choice responses was to make these more accessible than 
they had been to the younger subjects, and these different 
administrative arrangement might account to some extent for 
apparent differences with age. It must also be emphasized that 
the four choices of explanation for the outcomes of social 
encounters are not exhaustive. A more open-ended approach 
might reveal kinds of explanations which bears greater 
relationship to real life situations (Frieze, 198I).
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Chapter 5
Experiment 3
LEVELS OF RESPONSIBILITY ATTRIBUTION - MAIN INVESTIGATION
INTRODUCTION
This chapter is the report of an experiment concerning 
attribution of responsibility (AR) in children and young 
adults, and follows up the pilot work of Experiment 1. It 
includes a partial replication of an investigation by Ferguson 
and Rule (1980) which tested a hypothesis, based on the ideas 
of Heider (1958), that older subjects would attribute less 
responsibility whilst also discriminating more between four 
levels of commission, viz. Causality, Foreseeability, 
Intentionality, and Justification (defined in Ch 2, pp20-22).
Ferguson and Rule (1 9 8 0 ) found, as expected, that 13-15 
year-olds discriminated significantly between Heider’s levels, 
whilst the 7-9 year-olds were relatively undifferentiated and 
attributed more responsibility at each level.
Since the results of the pilot study (Expt. 1) had 
suggested that the vignettes adapted from Ferguson and Rule 
(1 9 8 0) would make a suitable AR measure for use with English 
children, it was decided to use these for the main study. 
However, as was pointed out in the Discussion of Experiment 1, 
the internal consistency estimates during pilot work gave
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reason to believe that the two questions concerning cause and 
blame had not been adequately operationalized. The purpose of 
the first question in the Pilot Study, 'How much do you think 
that (actor) caused (outcome)?' had been to ascertain the 
extent to which subjects viewed the harm as a consequence of 
the actor's behaviour (Houston and Chambers, 1981, Shultz and 
Schleifer, 1 9 8 3 ), regardless of any moral evaluation of the 
action, which was assumed to be the subject of the second 
question, 'How much you you think that (actor) should be blamed 
for (outcome)?'. During subsequent informal discussion, 
however, it is emerged that subjects had experienced difficulty 
in conceptually separating the blame and cause questions. Some 
assumed that the term 'cause' carried implications of moral 
responsibility, and some interpreted the term 'blame' in a 
non-moral and strictly causal way. Adults sometimes 
demonstrate these tendencies, as when they 'blame' a very young 
child or an animal for causing a motor accident by running out 
into the road - or, indeed, when they 'blame' the weather for 
some calamity. In common parlance, there is no logical 
contradiction in the statement 'I accept blame for causing X's 
injury, but I did not intend to hurt X'. In a recent 
attribution study involving children of 5-11 years, Schleifer 
et al (1 9 8 3 ) point out that the formulation 'How much ought x 
to be blamed for y ? ' is difficult for some children to 
understand, and Sosis (197&) with adults found that a question 
involving guilt was sometimes interpreted in terms of causation 
rather than blameworthiness.
In view of this potential confusion, it was decided that 
the questions to be used in the main study should be re-worded
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in order to make the distinctions between personal causality 
and moral responsibility more apparent and accessible. As 
explained in the Introduction to Experiment 1, ratings for 
moral and causal responsibility would be expected to elicit 
different configurations of data. Moral judgements should be 
more sensitive to foreseeability and motivational information, 
whereas perceptions of cause should focus more exclusively on 
the actor's intentions (personal v. impersonal causality). 
Further, while little or no attribution of moral responsibility 
would be expected at the level of Causality, perceptions of 
causation would be expected even at this level since the 
outcome is generated by the actor, though unintentionally. 
However, assuming that subjects will perceive people as agents, 
following rules which will satisfy their interests (Mischel, 
1 9 6 9 ). ratings for causal attribution should be higher at the 
levels involving intentionality since the event produced by the 
actor will be perceived as inextricably linked with his or her 
intentions. In short, for causal attribution, the data curve 
across the levels of commission should be fairly high with 
somewhat greater attribution at Intentionality and (less so) at 
Justification; for attribution of moral responsibility, 
however, the data curve would be expected to rise sharply from 
near zero attribution at Causality, through Foreseeability to 
Intentionality and fall off at Justification when mitigating 
circumstances would be taken into account.
It was presumably this kind of distinction between 
attribution of causality and attribution of moral 
responsibility that was intended in a developmental study of 
responsibility for object-damage by Harris (1977), who
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predicted convergence of the age groups* attributions at the 
level of foreseeable commission in cases of causal attribution 
but not until the level of Intentionality in judgements of 
moral responsibility (’naughtiness*). Similarly, in their 
study of children and adults concerning responsibility for 
injury, Fincham and Jaspars (1979). believing that judgement of 
causality is not primarily an evaluative event and may 
therefore result in an earlier consensus between ages, 
predicted that a convergence of age groups would occur for 
their blame question only at the level of Intentionality, 
whereas for the cause question convergence might be evident at 
the Causality or Foreseeability levels. Although the results 
of both these studies were consistent with the predictions, the 
data patterns given in the figures suggest that differentiation 
was more than might be expected had subjects interpreted the 
cause question as one demanding factual reasoning rather than a 
value judgement.
The questions used in the present experiment were 
formulated as a result of informal conversations with children 
after the pilot study interviews. These had suggested that 
attribution of causality might be more successfully 
operationalized by the question ’How much do you think that 
(outcome) was because of what (actor) did?'. At the same time, 
it was considered that the moral implications of the blame 
question could be made more explicit. It is extraordinarily 
difficult to find terms which are both meaningful for children 
and also convey the notion of moral reprehensibility rather 
than societal disapproval. This could be a problem with words 
like 'naughty' (e.g. Piaget, 1932; Chandler et al, 1973:
- 112 -
Harris, 1977), 'bad' (Rule et al, 197%: Gottlieb et al, 1977; 
Suis and Kalle, 1978; Ferguson and Rule, 1980) and 'mean' 
(Rotenberg, 1980). Schleifer et al (1983), who ran into an 
interpretational problem with a blame question, chose 'bad' as 
the operative term, but appreciated that this could attract 
answers which evaluated the actor's general character rather 
than his blameworthiness for a particular incident. In an 
attempt to elicit the subjects' genuine response, it was 
decided to re-formulate the blame question to read 'How angry 
do you think we should be with (actor) for (outcome)?' since it 
was thought that subjects would associate feelings of anger 
with moral blameworthiness. The punishment question, however, 
would remain in its original form, i.e. 'How much do you think 
that (actor) deserves to be punished for (outcome)?' since the 
internal consistency estimates for this dependent variable had 
been satisfactory in pilot work.
EXPERIMENTAL OVERVIEW AND HYPOTHESES
Whereas the study by Ferguson and Rule (1980) compared 
responses of pre-adolescent and adolescent children, the 
present investigation involved groups of eight and eleven 
year-olds plus college students. Further, as in the Pilot 
Study, but in contrast to Ferguson and Rule, a distinction was 
made between perceptions of cause and moral responsibility. 
Additionally, separate analyses were made for evaluations of 
blame and punishment, rather than treating these together as 
'moral responsibility'. Again as in the Pilot Study, an
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attempt was made to explain individual differences in terms of 
locus of control and intellectual ability.
Methodologically, however, the present experiment differed 
from the Pilot Study in two respects. First, the wording of 
the first two stimulus questions was changed in the manner 
described in the previous section in order to distinguish more 
explicitly between perceptions of causality and evaluations of 
moral responsibility. Secondly, the Bialer-Cromwell measure of 
locus of control was replaced by the internality-stability 
measure developed in Experiment 2. Like most of the 
Bialer-Cromwell items, those in the new instrument are 
concerned essentially with interpersonal behaviour and not with 
achievement in academic settings. However, separate sub-scales 
produce scores for successful and unsuccessful outcomes and 
with respect to four targets - a child and an adult who are 
liked and a child and an adult who are less-liked. Assessment 
is also made of the stability of causal attribution.
Attributions of responsibility and causality - In their moral 
evaluations, it was anticipated that younger subjects would 
attribute more responsibility than older subjects (except for 
intentional commission) across levels since discrimination 
would be less sophisticated. In particular, it was expected 
that the eight year-olds would be less likely to discriminate 
in their judgements of predictable and unpredictable accidents 
(Causality v. Foreseeability levels). Thus, significant 
effects for age, stimulus levels, and the interaction of these 
two factors were expected for the two moral questions. In the 
case of the cause question, however, convergence of age groups
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was expected at the lower* AR levels since judgements of 
causality do not require the more sophisticated reasoning 
required for moral evaluation. For the reasons outlined in the 
Introduction, the data curve for the cause question was 
expected to be relatively high across the stimulus levels, and 
also less differentiated, since a measure of causal attribution 
would be expected even with respect to unintended outcomes 
(impersonal causality).
It was also decided to investigate the relationship 
between the three dependent measures. It was expected that 
judgements of responsibility in terms of blame and punishment 
would be strongly associated, as found by Ferguson and Rule 
(1 9 8 0 ), since each is a dimension of moral attribution. It was
also anticipated that causation, blame and punishment would be
linked in the manner found in studies with adults by Shultz et
al (1 981) and Fincham and Shultz (198I) (Note 1). These
revealed a correlation pattern whereby judgements of causation 
were strongly linked to those of blame, which in turn were 
linked to those concerning restitution and punishment, the 
direct relation between causal judgements and
restitution/punishment judgements being less strong. Results 
from a study by Shaw and Reitan (1969) had also shown that 
blame provided a basis for judgements of punishment. The 
entailment hypothesis makes theoretical sense on the grounds 
that moral culpability normally presupposes the establishment 
of a causal connection between the perpetrator and the effect, 
whilst considerations of punishment should arise only in cases 
where moral blame has been established (Hart and Honoré,
1 9 5 9). Since, according to this entailment model, punishment
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Is linked to cause through blame, the relation between cause 
and punishment was expected to be less strong once blame was 
partialled out.
Individual differences - In the Pilot Study with eleven 
year-olds, no consistent relationship had been found between 
intelligence and a propensity to discriminate between stimulus 
levels. However, as reported in Chapter 2, the evidence 
concerning the relationship between intelligence, on the one 
hand, and the ability to take intention and motives into 
account, on the other, is equivocal (cf. Keasey, 1975 and Shaw 
and Schneider, 1969a). For the present study, a moderate 
association between intelligence and the ability to 
discriminate between levels was considered likely, especially 
amongst the younger children who would be expected to find the 
task of differentiating amongst the levels of commission more 
demanding in terms of information processing.
The pilot study had also failed to reveal an association 
between locus of control and AR. However, since, as explained 
in the Introduction to the last chapter, it was considered that 
this failure might have been due to certain shortcomings in the 
Bialer measure, an association was anticipated in the present 
study, using the newly developed instrument described in 
Experiment 2. The hypothesis was based on the assumption that 
subjects would perceive the normal relationships between actor 
and victim in the stories to be friendly. The incidents 
portrayed would represent failures at the levels of Causality 
and Foreseeability, since outcomes in these cases would be 
unintentional, but success at the level of Intentionality. The
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position at the level of Justification would be somewhat 
ambiguous since the injury sustained by the actor's friend was 
presumably not intended, though the act of aggression was so.
It was therefore anticipated that, at the levels of Causality 
and Foreseeability and (probably) Justifioaton, an association 
would be found between AR and internality scores with respect 
to the 'liked* child target for unsuccessful incidents (Ch+ 
failure); at the level of Intentionality, the association 
would be in relation to successful incidents (Ch+ success). 
Since Heider (1958) assumed that an observer attributes the 
cause to stable factors in the actor or in the environment, it 
was predicted that the above effect would be marked with 
respect to internal-stable rather than internal-unstable scores 
on the new measure.
METHOD
Subjects. - The sample consisted of 96 subjects comprising 32
children aged 8 years (M = 8.Ü5, SD = .27) and 32 aged 11 years 
(M = 11.&8, SD = .28) plus a group of 32 adult students, with 
sexes represented equally at each age. The child subjects were 
the same as those in Experiment 2, with the addition of one boy 
and one girl at each age level. They came from mixed social 
backgrounds with an ability spread which somewhat 
over-represented the most able and under-represented the 
least-able in the populations. The adults were randomly drawn 
from post-graduates taking the one-year teacher education 
course at an institute of Higher education in London. This
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clearly gave a biased adult sample, but it did provide a base 
for examining the extent to which children’s evaluations 
departed from those of young, educated adults.
Materials. - The stimulus stories used to assess AR were the
same as those used in the pilot investigation (Expt. 1), being
adapted from Ferguson and Rule (1 9 8 0 ). As before, four levels
of commission (Causality, Foreseeability, Intentionality, and 
Justification) were manipulated within the context of eight 
story themes (to control for story context) which described a 
child actor of the same sex as the subject committing mild 
aggression against another child of the same sex. Subjects 
received two stories representing each level of commission, 
with order of presentation counter-balanced as in Experiment 
1. For each story, subjects were asked to respond to questions 
designed to assess AR with respect to cause, blame and
punishment, worded in the revised manner explained in the
Introduction to this chapter. To test the effectiveness of the 
revised cause question, the 11 year-olds were also given the 
wording used in the Pilot Study (’How much do you think that 
(actor) caused (outcome)?’) as well as the new wording (’How 
much do you think that (outcome) was because of what (actor) 
did’?).
To test the relationship between general intelligence and 
the ability to discriminate between the stimulus levels, use 
was made of data supplied by the school authorities from 
Young’s Non-Readers Intelligence Test in the case of the eight 
year-olds and the verbal ability sub-scale of the AH2 Group 
Test of General Ability (long-term limit) in the case of the 11
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year-olds. To test the relationship between locus of control 
and A R , use was made of data from the internality-stability 
measure collected in the course of Experiment 2.
Procedure. - All children were interviewed individually and
were assured that they were not participating in a formal 
test. They were told that they would hear some stories, after 
which they would be asked two or three questions to make sure 
that the events of the story had been understood; they would 
then be asked their opinions of the main character’s actions. 
At the conclusion of each story (which was read twice), 
subjects were asked some prepared questions to test 
understanding: in only a few cases, entirely with the younger
children, was it necessary to review the stories. Subjects 
were then requested to assign responsibility to the central 
character by answering the questions relating to each 
attribution measure. Each subject used a four-point scale 
represented on A3 cards by pointing either to a line labelled 
’not at all' or to one of three boxes arranged in increasing 
order of height and labelled ’a little’, ’quite a lot’, and 
’very much’. In order to minimize the incidence of response 
set, the order of choice answers was reversed for the blame 
question. Separate cards of different colours were used for 
each measure to help emphasize the different nature of the 
questions.
The adults completed individually prepared AH booklets, 
each page containing one of the stories and the three AR 
questions (with order of presentation counter-balanced between 
subjects) plus the four choice attributional responses beneath
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beneath each (again with order» of presentation reversed for the 
blame question). Responses were made by placing a tick against 
the chosen answer for each question.
RESULTS
Descriptive statistics. - AR scores were obtained by assiging 
a value of 1 ~ H to each rating, with H representing the 
greatest amount of attribution. Using the first and second 
scores at each stimulus level, split-half reliability 
coefficients (corrected by the Spearman-Brown formula) were 
computed for each of the three dependent variables. This 
procedure was judged appropriate in view of the consensus of 
opinion among assessors concerning the content validity of 
items (reported in Expt. 1). As can be seen from Table 5.1,
Table 5.1
SPLIT--HALF RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS FOR AR STORIES
Dependent Level 8 years 11 years Adult;
measure (N = 32) (N = 32) (N = 3Î
Cause Causality . H3 . 50 . 75
Foreseeability . 63 . 47 . 64
Intentionality . 55 . 75 .85
Justification . 40* . 70 . 91
Blame Causality . 41 . 62 . 52
Foreseeability . 50 . 51 . 55
Intentionality . 55 . 71 . 67
Justification . 69 . 52 . 59
Punishment Causality . 64 . 73 . 53
Foreseeability . 51 . 74 . 55
Intentionality . 51 . 63 . 72
Justification . 60 . 64 . 54
* P < .05. All other values are significant at p < .01.
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the internal consistency estimates ranged from .40 to .91 and 
were significant beyond the ,01 level except for one at age 8 
which was significant at .05. The two ratings obtained at each 
stimulus level were therefore averaged to give the AR score for 
that level.
Attribution of moral responsibility. - It was predicted that 
judgements of blame and punishment would be significantly 
affected by subjects' age, the stimulus levels, and the 
interaction of these two factors. The relevant profiles, which 
are given in Figs. 5.1(a) and (b) (means and standard 
deviations in Appendix B3.1) would appear to give general 
support to the hypotheses that judgements would become less 
negative with age, except at the level of Intentionality, 
whilst discrimination between the stimulus levels would become 
more marked. However, it is clear that, whilst ages converge 
at Intentionality with regard to blame, they do so for 
punishment only in the case of the child groups, the adults 
attributing somewhat less at each level.
To test the results for statistical significance, 
the scores for each dependent variable were submitted to a 3 
(age) X 2 (sex) x 4 (stimulus levels) analysis of variance, 
with levels acting as a repeated measure (ANOVA table in 
Appendix B3.2). As predicted, there was a highly significant 
main effect for age (F [2,90] = 25.32 and 46.06 for blame and 
punishment respectively, p < .001 in each case). Also as 
predicted, a highly significant main effect emerged for the 
stimulus levels (F [3,270] = 90.28 and 87.98 for blame and
punishment respectively, p < .001 in each case), and for the
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interaction between this factor and age (F [6,270] = U.Ol and
3.96 for blame and punishment respectively, p < .001 in each 
case). Although gender did not emerge as a significant main 
effect or in a first-order interaction with age or stimulus 
levels, the above results were qualified by significant age x 
sex X stimulus levels interactions (F [6,270] = 8 .3 6 , p < ,001
for blame; 3.^3. p < .01 for punishment).
To follow up the significant interactions involving age, 
sex, and the stimulus levels, various tests for simple simple 
main effects were carried out, following the prodecure in Kirk 
(1 9 6 8 , pp. 289-2 9 2 ), with p set at .05 in these and all 
subsequent analyses. The first tests were performed with 
regard to the expected age differences in amounts of 
attribution at the stimulus levels. For judgements of blame, 
significant effects for age were found for both sexes at 
Causality but for male subjects only at Foreseeability and 
Justification, with no effect, as predicted, at the level of 
Intentionality. For punishment, similar significant effects 
were found for both sexes at all levels except Intentionality, 
in which adult males were significantly less harsh in their 
judgements than the older children.
To probe further the expectation that attribution would 
generally decline with age, a priori t-tests were used to 
compare means between ages (Kirk, 1968, pp 267-268 and 
292-29Ü). The conservative test was used for determining the 
critical value of t, as recommended by Kirk (1 9 6 8 ) for 
situations in which error terms estimating different sources of 
variability are pooled. In view of the significant
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second-order interaction for each of the attribution measures, 
separate calculations were made for males and females where the 
tests for simple simple effects had shown this to be 
warranted. The results are presented in Fig. 5.2, where the 
vertical connecting lines indicate significant differences 
between adjacent age levels. From Fig.5.2, it can be seen 
that, as anticipated, ages tended to converge at the level of 
Intentionality. The one exception occurred among adult males, 
who were significantly more lenient in their judgements of 
punishment than other groups. At the remaining three stimulus 
levels, it appears that significant differences between 
adjacent ages was confined to boys in the case of blame, except 
at the Causality level for older children v. adults, where 
differences were also significant for female subjects. For 
punishment, however, differences were significant for both 
sexes between adjacent ages at Causality and Foreseeability, 
though not at Justification, where differences between the 
child groups were significant for males only, those between the 
older children and adults being significant for females only.
To probe further the nature of the significant 
second-order interactions involving sex differences for 
judgements of blame and punishment, a posteriori comparisons 
between sexes were compared at each age level, using Tukey 
tests (Kirk, 1968, pp 292-294). The results showed that, 
although the younger boys attributed significantly more blame 
than girls of the same age at the Foreseeability level, 
judgements were otherwise harsher among female subjects where 
sex differences occurred. For blame, these were at Causality 
among the 11 year-olds and at Intentionality among the adults,
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Fig.5.2: SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ADJACENT AGES & LEVELS
(a) J u d g e m e n t s  of Blame
8 years C
11 years Q
Adults C
(b) Judgements of Punishment
8 years Q
Adults
11 years q
Connecting lines indicate significant differences for 
male (------'----- ) and female (-----------) subjects
Key;
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C = Causality 
F = Foreseeability 
I = Intentionality 
J = Justification
whilst for punishment the effect was at the level of 
Justification among the older children and at the 
Intentionality level among the adults.
The second prediction was that increased discrimination 
between the stimulus levels would be demonstrated with age. 
Tests for simple interaction effects showed that gender was a 
significant factor in relation to age and stimulus levels only 
in the case of blame, and then for the child groups only. To 
probe further the nature of the significant age x stimulus 
levels interaction, further t-tests were performed with respect 
to each pair of adjacent stimulus levels, calculations being 
performed separately for boys and girls in the case of blame. 
These results are also shown in Fig. 5.2, in which the 
horizontal connecting lines indicate significant differences 
between the stimulus levels. It can be seen that differences 
between blame and punishment judgements again appear. For 
blame, subjects of both sexes in all age groups discriminated 
significantly only between intentional and justified 
commission. At 11 years, subjects of both sexes discriminated 
significantly between Foreseeability and Intentionality. Only 
among the adults did subjects of both sexes significantly 
separate Causality and Foreseeability. For punishment, 
however, significant discrimination between each pair of 
adjacent levels is evident for both sexes from the youngest 
age.
Age differences in discrimination between the stimulus 
levels were also tested using, as the criterion for successful
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discrimination, the number of subjects whose ratings between 
adjacent stimulus levels were different by at least one point 
in the predicted direction. The results, presented in Fig,
5 .3 . suggest increasing discrimination with age, as before. 
Again, earliest development in sophisticated attribution is at 
Intentionality-Justification, then at Foreseeability- 
Intentionality, and finally at Causality-Foreseeability which 
caused the greatest difficulty, even for adults. When 
differences between the proportions at each age were tested for 
significance (Guilford and Fruchter, 1973, PP 162-164), the 
above trend was confirmed. Highly significant age differences 
in discrimination were evident between the child groups as 
regards Intentionality-Justification for both the blame and 
punishment questions (z = 3.55 for each AR measure, p < .001), 
but not between the older children and adults. For 
Foreseeability-Intentionality, discrimination was insignificant 
between the child groups but significant between the older 
children and adults for blame (z = I.7 6 , p < .0 5 ) and between 
the youngest subjects and adults for punishment (z = 2.49, P < 
.01). At Causality-Foreseeability, however, the differences 
for punishment were insignificant between all age groups, and 
for blame were significant only between the older children and 
adult subjects (z = I.8 0 , p < .05).
In short, general support was found for the prediction 
that, except for perceptions of intentional commission, 
subjects would attribute less moral responsibility with 
advancing age. However, this was more the case for punishment 
than for blame, in which significant differences between 
adjacent age groups were generally among males only,
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Fis. 5.3: NUMBERS OF SUBJECTS DISCRIMINATING BETWEEN ADJACENT
LEVELS BY AT LEAST ONE POINT
28
(a) Blame
16
Causality- Foreseeability- Intentionality
Foreseeability Intentionality Justification
(b) Punishment
Causality-
Foreseeability
foreseeability- Intentionality- 
Intentionality Justification
8 year-olds 11 year-olds Adults
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differences between the child groups being narrower among girls 
than boys for this attribution measure. The prediction that 
older subjects would, at the same time, be more discriminating 
between levels of commission also received support, but the 
comparison of means suggested that the ability to offer 
sophistiated discriminations was evident among even the 
youngest subjects, though for both sexes this was the case only 
for judgements of punishment. Whether the criterion for 
discrimination was based on mean scores or on numbers of 
subjects making clear distinctions between the stimulus levels, 
it would seem that discrimination between the levels of 
Intentionality and Justification come earlier than those 
relating to Foreseeability-Intentionality, with the separation 
of Causality and Foreseeability causing the most difficulty 
(even among the adults on the second criterion). Where sex 
differences occurred, some tendency for females to be harsher 
in their judgements than males emerged, particularly among 
adults at the level of Intentionality.
Attribution of causality. - In contrast to their moral 
evaluations it was hypothesized that subjects’ judgements of 
causality in response to the revised wording of the question 
would be greater and less differentiated than those for moral 
responsibility, age differences also being less pronounced.
The data profiles in Fig. 5.4(a) do suggest some age 
differences, with higher ratings among the adults.
Nevertheless, as anticipated, the data lines are fairly high 
and horizontal, with a slight peak at Intentionality especially 
for the adults. To test the results for statistical
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Fia. 5.4(a)
MEAN SCORES FOR CAUSAL ATTRIBUTION
cùouL/1
Z<LU
Z
3 8 yrs
2
1
Causality Foreseeability Intentionality
STIMULUS LEVEL
Justification
significance, the scores were submitted to a 3 (age) x 2 (sex)
X 4 (stimulus levels) analysis of variance (table in Appendix 
B3.2). Age and sex acted as between-group factors and stimulus 
levels as a within-group factor. Highly significant main 
effects emerged for stimulus levels (F [3,270] = 5.78, p <
.001) and also, unexpectedly, for age (F [2,90] = 10.80, p <
.001). Although there was no significant effect for sex, a 
significant sex x age x stimulus levels Interaction emerged (F
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[6,270] = 2.75, P < .025).
To probe the nature of the unexpected second order 
interaction involving sex, tests for simple interaction effects 
were computed. It emerged that the age x levels interaction 
was significant only for the female adults (F [3,270] = 4.93, P 
< .01) and the eight year-old boys (F [3,270] = 2.98, P <
.025). Since some discrimination was expected between 
Intentionality and other levels, but not between the levels of 
Causality and Foreseeability, relevant a priori t-tests (Kirk, 
1968, pp 292-294) were made, as before. For the younger boys, 
significant differences emerged for Causality-Intentionality 
but not between any adjacent levels. For the adults, however, 
differences were also significant between Intentionality and 
the adjacent levels of Foreseeability and Justification. Also 
as anticipated, no significant age differences emerged between 
the child groups at any stimulus level; and those between the 
older children and adults were confined to females at 
Intentionality and males at Justification.
As a further test of the impact of the revised cause 
question, the older children were also given the wording used 
in the Pilot Study. Comparing the results displayed in Fig. 
5.4(b) with those of Fig. 5.1, it can be seen that, as 
expected, the data curve for the old wording once again 
resembles the data curves for blame and punishment, and can be 
contrasted with the more horizontal data pattern relating to 
the revised wording of the cause question (Fig. 5.4(a)). A sex 
X  stimulus levels ANOVA demonstrated a highly significant 
effect for stimulus levels (F [3,90] = 21.62, p < .001: table
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Fis. 5.4(b)
MEAN SCORES FOR CAUSAL ATTRIBUTION AMONG 11 YEAR-OLDS 
USING OLD WORDING OF QUESTION
a:OUun
Z<
3
cr
2
1
Causal ity Foreseeabil i ty Intent ional i ty
S T IM U L U S  LEVEL
Justif ication
in Appendix B3.3). Following the procedure recommended by 
Winer (1971, pp. 428-430), the estimated percentage of variance 
due to the stimulus levels effects was calculated. Consistent 
with the expectation, only three per cent of the variance was 
attributable to the stimulus levels in the case of the revised 
cause question compared with 35 per cent for blame and 34 per 
cent for punishment.
In short, the configuration of data for perceptions of
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Causality was consistent with the expectation than attributions 
for this measure would be uniformly high across stimulus levels 
at each age, with markedly less discrimination than for 
attributions of moral responsibility. Differences between the 
stimulus levels and age groups were in the main associated with 
adult subjects, the most noticeable of which was the tendency 
among the adult female subjects to make significant 
distinctions between their attributions at Intentionality and 
adjacent levels. Additionally, the percentage of variance 
attributed to the stimulus levels was only three per cent for 
perceptions of Causality compared with over thirty per cent for 
attributions of blame and punishment.
Association between dependent measures. - To test the 
hypotheses concerning associations between judgements of 
causality, blame, and punishment, Pearson product moment 
correlations were computed between these measures at each 
stimulus level for each age group Partial correlations were 
then calculated between each pair of attribution measures, 
controlling for the other measure. Additionally, average 
correlations for the stimulus levels were calculated by 
transforming each r into a Fisher z coefficient, finding the 
mean z, and transforming this back to the corresponding r. The 
results are given in Table 5.2.
Consistent with the predictions, the results indicate that 
the strongest links are between judgements of blame and 
punishment. At each age and stimulus level (except for adults 
at Causality), the association between these attribution
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Table 5-2
CORRELATIONS (r) BETWEEN ATTRIBUTION MEASURES
Correlations 
(df = 30)
Correls. controlling 
for 3rd variable 
(df = 29)
C-B B-P C-P C-B(P) B-P(C) C-P(B
06 . 74** . 44** -. 44 . 80** . 59**. 58** . 25 . 39* . 54** - . 02
35* . 67** . 67** -.18 . 63** . 63**
40* . 80** . 25 . 34* . 79** -.13
33* . 71** . 42* . 05 . 71** . 29
8 years
Causality
Foreseeability
Intentionality
Justification
Average
11 years 
Causality 
Foreseeability 
Intentionality 
Justification 
Average
Adults
36* . 73** . 2545** .64** . 29
39* . 59** . 29
32* . 75** . 38*
38* . 68** . 31*
Causality . 01 . 26 -.07
Foreseeability -.05 . 58** -. 10
Intentionality . 25 . 68** . 17
Justfication . 06 . 46** . 17
Average . 06 . 56** . 04
. 27 . 71** -. 02
. 36* . 60** - 00
. 28 . 54** . 08
. 06 . 72** . 22
. 25 . 65** . 07
. 03 . 26 - . 08
. 01 . 58** - . 09
. 19 . 67** . 00
. 02 . 46** . 16
. 04 . 56** . 01
* P < .05 ** p < .01 (one-tailed tests)
C-B = correlations between judgements of cause and blame
B-P = correlations between judgements of blame and punishment
C-P = correlations between judgements of cause and punishment
{ ) = variable partialled out
measures is moderate or high and is significant at the one per 
cent level, remaining so when judgements of cause are 
partialled out. Among the child groups (except for the 8 
year-olds at Causality) the association between cause and 
blame, although low or modest, is significant at the five per 
cent level or better. However, except for two levels at 8 
years and one at 11 years, this link becomes insignificant when 
the effects of punishment judgements are nullified. Among the 
adult subjects, the link between cause and blame is very weak.
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The expectation that the association between cause and 
punishment, controlling for blame, would be weaker than that 
between blame and punishment, controlling for cause, received 
clear support at each age level, except at Intentional!ty among 
the 8 year-olds. The complementary expectation, that the 
association between cause and punishment, controlling for 
blame, would be weaker than that between cause and blame, 
controlling for punishment, received support at all levels 
except Justification among the 11 year-olds, but was not 
generally supported among the adult subjects. Among the 8 
year-olds, although the effect is also evident at two levels, 
the association between cause and punishment at Causality and 
Intentionality is not only higher than that between cause and 
blame but is significant at the one per cent level even when 
the effects of blame judgements are nullified.
In short, the results for all age groups lend clear 
support to the prediction that blame and punishment would be 
the most strongly linked of the attribution measures. The 
hypothesis that judgements concerning cause, blame and 
punishment would be related in the form C - B - P, cause being 
linked to punishment through blame, was not found among the 
adult subjects, but received a measure of support among the 11 
year-olds. Although support for the entailment model was also 
found at two levels among the 8 year-olds, at the other two 
levels cause and punishment were more strongly linked than 
cause and blame.
Individual differences within age groups. - Individual 
differences were investigated with regard to general
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intelligence and locus of control.
In order to investigate the possibility that, for eight 
year-olds if not the older children, a relationship would be 
found between general intelligence and a propensity to 
discriminate between adjacent stimulus levels of blame and 
punishment judgements, tests of association for each pair of 
adjacent levels were calculated between general ability and 
incidence of successful discrimination. The criterion for 
successful discrimination was defined as a difference in the 
predicted direction of at last one full rating. For the 
younger children, although continuous scores for ability 
(Young’s Test) were available from the school, biserial 
coefficients were computed since the discrimination variable 
was dichotomized but basically continuous. For the 11 
year-olds, ability assessments were available in grades (AH2 
verbal ability test); the proportions of subjects in each 
ability grade who met the discrimination criterion were 
therefore calculated and then subjected to chi-square 
(combining grades A-B and C-D to deal with the small expected 
frequencies in the extreme grades).
From the results given in Tables 5.3(a) and (b), it can be 
seen that, with one exception, the links for the younger 
children were positive. Of these, that relating to 
discrimination between Causality and Foreseeability was 
significant at the .01 level for judgements of blame (r = .49)^ 
and fell just short of the .05 level for judgements of 
punishment (r = .29); that relating to
Intentionality-Justification was significant at the .05 level
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Table 5.3(a)
BISERIAL CORRELATIONS BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE (YOUNG) AND 
SUCCESSFUL DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN ADJACENT STIMULUS LEVELS
AMONGST THE EIGHT YEAR-OLDS
Blame
Punishment
Causality < Foreseeability 
Foreseeability < Intentionality 
Intentionality > Justification
Causality < Foreseeability 
Foreseeability < Intentionality 
Intentionality > Justification
49**
14
20
2926
38*
» P < .05 ** P < .01
Table 5 .3 (b)
PROPORTIONS OF 11 YEAR-OLDS WITHIN EACH VERBAL GRADE (AH2) 
MAKING SUCCESSFUL DISCRIMINATIONS BETWEEN ADJACENT STIMULUS
LEVELS
A B C D All
grades
N = 7 9 12 4 32
Blame
Causality < Foreseeability . 29 . 11 . 25 . 75 . 28
Foreseeability < Intentionality . 57 . 44 . 42 . 00 . 41Intentionality > Justification . 86 .78 . 83 . 50 . 78
Punishment
Causality < Foreseeability . 29 . 22 . 25 . 50 . 28
Foreseeability < Intentionality . 43 .56 . 67 . 50 . 56
Intentionality > Justification . 71 .67 . 92 . 75 . 78
for punishment only (r = .3 8 ). No association between
intelligence and a propensity to discriminate between the 
stimulus levels was found with respect to the older children, 
all chi-square values being below the level required for 
significance. In short, with respect to the younger subjects 
only, limited support was received for the hypothesis that
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general intelligence would be related to sophisticated 
attributions, and the associations, in general, were weak.
To test the assumption that the more able children would 
attribute less responsibility at Causality and Justification, 
but more at Intentionality, correlations were computed between 
intelligence and AR at these levels. The results are given in 
Table 5.3(g )* Consistent with the prediction, a very modest 
tendency emerges for the more intelligent eight year-olds to 
attribute less responsibility for unforeseeable accidents (r = 
-.33 for blame; -.37 for punishment; df = 29, p < .05 in each 
ease) and less punishment for justified commission (r = -.32, 
df = 29, P < .05). The expected positive association between 
malicious intention and the ability measures emerges clearly 
only for the 11 year-olds and is significant only for blame (r 
= .37, df = 30, p < .05). However, the remaining correlations 
for the older group are very low and not statistically 
significant.
As regards the relation between locus of control and AR, 
it was also predicted that, at the levels of Causality, 
Foreseeability, and (probably) Justification, an association 
would be found between AR (blame and punishment), on the one 
hand, and, on the other, internality scores (especially when 
associated with perception of stable rather than unstable 
causes) with respect to unsuccessful incidents with 'liked’ 
other children. At the levels of Intentionality and (possibly 
Justification), the link was expected in relation to successful
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Table 5.3(c)
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE AND AR
Dependent measure and 
stimulus level
8 years 
(N = 31[a])
11 years 
(N = 32)
Blame
Causality
Intentionality
Justification
Punishment
Causality
Intentionality
Justification
33*
10
11
37*01
32*
06
37*
25
01
20
09
* p < .05 (one-tailed tests)
[a] No ability quotients were available for one boy.
incidents. Product moment correlations were therefore computed 
between, on the one hand, AR scores for blame and punishment at 
each stimulus level and, on the other hand, IS and lU scores 
for Ch+ taken from Experiment 2. (At each age one girl and one 
boy was not included since, as explained in the Method section 
of Experiment 2, the sample for the internality measure was 
restricted to fifteen in each age-gender group.) The results 
gave uniformly low correlations, ranging from -.34 to +.41, 
with over three-quarters within the range -.20 to +.20. At 
each age only two correlations were significant on a one-tailed 
test, though this was with respect to the same variables, viz. 
blame and punishment with respect to justified aggression with 
cause attributed to stable factors in self regarding successful 
incidents (r = .40 (blame) and .31 (punishment) for 8 
year-olds; .41 (blame) and ,33 (punishment) for 11 year-olds, 
df=28, p < .05 in each case). None of the correlations with
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internality combined with unstable causes (lU) was 
significant. The four significant links are tenuous, but since 
the same links occurred at both ages, they may indicate a 
tendency for children who attribute failures to stable reasons 
in themselves to attribute responsibility to other children who 
successfully engage in justified aggression against their 
friends.
DISCUSSION
The estimates of internal consistency which were obtained 
for the stimulus stories were moderate to high. In a review of 
the literature concerning moral judgement stories, Keasey 
(1 9 7 7 ) found that, in the only study in which reliability was 
considered, Johnson (1962) reported test-retest correlations 
ranging from .30 to .5 8 . However, Garcia-Esteve and Shaw 
(1 9 6 8 ) reported test-retest correlations ranging from ,81 t o - 
, 91 in their Heiderian study. The statistics from the present I
study are closer to those of Johnson than to those of |
Garcia-Esteve and Shaw. At the same time, the fact that each j
split-half estimate was based on only two items militates jI
against very high coefficients. !
i
IThe results regarding Heider’s levels in general provided 
strong support for the hypotheses. Consistent with Heider’s 
(1 9 5 8 ) theory, the amount of blame and punishment suggested at 
each of the stimulus levels except that of Intentionality 
generally declined with age, whilst discrimination between the 
stimulus levels generally increased with age. Whilst
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judgements for blame and punishment produced very similar data 
patterns, those for cause were, as expected, less 
differentiated, with consistently high amounts of attribution 
at each level.
Several results of the present study relating to moral 
judgements can be contrasted with those of Ferguson and Rule 
(1 9 8 0 ). They relate both to the amount of responsibility 
attributed and the extent to which subjects differentiated 
amongst the stimulus levels as a function of age and gender. 
However, the comparisons must be treated cautiously, since 
Ferguson and Rule averaged their results for 'badness', blame 
and punishment and also reported findings at each level for 
intense and mild outcomes combined. The present study analysed 
blame and punishment separately, and the questions were 
focussed on mild outcomes only.
Comparing 7-9 with 13-15 year-olds, Ferguson and Rule 
found that the younger children were relatively
undifferentiated in their sensitivity to Heider's levels, and 
attributed more responsibility in each situation, girls 
especially so. In contrast to Ferguson and Rule, the eight 
year-olds in the present study significantly separated each 
adjacent level in the case of punishment. For blame, both 
sexes at this age significantly discriminated between malicious 
and justified aggression, a finding consistent with that 
obtained by Fincham and Jaspars (1979). whilst unforeseeable 
and foreseeable accidents were significantly distinguished by 
the boys, and foreseeable and intentional acts were 
significantly distinguished by the girls. Further, by 11
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years, subjects of each gender were attributing significantly 
more blame for intentional than for foreseeable, accidental 
outcomes. In short, the younger subjects in the present study 
were more sophisticated in their moral evaluations than in the 
Canadian samples, being more like those studied in Oxford by 
Fincham and Jaspars (1979) and Fincham (198I). Additionally, 
the 11 year-olds in the present study seemed to be as sensitive 
to Heider's levels as were the adolescents in Ferguson and 
Rule’s investigation.
The reasons for the greater maturity evidenced by the 
younger subjects in the present study compared with Ferguson 
and Rule’s could be cultural, but are more likely to be due to 
two methodological changes. The first of these relates to the 
more explicit wording at the lower levels of Causality and 
Foreseeability. As explained in Experiment 1, the objective 
was to maximize the chances of the assessment locating 
variations in attributional style according to circumstances, 
and not the ability to infer these circumstances which might 
have put the younger and least able children at a 
disadvantage. Even so discrimination between these particular 
levels caused the most difficulty, even with adults. The other 
methodological point relates to outcome intensity. Ferguson 
and Rule presented subjects with both severe and mild outcomes, 
but this did not affect the younger subjects’ attributional 
tendencies. In the present study only mild outcomes were used, 
possibly enabling the younger children to be more sensitive to 
the intent information and less ’engulfed’ by the impact of the 
outcome.
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Ferguson and Rule’s finding that the younger subjects 
attributed more responsibility at each level, differences being 
more noticeable amongst girls, is also at variance with the 
results of in the present study. For blame, convergence of 
ages at Intentionality was nearly perfect (Fig.5.la); for 
punishment, a similar result occurred for the child subjects, 
but adults did attribute less at this level (Fig. 5.1b). Also
in contrast to Ferguson and Rule’s findings, differences
between the child groups in the present study were more 
pronounced for boys, who at 11 years attributed significantly 
less responsibility than at eight years at each level except 
Intentionality. Further, whereas Ferguson and Rule found that 
sex differences dissipated with age, the adult female subjects 
in the present study attributed more blame for malicious
aggression than even the eight year-olds. Sex differences have 
not generally been found in studies investigating developmental 
differences based on Heider. In the development of moral 
reasoning based on Kohlberg’s work. Walker (19SU) found only 
six significant sex differences in samples of children aged 
5-17 years. However, the fact that the differences that did 
occur demonstrated greater maturity in girls is in contrast 
with the present findings.
The success of the younger subjects in clearly separating 
malicious from justified aggression calls for special comment 
since this effect was not obtained with children of about this 
age by Ferguson and Rule (198O) or by Shaw and Sulzer (196%), 
though it was by Fincham and Jaspars (1979) and with six 
year-olds by Fincham (198I). In the Shaw and Sulzer 
investigation, it was found that even adults did not attribute
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significantly less responsibility for justified than for 
intentional aggression; yet in the present study, one-third of 
the children aged eight years reduced the amount of blame and 
punishment assigned at the Justification level, whilst almost 
four in five did so at 11 years. The present findings are more 
consistent with those of Darley et al (1978) and Peterson and 
Keasey (cited in Keasey, 1977), who found that children as 
young as four or five years were no less likely than adults to 
assign punishment for harm done if the circumstances 
legitimated the action.
However, as noted in the report on the Pilot Study, 
justified commission was operationalized both in the Ferguson 
and Rule study and in the present investigation as pro-social 
aggression. This is in contrast to Fincham and Jaspars (1979) 
whose stories at this level dealt with self-defence or 
retaliation, and to Shaw and Sulzer (196%) who confounded 
provocation, coercion and pro-social aggression. This 
difference in interpretation appears to produce different 
judgemental ratings in relation to other stimulus levels. The 
mean scores obtained by Fincham and Jaspars (1979) indicate 
that, operationalized as a 'natural' response to provocation, 
justified commission is seen by subjects as being more 
reprehensible than foreseeable commission but less so than 
malicious intention. This finding provided the authors with 
empirical support for a suggestion made by Fishbein and Ajzen 
(1973) that reversing the last two levels of Intentionality and 
Justification would enable Heider's scheme to represent a 
Guttman scale, forming a single dimension of perceived 
responsibility. But, as Fishbein and Ajzen (1973, P .150)
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suggest in a footnote, 'it is not clear* that the contextual 
level of Justification should be placed between Foreseeability 
and Intentionality. It is possible that Justification leads to 
a level of attribution that stands between Causality and 
Foreseeability: Shaw and Reitan (1 9 6 9 ) reported data that
appears to support the latter order'. A study by Harvey and 
Rule (1 9 7 8 ) with adults suggests that aggression which is 
justified by provocation can be perceived by subjects as less 
reprehensible than foreseeable but unintentional aggression if 
the justified action takes the form of verbal abuse and the 
malicious action results in mild physical injury. In the 
Ferguson and Rule (198O) study, where injury arises from 
pro-social aggression, the mean moral judgements at the 
Justification level were equal to those at the Foreseeability 
level in the case of the 7-9 year-olds, but were virtually the 
same as those for accidental commission in the case of 
adolescents. In the present study, however, a more consistent 
pattern emerges across the three age levels, the mean score for 
justified aggression generally falling between those for 
unforeseeable and foreseeable accidents in judgements of 
blame. Comparisons of these various results would suggest 
that, when construed as a response to altruistic concern, the 
circumstances are judged by subjects to be more mitigating than 
self-defence: it is as though the injury is perceived as an
accident, not clearly foreseeable, but almost the inevitable 
result of the actor's humanity. Subjects as young as eight 
years are thus prepared to count an altruistically motivated 
act of aggression by another almost as if it were an accident.
The results on moral attribution can be contrasted with
1%5 “
those of Shaw and Sulzer (196%) whose 6-9 year-olds went 
against the trend of older subjects in assigning more 
responsibility for careless than for purposive commission. The
authors assumed that this was an artifact of the serious 
outcomes portrayed in their stories at the Foreseeability 
level. In the present study, not one of the 11 year-olds or 
adults found foreseeable commission more reprehensible than 
malicious intention, and even at eight years only five children 
did so - and then for the blame question only.
It is important to note that, in spite of the increasing 
tendency to offer more sophisticated attributions with age, no 
evidence emerged to suggest that Heider's levels of commission 
represented developmental stages in Kohlberg’s sense of 
structural wholes. As Fincham and Jaspars (1979) and Ferguson 
and Rule (1980) found, the moral evaluations of the youngest 
children were in the same direction as those of older children 
and adults, development being characterized by more marked and 
statistically significant discrimination.
The different data patterns found for the cause and moral 
responsibility questions extend the findings of Ferguson and 
Rule (who did not test for cause) and also those of Harris 
(1977) and Fincham and Jaspars (1979), whose findings on cause 
and reponsibility were less contrasting than in the present 
study. The prediction that the revised wording of the question 
concerning causality would produce higher and less 
differentiated attribution than the blame and punishment 
questions was confirmed for all groups. The finding that about 
one-third of the variance was attributable to the stimulus
— 1 % 6 —
levels for» the questions concerning moral responsibility and 
the previous wording of the cause question in the pilot study 
stands in contrast to the three per cent found for the revised 
question on perceptions of causality. However the adult female 
subjects were relatively more discriminating than the other 
groups, suggesting that they were more sensitive than younger 
subjects or adult males to the notion of personal causality, 
which entails the concept of agency for intentional actions. 
Heider’s level of global responsibility, in which the actor is 
held responsible for effects which are associated with him 
contextually but not directly, was not included in the design. 
Had it been so, discrimination would probably have been shown 
between that and other levels for perceptions of causality.
It is interesting to note that the position of each age 
group in relation to the others was different for attributions 
of causality than for those of moral responsibility. For the 
cause question, adults attributed more responsibility than the 
youngest children although these, in turn, attributed rather 
more than the 11 year-olds. This result replicates that of 
Fincham and Jaspars (1979), whose data also show that adults 
are less reserved in the judgements of cause than in their 
evaluations of moral reprehensibility.
Analysis of the relationship between the three attribution 
measures gave general support to the prediction that the moral 
judgements of blame and punishment would be significantly 
related, and more strongly so than either cause and blame or 
cause and punishment. It is just possible, however, that the 
blame-punishment coefficients are inflated since the
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formulation of the blame question, ’How angry do you think we 
should we be with (actor) for (outcome)?’, might have been 
interpreted by some children in terms of reprimand. A better 
wording (used in Experiment 5 onwards) might have been ’How 
angry do you think we should feel ....?’ Amongst the ( I 
c/Wa , some support was found for the entailment model, 
proposed by Fincham and Schultz (I98I), that cause is linked to 
punishment through blame. However, causality and blame were 
not strongly linked, a surprising finding since questions of 
blame can only reasonably arise when the cause of harm has been 
attributed to the actor. In a recent study with children aged 
5-11 years, Schleiffer et al (1 9 8 3 ) found that the link between 
cause and punishment was less remote than it had been for 
adults. This result is consistent with the present findings
with respect to the 8 year-olds at the levels of Causality 
and Intentionality. However, the Schleiffer et al study 
concerned acts of omission, not commission, and the protagonist 
was an adult. Of course, as Fincham and Shultz (1 9 8 1 ) point 
out, a set of coefficients that support the linear model 
Causality-Blame-Punishment, in that direction, will also 
support the alternative model Punishment-Blame-Causality, or 
one in which attribution of blame is held as the source of both 
judgements of cause and of punishment. However, the first 
model seems the more rationally defensible and is consistent 
with that used in law (Hart and Honore, 1959). The present 
findings would also seem generally consistent with those of 
Shaw and Reitan (1969) who found that adults gave higher 
ratings for ’responsibility’ than for punishment or reward.
Attempts to explain individual differences had only
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limited success. There was some evidence to suggest that the 
more intelligent younger children tended to attribute less 
moral responsibility for injury which was either unforeseeable 
or justified, and for injury which is the result of malicious 
intention - though no consistently statistically significant 
links emerged. It could be that Shaw and Schneider (1969a., 
p.3 8 ) were correct in suggesting that 'only minimal ability is 
required to learn the norms concerning the appropriate 
variables to be considered in the attribution-sanctioning 
process *.
The expected link, between AR and locus of control was 
barely evident, in spite of the greater refinement of the newly 
developed internality-stability measure. However, as 
predicted, the two significant correlations at each age were 
between attribution of responsibility and internality with 
respect to stable rather than unstable outcomes. This is 
consistent with Heider’s view that the observer attributes 
responsibility to stable factors. The most favourable 
representation which can be put on the results obtained is that 
children who attribute failures to stable factors in themselves 
will attribute relatively more responsibility than other 
subjects to perpetrators of justified aggression.
Nevertheless, while the new measure provides more detailed data 
on internality than the Bialer scale, it is no more successful 
in generating a clear and consistent link with attribution of 
responsibility to others. Yet, some previous research with 
adults has found a relationship between these two variables 
(e.g. Phares and Wilson, 1972; Sosis, 197%; Kauffman and 
Ryckman, 1979) - though there have been exceptions (Schiavo,
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1973). It could be that the difficulty in finding the expected 
link arises in part from the low variability which the 
four-point response scale produces. More likely, the 
explanation lies in the nature of incidents depicted in the 
stimulus stories, in which outcomes are mild and the guilt of 
the perperator fairly explicit. Kelley (1 9 6 7 ) has pointed out 
how a degree of ambiguity must be present in a situation if 
there is to be room for personal interpretation of the 
evidence. These matters will be discussed in Chapter 7 and 
pursued in Experiments 5-8.
Note 1. In a critical note regarding Fincham and Shultz’s 
study, Shotter (I98I) has questioned the point of testing 
empirically common-sense and legal concepts in order to clarify 
questions about how responsibility should be decided in law.
He argues that to put common-sense reasoning to empirical test 
is rather like testing groups of people with geometrical 
problems where a statistically distributed result would not 
prove Euclid’s axioms wrong but just that people are 
incompetent at geometry (or that there was a design fault). 
Further, Shotter argues that attempts to clarify the proper use 
of concepts by empirical techniques ignore the fact that there 
may be no general usage or that usage is context-bound.
Shotter is right to emphasize the futility of drawing 
ethical conclusions by means of scientific method. However, as 
Lloyd-Bostock (1 9 8I) has pointed out, the matter is more 
complex that Shotter allows since in some legal cases it is 
unclear what is meant by appeals to common sense. It could be, 
as she argues, that empirical work will 'point up where lawyers 
are being vague and explicit value judgements are being evaded’ 
(p. 162). In the present study, of course, the point at issue
is not so much a clarification of common-sense reasoning but 
rather the extent to which children appear to conform in their 
thinking to what is logical and reasonable in adult 
estimation. These possibilities will be followed up in 
Chapters 7-11.
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Chapter 6 
Experiment %
LEVELS OF RESPONSIBILITY ATTRIBUTION - A FOLLOW-UP STUDY
INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1970s, a number* of studies have 
demonstrated that, although children are less differentiated in 
their social and moral thinking than adults, they can and do 
offer more sophisticated judgements than earlier research had 
suggested, given certain favourable conditions (Fincham, 1983; 
Keasey, 1977; Rogers, 1978).
One reason why the earlier investigators sometimes 
underestimated the ability of young children is that the 
methodology employed did not sufficiently engage the subjects' 
competencies. Kassin (1981, p.170) has suggested that 'young 
children might appear less competent than they really are 
because they were unable to comprehend or recall the causally 
relevant information'. However, as Rogers (1978, p.121) has 
argued, 'the child fails to take intentions into account not 
because he is unable to comprehend them but because he does not 
perceive them as salient'. In this respect, a common criticism 
of the stories used by Piaget in his studies of children's 
moral thinking is that intent and consequence information was 
confounded (CoTstanzo et al, 1973). More recent studies have 
found that the independent manipulation of the perpetrator's
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intentions can enable children as young as five or six years to 
distinguish between accidental and intentional acts (e.g. 
Armsby, 1971; Berg-Cross, 1975; Chandler et al 1973; Farnill, 
197%). Darley et al (1978) found to their surprise that 
children of this age were no less likely than adults to assign 
punishment for legitimate action causing harm if the stories 
used to elicit the judgements are short so as not to overburden 
memory capacity, are supplemented by visual material, and are 
explicit about the contextual information surrounding the act.
In spite of numerous methodological advances which have 
been made in studies concerned with children's use of 
intentional cues in evaluating behaviour, comparatively little 
experimentation in the administrative arrangements for 
eliciting judgements from children has occurred in 
attributional studies based on Heider (1958). Although there 
has been refinement in story presentation (Fincham and Jaspers, 
1979; Ferguson and Rule, 1980; Fincham, 1982a) and an 
experiment in the use of video (Harris, 1977), a common 
characteristic of studies with children concerning Heider's 
levels involves asking subjects to make each evaluation 'cold', 
i.e. without any explicit opportunity to compare the stories at 
each level of commission or to revise initial opinions after 
reflection. The implicit assumption behind this arrangement is 
that subjects hold some absolute view about the extent to which 
attribution of responsibility should be made at each stimulus 
level. It is possible that, had the subjects been given 
opportunity to compare initial ratings and to re-value them 
accordingly, younger children especially would have been able 
to demonstrate more convincingly their ability to discriminate
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between levels of commission. Of interest here is Imamoglu's 
(1 9 8 0 ) finding that children of 5 to 12 take more time to 
evaluate accidental acts than intentional ones, suggesting that 
they need a relaxed atmosphere and time to think. The present 
study is therefore essentially concerned with a set of 
conditions which could help children to be discriminating in 
their judgements by enabling them to compare situations in 
which all factors are kept constant except for the 
attributional situation itself, and also in which the children 
are encouraged to stop and reflect, so becoming more conscious 
of their own thinking.
EXPERIMENTAL OVERVIEW AND HYPOTHESES
In this study, subjects of eight and eleven years were 
asked to evaluate the acts of other children within two story 
themes, each involving the four levels of commission used in 
Experiment 3 (Causality, Foreseeability, Intentionality, and 
Justification). As subjects made each judgement, the results 
were left on the table before them, enabling subsequent 
judgements to take the earlier ones into account. Finally, 
when all the stories had been evaluated, subjects were invited 
to alter their initial ratings after reflecting on all their 
judgements.
It was hypothesized that, in comparison with the results 
from the previous experiment, subjects in the new experimental 
conditions would discriminate between adjacent levels of 
commission more sharply. More especially, it was considered
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that this effect would be particularly noticeable at the 
Causality-Foreseeability and Intentionality-Justification 
levels. Each level in the first pair represents an accidental, 
non-intentional act, the difference between them being that the 
outcome could reasonably have been anticipated at the 
Foreseeability level; whilst each level in the second pair 
represents an intentional act, the difference between them 
being one of motive. It was assumed that the new experimental 
conditions would be especially facilitatory in enabling 
subjects to differentiate between the levels of each pair, 
since the concrete, and therefore more salient, factor remains 
constant and the abstract one differs. Finally, it was 
expected that the results would be most noticeable amongst the 
younger subjects who had discriminated less markedly and 
significantly than the eleven year-olds in Experiment 3.
METHOD
Subjects. - Sixty-four subjects, thirty-two aged 8 years and 
thirty-two aged 11 years, participated in the study. These 
were the same children who had been involved in Experiment 3.
Materials and Procedure. - Each subject was individually 
presented with two story-themes, with order of themes reversed 
for half the subjects. Four stories within each theme (details 
of which can be found in Appendix A%) represented the same 
levels of commission (Causality, Foreseeability,
Intentionality, and Justification) as those used in Experiment 
3, and, as before, each involved a child whose actions lead to
- 1 5 %  -
another child of the same sex receiving mild injury. However, 
in contrast to the previous study, each subject received all 
levels relating to each theme. The stories were written in the I
same style and format as those adapted from Ferguson and Rule j
(1 9 8 0 ) and used in Experiment 3, with beginnings and injury 1
I
outcomes held constant across the four stimulus levels. The 1
contexts of the themes, playing in the playground and riding |
bicycles, were chosen for their relevance to the age groups 1
tested and for their absence in the Ferguson and Rule stories :
which had been used in the previous study. As before, the :
names of characters reflected the gender of the subject. ,
To test for content validity, the complete set of stories 
was given to two teachers who were asked to assign each to one 
of the levels of commission. Because each story was correctly 
placed by both assessors, no structural alterations were 
thought necessary; however, following suggestions from the 
teachers, one or two minor changes in wording were made to 
ensure that the stories were within the reading ability of the 
youngest subjects.
For each theme, the procedure was as follows:
(1) A large and long coloured card 10 inches deep and 36 inches 
wide, divided by a vertical line into two sections, was 
presented to the subject (Fig. 6.1). The beginning and end of 
the story theme was printed in the narrower, left-hand section, 
with a gap in the middle for the story variations which 
reflected the four stimulus levels. The wide right-hand 
section of the card was headed 'How angry do you think we 
should be with [actor] for [outcome]', i.e. the same question
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used in Experiment 3 to elicit judgements of blame. In a margin 
beneath this question was a rating scale consisting of four 
long horizontal sections labelled (again as in Experiment 3) 
'not at all', 'a little', 'quite a lot' and 'very much'.
Squares of increasing height and width were printed alongside 
the last three labels, no square appearing by the first in 
order to emphasise the complete absence of blame. The labels 
were printed in ascending order for one theme and in descending 
order for the other.
(2) The four missing parts of the story theme, containing the 
intentional information, were printed on separate cards 5 
inches by 1 1/2 inches. These were placed downwards in front 
of the subject, who was asked to shuffle them (to randomize 
order of presentation) and place the pile, still face 
downwards, in the gap of the story-theme in the left-hand 
section.
(3) The subject was then asked to read the story, turning over 
and reading aloud the top card of the pile which had been 
placed in the middle of the story. (All children managed this 
part of exercise without difficulty, except two from the 
younger group who needed help with two or three words.) After 
the subject's attention had been drawn to the attribution 
question, he or she was asked to place the card which had just 
been read in one of the long right-hand horizontal sections, 
the choice of section depending on the subject's response to 
the question. This procedure was repeated with the other three 
cards in the left-hand section. In order not to restrict the 
range of responses available for each evaluation, it was
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emphasized that cards could be placed in any section, 
regardless of the position of previous cards. Each section was 
thus wide enough to accommodate all four cards if necessary 
(see Fig.6.1).
(il) After all judgements had been made, the subject was asked 
to note the position in which each card had been placed on the 
rating scale and then told that he or she could change the 
position of any card, if desired. Care was taken to emphasize 
that there was no obligation to revise ratings, and that an 
adjustment should only be made if the subject felt strongly 
about it.
(5) The subject then completed the other story-theme in the 
same manner.
RESULTS
In this section, the experimental conditions of Experiment 
3 will be referred to as 'Condition 1', and those of the 
present study as Condition 2a (for the initial judgements) and 
Condition 2b (for the revised judgements). Results relating to 
Condition 1 were taken from Experiment 3.
As in the previous study, ratings for Conditions 2a and 2b 
were scored from 1 (for 'not at all') to 4 'for 'very much'). 
Following previous practice, the two scores at each level of 
commission for these conditions were correlated to estimate the 
internal consistency of the measure. The results, corrected by
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the Spearman-Brown formula, are given in Table 6.1, which shows 
values ranging from .Hi to .7^. Since these were moderate to 
high, significant at the .01 level or better, and comparable to 
those obtained in Condition 1, each pair of scores at each of 
the stimulus levels was averaged to give the final score for 
each subject. Means and standard deviations appear in Appendix 
Bil. 1,
Table 6.1
SPLIT-HALF RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS FOR 
EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS 2a and 2b
Age 8 (N = 32) Age 11 (N = 32)
Stimulus level Cond 2a Cond 2b Cond 2a Cond 2b
Causality .56 . 6/1 .ill .62
Foreseeability .50 .55 .62 .56
Intentionality .63 .60 .66 .6/1
Justification .50 .53 .60 .7k
Note: All values are significant at the .01 level or better
It was expected that subjects, especially the eight 
year-olds, would discriminate more sharply between adjacent 
stimulus levels (especially Causality-Foreseeability and 
Intentionality-Justification) in Conditions 2a and 2b. The 
configuration of data lines presented in Fig. 6.2 is consistent 
with this prediction. Over the experimental conditions,
subjects substantially reduced the amount of attribution at
Causality and at Justification. The younger group also
increased attributions slightly at Intentionality, while the
older group gave higher ratings at Foreseeability.
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To test the results for significance, a 2 (sex) x 3 
(experimental condition) x H (stimulus levels) mixed analysis 
of variance was computed for each age group, with repeated 
measures on the last two factors (tables in Appendix BÜ.2). As 
expected, in addition to a highly significant main effect for 
the stimulus levels with respect to both the 8 year-olds (F 
[3,90] = 39.06, p < .001) and the 11 year-olds (F [3,90] =
77.06, p < .001), highly significant experimental conditions x 
stimulus levels interactions were obtained (F [6,180] = 9.67 at
8 years, 8.20 at 11 years, p < .001 in each case). Sex did not 
emerge as a significant main effect at either age. However, 
for the younger subjects, a significant sex x experimental 
condition effect (F [2,60] = 4.75, P < .025) was qualified by a
highly significant second order interaction also involving the 
stimulus levels (F [6,l80] = 7.83, P < 001); for the older
subjects, the sex x experimental condition interaction was not 
significant, but a moderately significant second order 
interaction emerged (F [6,l80] = 2.20, p < .05). As will be 
seen, these interactions involving sex entirely reflected the 
results in Condition 1.
To probe the nature of the interactions, tests for simple 
effects were carried out (Kirk, 1968, pp 303-306), with p set 
at .05 (as in all further analysis). The increases in 
attribution of responsibility by the 8 year-olds at 
Intentionality and by the 11 year-olds at Foreseeability were 
found to be not significant. However, for each age-group, a 
simple main effect for the experimental conditions was found at 
the levels of Causality and Justification, indicating that the 
reduction in attribution at these stimulus levels was
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significant. Since this was consistent with the predictions, a 
comparison of means at these levels was then undertaken using 
a priori t-tests, examining girls and boys separately in view 
of the interactions involving sex. It was found that for all 
subjects, regardless of age and sex, significant reductions at 
Causality and Justification had occurred by Condition 2b, 
whilst between Conditions 1 and 2a the difference had also been 
significant for the younger girls at both levels and for all 
older subjects at Causality.
In order to test further the expectation that subjects 
would discriminate more effectively between the stimulus levels 
in Conditions 2a and 2b, a priori t-tests were also computed to 
compare adjacent means amongst the stimulus levels in each of 
the new experimental conditions. The significance of the 
results are presented in Table 6.2. These show that sex 
differences in failure to discriminate significantly between 
levels were entirely confined to Condition 1. By Condition 2a, 
subjects of both sexes had significantly differentiated 
Causality from Foreseeability (whereas only boys in this group 
had done so in Condition 1), and, by Condition 2b, the younger 
subjects had significantly discriminated between Foreseeability 
and Intentionality (whereas only the girls had done so in 
Condition 1). Intentionality and Justification, which had been 
successfully separated in Condition 1, remained so in 
Conditions 2a and 2b. Thus, by the end of the experiment, the 
younger subjects of both sexes had significantly discriminated 
between all adjacent means of the stimulus levels. The 11 
year-olds girls, who in Condition 1 had failed successfully to 
discriminate between Causality and Foreseeability, had done so
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Table 6.2
SIGNIFICANCE OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ADJACENT STIMULUS LEVELS 
FOR EACH EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION
— — — 8 years---  11 years—
boys girls boys girls
Causality- Cond. 1 ***** * * * *
Foreseeability Cond.2a * * * * * * * * * * * * *****
Cond.2b ***** ***** ***** *****
Foreseeability- Cond. 1 ** ***** ****
Intent ionality Cond.2a * **** *** *
Cond.2b * ***** ***** *
Intent ionality- Cond. 1 * ** ***** *****
Justification Cond.2a **** ***** ***** *****
Cond.2b ***** ***** * * * * * * * * * *
* P < . 05** p < . 025* * *  p < . 01
* * * *  p < . 005* * * * *  p < . 0005
Note ; Values are based on t-tests (one-tailed) ,
by Condition 2a, signifying that all the older subjects had now 
significantly separated each adjacent stimulus level.
In short, with the exception of the older girls, the 
results generally become increasingly significant, as 
anticipated. This is especially so amongst the younger 
subjects, who began from a lower base.
The results for each pair of adjacent stimulus levels were 
also analysed by comparing the proportions of subjects who 
discriminated by at least a full point in each Condition. The 
results are presented in Fig. 6.3. Whereas in Condition 1, 
only about a quarter of subjects at each age had separated
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Fig. 6.3
NUMBER OF SUBJECTS IN EACH EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION 
DISCRIMINATING BETWEEN ADJACENT STIMULUS LEVELS 
BY AT LEAST ONE POINT
(a) 8 years
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(b) 11 years
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Intentionality Justification
Causality and Foreseeability according to this criterion, by 
Condition 2b six out of ten subjects at 8 years and seven out 
of ten at 11 years had been successful. In clearly 
differentiating Intentionality and Justification, the 
proportion of younger subjects rose from about one-third in 
Condition 1 to roughly three-quarters in Condition 2b.
However, discrimination between Foreseeability and 
Intentionality was relatively unaffected by the new
arrangements. The significance of these differences was
examined using McNemar's formula (Guilford and Fruchter, pp 
164-166). It was found that differences with respect to 
Causality-Foreseeability were significant for the younger 
subjects between Conditions 2a and 2b (z = 3.16, p < .01) and 
for the older subjects between Conditions 1 and 2a (z = 3.46, p 
< .01). At Intentionality-Justification, differences were 
significant between the first two conditions (z = 3.32, p <
.01) for the younger group only, over three-quarters of older 
subjects having already met the criterion in Condition 1.
Finally, note was made the number of children who took 
advantage of the opportunity to give revised evaluations in 
Condition 2b. As the figures from Table 6.3 demonstrate, more
than four-fifths of the younger children and three-quarters of
the older ones volunteered at least one change in their 
ratings. All but three of the older subjects who had second 
thoughts made just one or two changes, but a dozen of the 
younger subjects made alterations between three and six times. 
Further, 84 per cent of the changes made by the younger 
subjects (average number 2.13), and 96 per cent of those made 
by the older subjects (average number 1.31), were in the
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direction which indicated discrimination in the manner 
predicted.
Table 6.3
NUMBER OF SUBJECTS VOLUNTEERING REVISED 
EVALUATIONS IN CONDITION 2b
Number of revisions Number of children
8 years 11 years 
(N = 32)(N = 32)
0 5 8
1 7 132 8 8
3 6 1
4 4 0
5 1 2
6 1 0
DISCUSSION
The results of this experiment must be treated with some 
caution for the reasons discussed below. Nevertheless, it 
seems fair to conclude that children of Primary school age can 
be more sophisticated in the way they attribute responsibility 
for personal injury if they are given opportunities to compare 
their judgements for each case and to revise initial 
evaluations. Although young children can often identify 
subjective attributional information, they find difficulty in 
processing it (Rogers, 1978), and need time (Imamoglu, 1974) 
and prompting (Rogers, 1978) to help them do so. In the new 
experimental conditions, both the 8 and 11 year-olds made 
clearer and more statistically significant discriminations 
between levels than they had done in Experiment 3 when each 
judgement was made without explicit reference to the others and
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when no opportunity was provided for second thoughts. As 
anticipated, the increased discrimination was especially 
pronounced for the younger subjects, since the new experimental 
conditions enabled boys and girls alike to separate 
significantly Causality-Foreseeability and
Foreseeability-Intentionality, whilst also discriminating more 
clearly between Intentionality and Justification.
It might be objected that, in taking advantage of the 
opportunity to change initial ratings, subjects were simply 
responding to perceived expectations. However, apart from the 
fact that care was taken to advise the children to alter their 
evaluations only if they genuinely felt it to be appropriate, 
changes made simply to please the investigator would presumably 
be random and so would not have supported the hypothesis. In 
fact, in the vast majority of instances, the children revised 
their evaluations in the expected direction.
As a further check against the possibility that the 
children would change their minds simply because they felt they 
were expected to do so, the younger subjects were asked to give 
reasons for their revisions. Although a few were unable or 
unwilling to articulate an explanation, the reasons given were 
in general ones which reflected an understanding of the 
relevant issues, as the following examples illustrate;
Reduction in attribution at Causality:
* He didn’t do it on purpose. ’
'Well, she didn’t really push her - it was just an 
accident.’
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Increase in attribution at Foreseeability:
'Because he was being clumsy- he just didn't bother.' 
'It's dangerous not to look where you're going.'
Increase in attribution at Intentionality:
''cos he meant to be nasty.'
'Because she should have just said, "I don't want to 
play with you any more" - but instead pushed her 
over.'
Reduction in attribution at Justification:
'He wanted to help Paul'.
'cos Janet was really being kind.'
A further objection could be that the increased 
discrimination simply reflected the means by which the stories 
were communicated to the subjects. In Condition 1, the items 
were read to each child by the investigator, whereas in 
Conditions 2a and 2b, this arrangement was reversed, the child 
reading to the investigator. It is possible that the latter 
procedure, involving the facility of being able to refer to the 
text at any time, made less demand on subjects' memories and 
allowed the characteristics of each stimulus level to be more 
salient. However, there are two reasons why this is unlikely 
to be the total explanation for increased discrimination.
First, the reading facility was common between Conditions 2a 
and 2b, between which further improvement was shown, especially 
by the younger subjects. Secondly, in Condition 1, all 
subjects answered questions to test their understanding before 
judgements were made.
As a check against the possibility that improvement was
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confined to the better* readers, correlations were computed 
between reading ability (using scores, made available by the 
school, based on Young's Group Reading Test and Daniels and 
Diack's Graded Reading Tests for the younger and older children 
respectively) and attribution scores in Conditions 1 and 2a at 
the Causality and Intentionality levels. For the 8 year-olds, 
the correlations at Causality were -.07 in Condition 1 and .26 
in Condition 2a; at Intentionality, the corresponding 
correlations were .13 and -.02. For the 11 year-olds, the 
correlations were -.15 and .-6 at Causality, and .18 and .30 at 
Intentionality in Conditions 1 and 2a respectively. None of 
these values is significant, and two in Condition 2a, in which 
subjects read the stories themselves, are virtually zero.
Another possibility is that the changes in evaluations 
were a function of the new story contexts featured in the new 
administrative arrangements. Again, this could not explain 
improvement between Conditions 2a and 2b, but undoubtedly a 
more appropriate design would have ensured a common set of 
stories across experimental conditions, with themes allocated 
on a random basis to each subject in each condition. 
Unfortunately, such a provision was not feasible since the 
present study was conceived after the subjects had completed 
Experiment 3 (Condition 1). For this same reason, it was not 
possible to arrange for half the subjects to complete 
Conditions 2a/2b before Condition 1: it is therefore quite
possible that the experience of Condition 1 favourably affected 
performance in the later conditions.
In short, the results of this study suggest that children
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can be more differentiated in their moral judgements if they 
are given time to stop, compare, and reflect upon their initial 
evaluations. The methodology, which enabled young children in 
particular to make clearer distinctions between resembling 
attributional situations, has clear practical implications for 
teachers who wish to provide optimum conditions for helping 
children to develop more sophisticated ways of appraising 
social situations. Indeed, the stimulus materials employed in 
the experiment were subsequently used by a class teacher to do 
just that. Because the children are asked to evaluate actions 
at different levels of commission within a single story theme, 
they are helped to perceive variations in foreseeability, 
intentionality and motivation while other factors, such as 
context and outcome, are kept constant. Additionally, the 
procedure whereby ratings are specified by physically 
manipulating cards which represent the different levels of 
commission make these abstract features of an attributional 
situation more salient. Because the arrangements for the 
presentation and evaluation of Heider*s levels allow the 
stimulus materials to convey greater 'meaning', they help to 
stimulate discussion in a classroom, thus promoting further 
learning. The materials and procedure would therefore seem to 
have potential for enabling children to develop a more 
discerning attributional style.
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Chapter 7
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES AND ATTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITY
IN A COMPLEX SITUATION
This chapter is a general introduction to Experiments 5 - 
a. It examines the conditions under which locus of control 
might be associated with children's attributions to others for 
their behavioural outcomes, and it considers some of the issues 
involved in children attributions of responsibility to the 
victim of an accident.
Locus of control and attributions to others
The results of Experiment 3 provided strong support for 
the hypothesis that children's judgements of responsibility for 
personal injury are a function of both the level of their 
development and the level of commission under review (i.e. the 
circumstances in which the perpetrator acted, taking into 
account intention, foreseeability, motive and environmental 
forces). It was also shown that, for perceptions of causality, 
developmental differences are different in nature from those 
concerning judgements of moral responsibility, and the 
magnitude of differences between levels of commission is less 
pronounced. Finally, it was clear that, even amongst eight 
year-olds discrimination is evident, especially if, as in 
Experiment U, subjects are encouraged to compare and permitted
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to revise their initial judgements. These findings extend 
those from recent studies (e.g. Fincham and Jaspars, 1979; 
Ferguson and Rule, 198O), and demonstrate some conditions in 
which children's attributional reasoning is more mature than 
suggested by earlier work based on Heider's levels.
However, only minimal support was found in Experiment 3 
for hypotheses relating to individual differences concerned 
with general intelligence and internal-external locus of 
control. Some association was found between intelligence and 
attribution of responsibility in the case of eight year-olds, 
but not for 11 year year-olds, supporting the suggestion of 
Shaw and Schneider (1969a) that only minimal ability may be 
required to learn the criteria needed in order to discriminate 
between different levels of commission. As far as locus of 
control is concerned, however, it was thought appropriate to 
pursue the matter further in the absence of previous studies on 
the relation between locus of control and attribution of 
responsibility in children.
In response to the failure to find a clear link in 
Experiment 1 between internality and a disposition to attribute 
responsibility to others, a new measure of causal attribution 
to self was constructed (Experiment 2) to take account of three 
factors in addition to locus of control; the stability of the 
perceived cause of the outcome, the nature of the outcome 
(successful or unsuccessful), and the status (peer or adult) 
and familiarity (liked or less-liked) of the target actor. 
However, the manipulation of these factors did not materially 
improve the predictive value of self-attributional tendencies
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in relation to attribution of responsibility to others 
(Experiment 3). The exception was that low but signifiant 
correlations were found between children who, on the one hand, 
are high in internality in failure situations when the cause of 
outcome is stable, and, on the other, attribute relatively 
greater amounts of responsibility to other children who are 
engaged in justified aggression against friends. From 
examination of the literature relating to adult subjects, it 
was thought possible that the failure to find an association 
between internality and a disposition to attribute 
responsibility to others was due to the lack of certain 
features in the stimulus stories and the possibility that some 
subjects did not identify with the actor. The next four 
experiments explore this possibility.
In this chapter, five factors in attributional situations 
involving injury will be examined in relation to their possible 
interaction with locus of control orientations. These are; (1) 
situational relevance to the observer, (2) ambiguity of the 
actor's guilt, (3) severity of the outcome of the actor's 
behaviour, (Ü) perceived similarity between observer and actor, 
and (5) the observer's knowledge about the victim's behaviour 
prior to injury.
On the first point, that of situational relevance, much 
recent developmental work has demonstrated that children are 
motivated to be discerning in their judgements if the situation 
is presented in a way which has 'meaning' for them (Donaldson, 
1 9 7 8). In the original study concerned with the manipulation 
of Heider's levels of commission with children, Shaw and Sulzer
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(196%) noticed how age differences were narrower and 
discrimination between levels greater when the attributional 
situation was personally relevant to the children. More
generally, Shaver (1970) has pointed out that only if an
accident appears to the observer to possess 'high situational 
possibility' will he feel the need to assign responsibility in 
a systematic way. An association between locus of control 
orientations is therefore the more likely to emerge in contexts j
which engage children's interests and 'make sense' to them. In j
!
Experiment 3, although all the stories concerned incidents !
relating to children's interests and pastimes, it is possible |
that they depicted events in too simple a way to bring out |
locus of control differences. Much of real life is more !
i
complicated, problematic and personally threatening, and i
therefore more likely to impinge upon our personal i
!
idiosyncracies. As Furnham et al (1 9 8 3, p.323) have suggested, ■
i'subjects are often coerced into providing data that they are \
unhappy with, not confident about, and which do not tap their j
Iabilities, cognitions or relevant processes'. The I
attributional measure developed for the remaining experiments I
therefore involves a situation which is arguably more realistic i
and presents more of a dilemma, involving an actor whose 
culpability is uncertain in view of various mitigating 
circumstances.
The next three factors, those concerning the ambiguity of 
the actor's guilt, the severity of the outcome, and the 
perceived similarity between subject and actor, will be treated 
together since evidence suggests that they interact. Several 
writers have pointed out how some degree of ambiguity must be
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present In a situation if there is to be room for personal 
interpretation (Kelley, 1 9 6 7; Mischel, 1977; Nowicki and Duke, 
1 9 8 3 ; Phares et al, 1971; Rotter, 1975). The argument is that 
differences between internals and externals are more likely to 
emerge under conditions which are ambiguous than under those 
which are highly structured since, if cues are explicit, 
differences in response style will be depressed. In contrast, 
if there is any chance of the actor's innocence, the observer 
will fall back on expectancies generalized from past 
experience. Evidence from a study by Dollinger and Taub 
(1 9 7 7 ), that external children show greater interest and 
perform better if the purpose of the task is made clear whilst 
internals are relatively unaffected, tends to support the 
general proposition that locus of control tendencies are 
affected by the degree of structure in a situation. It is 
interesting in this connexion to note that the few significant 
correlations which were obtained between locus of control and 
attribution of responsibility in Experiment 3 were in relation 
to the Justification level of commission, in which the mixture 
of aggressive and altruistic behaviour probably created some 
ambiguity about the perpetrator's guilt.
In a study with adults. Phares and Wilson (1972) could 
find no evidence of a significant guilt ambiguity x locus of 
control interaction - perhaps because the presence of doubt was 
too obvious to provide sufficient ambiguity of guilt. However, 
what did emerge was a highly significant triple interaction 
between locus of control, ambiguity, and severity of outcome. 
This effect led the authors to postulate that it is the 
combined presence of outcome seriousness and situational
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ambiguity which is crucial. The seriousness of the victim's 
injuries in the context of mitigating circumstances serves to 
increase the attributor's dilemma, thus more readily engaging 
the internal's generalized expectancy to assume that the actor 
is responsibile; but when outcomes are not serious and guilt is 
not obvious, both internals and externals will operate the 
principle of 'innocent until proved guilty'. In a study with 
senior high school students, Sosis (197^) found that internals 
attributed more responsibility than externals or moderates to 
the perpetrator of an accident in which the victim's broken 
leg, dislocated shoulder and multiple contusions (no doubt 
perceived as serious!) were clearly not the result of intention 
but of negligence. This finding would seem to demonstrate how 
the observer’s locus of control can be projected on to a 
defendant whose guilt is unclear but whose behaviour has 
produced serious results. The failure to provide such a 
combination of situational and outcome variables may explain 
the failure of Schiavo (1973) to find a link between 
internality and attribution of responsibility for an accident.
The impact of the combined effects of situational 
ambiguity and outcome seriousness in relation to attributional 
style and locus of control was extended still further in an 
investigation by Kauffman and Ryckman (1979). who added, as a 
third variable, the perceived similarity between subject and 
defendant. Support was received for the hypothesis that 
internals, in comparison with externals, would be harsher in 
their judgements of similar others in an ambiguous situation 
involving serious crime, whilst externals would attribute more 
responsibility to dissimilar others. The reason suggested for
- 176 -
the first effect was that internals would assume that the 
defendant, like the attributor, would be willing to accept the 
consequences of his action. In contrast, externals would see a 
personally similar actor as likely to be controlled by outside 
forces. For comparable reasons, when the defendant was 
personally dissimilar to the subject, the effects would be the 
reverse. The Kauffman and Ryckman study thus demonstrates the 
importance of controlling for a range of factors if an 
association is to be found between attribution of 
responsibility and locus of control.
Thus, taken together, the results of the above 
investigations would seem to suggest that internal subjects 
will be more likely than external subjects to attribute 
responsibility to an actor for personal injury if each of the 
following conditions are present: (i) the context is relevant
to the subject, (ii) the attributional situation is ambiguous, 
(ill) the outcome is serious, and (iv) the actor is perceived 
as personally similar to the subject. It would appear that, in 
order to engage differences in locus of control tendencies in 
attributing responsibility to others, no one of these factors 
is sufficient but each is necessary.
Attributions to a victim
So far, the arguments in this chapter have centred around 
the characteristics of the subject, actor, situation and 
outcome. But what of attributions in relation to knowledge 
about the victim? Piaget (1932) addressed this issue in his 
analysis of immanent justice, which was conceptualized in terms
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of the young child's need to 'affirm the existence of automatic 
punishment which emanates from things themselves' (p.250).
Thus the collapse of a bridge which leads to a child falling 
into water is construed by some children as a punishment for 
stealing. According to Piaget, belief in immanent justice 
'originates in a transference to things of feelings acquired 
under the influence of adult constraint' (ibid.. p.2 6 0) and 
that, as adult constraint diminishes with age, so do children's 
beliefs in immanent justice. Piaget also explains the impact 
of age in terms of the child's growing experience of a mismatch 
between a person's virtue and adversity which befalls him.
Recent studies, however, have yielded inconsistent 
findings regarding developmenal trends in immanent justice 
beliefs. Percival and Haviland (1978) did find a decline with 
age from 5 to 10 years, as did Freeman and Daly (198Ü) from U 
to a years. In contrast, Fein an Stein (1977)» although 
finding an increase in 'immanent reward' judgements, found no 
significant age effects with regard to 'immanent punishment' 
from 6 to 9 years. Between U and 9 years, Karniol (198O) found 
neither a decline in the incidence of misdeeds cited as 
producing adversity ('immanent causality') nor an increase in 
the attribution of the adversity to chance 
('chance-continguity').
The immanent justice hypothesis fails to deal with two 
problems. The first concerns the possibility that attributing 
some responsibility for adversity to a victim does not 
necessarily reflect immanent justice beliefs. Karniol (198O) 
found that some children will explain the contiguity between
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misdeed and misfortune by trying to provide a rational link 
before attributing the misfortune to chance. For instance, 
falling might be perceived as the result of carelessness which 
arose from thinking about the misdeed. Karniol found that this 
type of reasoning became more common with age, a trend she 
finds consistent with Piaget’s (1930) analysis of the child's 
changing conception of physical causality. This is a topic 
which Piaget did not integrate into his ideas on immanent 
justice, but it helps to explain why older children - and 
adults too - sometimes attribute responsibility to a victim.
The younger child is not concerned with linking cause and 
effect, whereas the older child tries to seek a plausible, 
naturalistic explanation to provide the mediating link. A 
further difference is that the older child sees the victim's 
contribution to the adversity as a necessary but not sufficient 
condition (Karniol, 1980).
A second problem is that attribution of responsibility to 
a victim who is innocent could not be interpreted in terms of 
immanent justice theory. In contrast, the 'just world' 
hypothesis (Lerner, 1965» 1970, 1971, 1980; Lerner and Miller,
1 9 7 8) would predict that a blameless or even virtuous victim 
could be held somewhat responsible for his or her misfortune. 
The hypothesis is based upon the individual's motivational 
needs rather than his or her level of cognitive development.
The victim of misfortune is judged responsible for his or her 
fate since 'individuals have a need to believe that they live 
in a world where people generally get what they deserve'
(Lerner and Miller, 1978, p.1030). We resist believing that
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others can suffer unjustly since we would then be forced to 
admit to the unsettling prospect that we too could suffer 
unjustly. Faced with the occurrence of apparent unjust 
suffering, our reaction is therefore to persuade ourselves that 
those who experience adversity must somehow deserve to do so. 
Heider (1958), too, recognized that 'misfortune, sickness, 
accident are often taken as signs of badness and guilt* (p.235, 
emphasis added). However, although numerous studies have 
invoked the 'just world' hypothesis to explain why adults 
sometimes blame innocent victims (e.g. in cases of rape), 
research in this paradigm has not so far involved the 
attributions of children.
If children of Primary school age possess 'just world' 
beliefs, they could be expected to see adversity deserved not 
only in the case of a 'naughty' victim but also, if to a lesser 
extent, in the case of an apparently 'good' victim. In the 
former case, the occurrence of the accident would confirm 
belief in a just world. In the latter case, while some 
children would probably feel impelled to suspend their 'just 
world' beliefs and to feel benevolent towards the victim, 
others would feel so threatened by the situation that they 
would dogmatically hold on to their beliefs and manipulate the 
evidence accordingly.
We can now summarize how these three theories concerning 
attributions to a victim would lead to different predictions as 
regards children's attributions to 'good' and 'naughty' 
victims. (1) The immanent justice theory would predict that a 
'naughty victim' will be held responsible as a consequence of
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the bad behaviour; in the absence of a misdeed, a 'good* victim 
will not be seen as responsible for adversity. Inconsistency 
in the literature make age effects difficult to predict, but 
certainly no Increase in immanent justice explanations would be 
expected. (2) The 'mediating causality' theory would also 
predict that a 'naughty' victim will be held responsible, but 
the explanation would be in terms of a postulated naturalistic 
causal link to explain the contiguity between the misdeed and 
misfortune. The 'mediating causality' theory would also allow 
for responsibility to be attributed to a 'good' victim, but 
attributions would be less likely since presumably the 
identification of a plausible naturalistic link would be less 
straight-forward. As regards age differences, Piaget's (1930) 
analysis of children's developing concepts of causality, 
together with the findings of Karniol (19SO), suggest that 
older children would be more likely to posit a mediating causal 
link when evaluating a victim's responsibility for the 
occurrence of adversity. (3) 'Just world' theory would predict 
that both a 'good' and 'naughty' victim would be judged 
negatively. The misfortune which befalls a 'naughty' victim 
confirms the ob'^server's belief in a 'just world', while that 
which befalls a 'good' victim would cause subjects who have 
strong 'just world' beliefs to feel impelled to attribute some 
responsibility to the victim and to see the adversity as 
deserved. No age effects in relation to 'just world' concepts 
are predicted in the absence of relevant previous research with 
children.
If locus of control is also taken into account in the 
way a victim is judged in a situation where the subject has
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identified with the perpetrator, externals, compared with 
internals, could be expected to attribute more responsibility 
to the victim since to do so would be characteristic of their 
tendencies to externalize responsibility. In relation to the 
victim's known behaviour before the accident, it could be 
further predicted that externals will be especially motivated 
to treat a 'naughty' victim harshly since they would wish to 
capitalize on shortcomings in the victim's behaviour.
The remaining four experiments in this thesis are focussed 
upon the issues raised in this chapter. In general terms, the 
aim was to test the expectation that children with an internal 
rather than external locus of control will be more likely to 
attribute responsibility to an actor for an accident involving 
personal injury, given the various conditions which have been 
discussed - i.e. the accident is serious and arises in a 
context relevant to the subjects, who identify with the actor 
whose guilt is ambiguous. A further but related aim is to test 
the expectation that attributions to a victim will be affected 
by the subject's knowledge of the victim's behaviour before the 
accident occurred. The impact of locus of control will also be 
examined in relation to this factor, and results across locus 
of control orientations will be considered in terms of immanent 
justice concepts, the ability to engage in causal chaining, and 
beliefs in a 'just world'. More specific hypotheses are given 
in succeeding chapters.
— i 8 2 —
Chapter S
Experiment 5 
JUDGING OTHERS IN A COMPLEX SITUATION 
PILOT STUDY 1
INTRODUCTION
The main purpose of this pilot investigation was to assess 
the viability of a new instrument and procedure to measure 
attribution of responsibility for an accident by children of 
Primary school age. The characteristics of the measure are 
that the situation is relevant to the subjects, the accident is 
serious, there is room to doubt the culpability of the main 
story character with whom subjects personally identify, and the 
behaviour of the victim is manipulated to be either good or 
naughty. The measure thus attempts to meet the various 
criteria, discussed in the last chapter, which are needed to 
test the hypothesis that attribution of responsibility will 
vary as a function of subjects' locus of control and knowledge 
of the victim's general behaviour prior to the accident.
It will help to explain the features of the attribution 
measure if an outline of the narrative is given first.
The story involves a child, who, after inadvertently 
breaking a glass bottle on a park footpath, succumbs to a 
friend's invitation to ride a new bicycle before disposing of
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all the broken glass. Subsequently, a four year-old girl falls 
over on the broken glass and badly cuts herself. The narrative 
is varied so that (a) the actor is the subject him/herself or 
another child and (b) the victim, just before the accident is 
behaving well or badly. The actor’s name is male or female 
according to the sex of the subject, in view of Shaver's (1970) 
finding, confirmed in a recent study with children (Condry and 
Ross, 1 985), that sex of actor can interact with sex of 
observer to influence attributions. The victim is a small girl 
because it was thought that subjects would be unlikely to 
identify with her. As Shaver (1970) has pointed out, where a 
perceiver is a possible victim, attribution can be different.
Informal discussion with children during the course of 
previous studies had suggested that a situation of this kind 
would be likely to elicit genuine attributional responses. A 
park was considered an appropriate context since, unlike a 
school or at home, there is relatively little situational 
constraint, and a range of behaviours might be considered 
appropriate (Price and Bouffard, 197%, cited in Monson, 1983), 
thus making it more likely that individual differences in 
attributional style would emerge. The general liking which 
children have for bicycles was confirmed during the course of 
Experiment 6 when, using a seven-point rating scale, 90 per 
cent of eight year-olds and 88 per cent of 10-11 year-olds 
endorsed the statement ’I like riding my bike' as either 'very 
true' (rating 7) or 'quite a lot true' (rating 6) (apparently 
only a very few children not owning a bicycle).
Guilt ambiguity was a less straight-forward matter to
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arrange, but was facilitated by employing two features which so 
far seem to have been neglected from attributional work with 
children. The first was that the actor’s behaviour was not one 
of commission but of omission. Such cases are common in law, 
involving as they do the notion of obligation or duty (Hart and 
Honore, 1959). Fincham and Jaspars (198O) point to two 
experiments (with adults) in which the amount of responsibility 
attributed in cases of omission was less than in those of 
commission when the obligation to act was moral or prudent 
(removing an object from a path), though not when it was legal 
(observing statutory safety precautions). It would thus seem 
that acts of omission can call upon different attributional 
tendencies, whilst role expectancies can affect the ambiguity 
of the situation. Further, as Fincham and Jaspars point out, 
since harm arising from an act of omission is not a direct 
result of what someone actually did, responsibility must 
necessarily be shared between the negligent actor and other 
factors. In view of the everyday significance attached to acts 
of omission, it is surprising that little work has been 
published in this area, and apparently only one (Schleifer et 
al, 1 9 8 3 ) has involved children as subjects, and here the story 
character was an adult.
The other ambiguating factor which is present in the new 
measure is intervention by a second actor. An intervening 
cause is one which breaks the chain of causation from the 
initial event to the final harm. The situation thus becomes 
problematic since the intervention could act as a mitigating 
factor, but there are no general rules for deciding whether it 
should. In such a predicament, subjects could be expected to
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resort to their locus of control expectancies generalized from 
past experiences. If the accident is additionally made 
foreseeable, internals rather than externals should evaluate 
the actor negatively since they would lean on this factor as a 
reason why main actor should accept responsibility.
In spite of the prevalence of legal and social problems 
associated with intervention by another person, few 
attributional studies have examined the effect of an 
intervening actor. Following Hart and Honore (1959). studies 
with adults suggest that the presence of an intervening cause 
does not affect the subject's judgement if the initial act is 
sufficient to produce the harm (Brickman et al, 1975) or if 
there is a clear duty not to perform the act (Shultz et al,
1979); however, as Hart and Honoré (1959) point out, 
attributions to an actor are likely to decrease if the 
intervention is voluntary rather an accidental, and if the 
actor could not have foreseen the intervention. In the present 
investigation, care was therefore taken to ensure that these 
conditions were met; the main actor's negligence in leaving 
broken glass on the path was a necessary but not sufficient 
condition to produce the little girl's injuries; there was no 
legal requirement that the glass must be removed from the path; 
the friend's intervention was intentional; and the main actor 
could not reasonably have foreseen that his/her friend would 
adopt an intervening role by constraining him/her from clearing 
up the glass. The inclusion of an intervening actor would not 
only help to create a predicament for attributors, but would 
also represent a situation more close to real life events than 
those in the simple vignettes characteristically used in
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research based on Heider.
The hypotheses in the present study concern the 
relationships between subjects' attributional style, on the one 
hand, and their locus of control tendencies and knowledge of 
victim's behaviour, on the other. Following the arguments on 
locus of control and attribution of responsibility presented in 
Chapter 2, together with the results of related studies with 
adults reviewed in the last chapter, it was assumed that, 
compared with externals, internals would attribute more 
responsibility to the main actor. In contrast, externals would 
be more likely to attribute responsibility to the intervening 
actor and to evaluate the victim harshly, such judgements being 
consistent with their tendencies to externalise
responsibility. The pilot study also included some exploration 
of subjects' evaluations of the victim in relation to her 
behaviour before the accident. This topic was discussed in the 
last chapter with reference to immanent justice concepts, 
causal chaining, and beliefs in a 'just world'. Each of these 
theories would suggest that attributions of responsibility to 
the victim would be more likely when her antecendent behaviour 
had been unacceptable. Attributions to a 'good' victim, 
however, could not be made in terms of immanent justice 
beliefs. They could be based upon a postulated mediating cause 
or the motivation to believe that those who suffer must have 
done something to deserve adversity. Experiments 7 and 8 
explored these possibilties in greater detail.
For this pilot study, it was decided to control for story 
character, the main actor being depicted either as another
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child or as the subject him/herself. The manipulation was 
thought useful in so far as individual differences in terms of 
locus of control, which concerns self-appraisal, would 
presumably be clearest when judgements were to self than when 
to other.
For the questioning procedure, it was decided to include 
some free response items, allowing subjects to explain events 
in their own words, and to subject answers to content 
analysis. This would allow a further set of hypotheses to be 
generated. Content analysis on children's free responses has 
been shown to be a viable proposition (Livesley and Bromley, 
1973; Peevers and Secord, 1973). Few attributional studies in 
social contexts have included the opportunity for children to 
comment freely on any scale, an exception being a recent 
investigation by Lalljee et al (1 9 8 3).
For pilot purposes, it was decided to assess the viability 
of free response items and content analysis by asking questions 
concerned with subjects' perceptions in three areas: (1) the
feelings of the main actor when realizing that someone had been 
hurt, (2) the reaction of the main actor when apprehended by 
the victim's mother, and (3) the culpability of any other 
actors. As regards the first of these, it was assumed that 
internals rather than externals would imagine the main actor 
feeling guilty since rational feelings of guilt are associated 
with an acceptance that one can regulate the behaviour of one's 
own which is recognized to have caused another person to suffer 
(Hoffman, 1983). In achievement situations, locus of control 
has been found to be an important determinant of affective
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reactions, internals being more likely than externals to 
experience feelings of guilt in failure situations (Weiner et 
al, 1978).
As regards reactions to the victim's mother, it was 
expected that internals would be more likely to imagine the 
main actor admitting responsibility, apologizing, and offering 
restitution in some way. Questions of this kind (to which 
others would be added in later studies) were expected to 
demonstrate 'self-serving biases’ in which the explanations 
serve to restore self-esteem (Lalljee, 198I; Lalljee et al, 
1 9 8 3 ). Grant and Ross (197%) have suggested that acts such as 
an apology for unintentional acts which cause harm are directed 
to restoring psychological equity. Another view is that, by 
expressing remorse publicly, negative repercussions for the 
harm-doer are reduced since he is then perceived as less 
aggressive. This suggestion has received support with both 
adults (Schwartz et al, 1978) and children (Darby and 
Schlenker, 1982). If internals felt more guilty than 
externals, they might be more likely to apologize to the mother 
of the victim.
The hypotheses can be summarized as follows:
(1) In comparison with externals, internals will attribute more
responsibility to the main actor.
(2) In comparison with internals, externals will attribute more
responsibility to the actor's friend, the victim's mother, and
the victim herself (especially in the 'naughty' condihlon); they 
will also be more likely to attribute the accident to bad luck.
(3) Internals will be more inclined than externals to suggest
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that the main actor* would experience feelings of responsibility 
and of guilt. Internals will also be more inclined to assume 
that the main actor would publicly admit responsibility; 
externals would be more inclined to assume that the actor would 
make excuses.
(%) The above differences in response style between internals 
and externals will be more evident when the subject him/herself 
is depicted as the main actor than when the subject is another 
person of the same age and gender, and has similar interests 
and hobbies.
(5) Subjects in general will be more likely to perceive the 
victim as responsible for the accident if there is evidence 
that the victim was behaving anti-socially at the time of the 
accident, and to feel more sorry for a victim who was..behaving 
well before the accident. Subjects will also attribute a 
measure of responsibility to the 'good' victim because either 
they are positing a causal link or they feel motivated to 
distort the evidence and evaluate the victim negatively in 
order to preserve beliefs in a 'just world'.
METHOD
Design. - Five factors, each with two levels, were combined 
in between-group design, viz. locus of control
(internality/externality), age (7-8/10-11 years), gender, mode 
of actor (Other/Self), and victim behaviour (Good/Naughty), as 
shown in the diagram below;
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Subjects. - Sixty-one children attending a First and Middle
school in Surrey took part in the study. Sixteen boys and 17 
girls were aged 7-8 years (range 7,10 to 8,9) and 13 boys and 
15 girls were aged 10-11 years (range 10,10 to 11,9). These 
comprised all the children of these age-groups in the school 
except for two younger boys and two older girls for whom 
parental consent for participation in the study was refused. 
From this original sample, an experimental sample of 32 
children was drawn, as described in the Procedure section 
below.
Materials. The Bialer-Cromwell locus of control test for 
children was administered to all subjects. Although this scale 
was seen to contain certain shortcomings, as outlined in the 
Introduction to Experiment 2, it was used in preference to the 
measure developed in Experiment 2 since it was easy to 
administer and had been validated with various samples of 
children aged 6-1% (Bialer, 196I; Gozali and Bialer, 1 9 6 8).
For the present study, compared with other published locus of 
control scales, it has the advantage that items are concerned 
with social situations rather than school achievement.
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The other* measure used was devised by the investigator and 
entailed the story of the attributional incident outlined in 
the previous section. With the victim in the 'good’ condition, 
the narrative in the Actor Other condition (with the principal 
and intervening actors male) was as follows:
One Saturday afternoon, John goes into the local park to 
meet a friend. He is excited because his friend has a new 
bike which he has said John can ride.
John gets to the park early. While he is waiting, he 
decides to open a bottle of coke which he has brought with 
him. The bottle is like the one you see on the table [a 
glass litre bottle of coke is exhibited].
But the bottle slips out of John’s hands, falling on to 
the concrete path and breaking into several pieces.
John picks up a piece of the broken bottle to put in a 
litter bin just by him.
But, just then, John's friend arrives with his new bike. 
'Hey, John!' he says. 'Come and have a ride on my new 
bike ! '
'Coming!' shouts John - and runs off to meet his friend, 
leaving the rest of the glass on the path. His friend runs 
after him.
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Meanwhile, a little girl age Ü is walking through the park 
with her mum. She is carrying some of her mum’s shopping 
in her doll’s pram.
The little girl’s mother stops to sit on a bench quite 
near where John had been standing. The girl gives her 
mother a kiss.
The little girl skips off along the path while her mother 
stays resting on the park bench.
Just as the little girl runs by the place where John had 
been standing, she trips and falls over on the broken 
glass. She is very badly cut and starts to scream.
John hears the little girl’s screams from across the park 
and turns round to see what has happened. He realizes that 
the little girl has fallen on to the broken glass which he 
left on the path.
When presented to girl subjects, the main actor’s name is Jane.
In the Actor Self condition, the main character is designated 
as ’ypu’. In the ’Victim Naughty’ condition, the seventh, 
eighth and ninth paragraphs are changed as follows;
Meanwhile a little girl age U is walking through the park 
with her mum. She keeps asking for more sweets, but her 
mum says that she has had enough sweets for the moment.
The little girl loses her temper and starts to hit her
1 9 3  -
mother.
The little girl runs off along the path. She is in a very 
bad temper because her mother won’t let her have any 
sweets.
Each paragraph in the story is illustrated by a bold line 
drawing presented on AÜ cards (see Appendix A5 for final 
version).
Procedure. - All children received the locus of control
measure in groups of five or six. The items were read out, 
subjects recording their answers by ringing ’yes’ or ’no’ on a 
response sheet. (’Yes’ preceded ’no’ for twelve of the 
twenty-three items, selected randomly, and ’no ’ preceded ’yes’ 
for the remaining items.)
A few days later, the AR measure was administered 
individually to a sub-sample of children who were drawn from 
the original sample on the following basis. Locus of control 
scores (M = 12.57, SD_ = 3.10 at 7-8 years; M = 13.63, SJD = 2.2% 
at 10-11 years) were split at the median, producing 16 internal 
subjects at each age level (scores of 13 or higher) plus 17 
external subjects at 7-8 years and 12 externals at 10-11 years 
(scores below 13). At each age, a random sample of eight 
Internals and eight Externals were then randomly assigned to 
the actor and victim behaviour conditions, so that one boy and 
one girl were in each cell (see diagram in Design section 
above). Although the numbers in each condition were too small 
to permit statistical analysis, they were judged sufficient to
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test the viability of the AR instrument in each cell of the 
design and to detect any clear patterns of results in relation 
to the hypotheses.
For attribution of responsibility, all subjects were 
tested individually by the investigator, as follows:
(a) The subject was escorted to the interview room by the 
investigator. If in the Self condition, he/she was 
photographed on arrival with a Polaroid camera, enabling prints 
to be available immediately. The subject’s photo was then 
displayed on the table as a reminder that the story to be 
heard, although imaginary, was about the subject him/herself.
If the subject was in the Other condition, he/she was 
questioned in an informal way about hobbies and interests in 
order that the investigator could facilitate the subject’s 
identification with the main actor in the story by saying,
’Well, as it happens, you’re going to hear a story about a 
boy/girl called John/Jane who also likes .... '
(b) The subject then heard the story, which had been recorded 
on tape by a female presenter, in either the ’victim good’ or 
’victim naughty’ condition, as appropriate. As the events in 
the story were related, the subject was shown the eleven 
pictures one by one and then asked to re-tell the story with 
the help of the illustrations. This episode was tape-recorded 
to test the possibility that internals and externals would 
’read’ different interpretations into the story. Following a 
suggestion by Furnham et al (1 9 8 3 ), subjects were then asked if 
they required any further information before giving their
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opinions about what happened in the story. No further 
information would in fact be supplied, but the data would 
enable modifications to be made in the story for future 
studies.
(c) The following open-ended questions (for * read the name of 
the main actor or ’you') were then put to the subject, whose 
responses were tape-recorded:
(i) When * hear(s) the screams coming from across the park, 
what do(es) * think and feel?
(ii) Now it so happens that the little girl’s mother had seen 
* drop the bottle and run off to meet a friend. So when the 
little girl falls on the glass and screams, her mum calls to * 
to come over to her. What does * say to the little girl’s 
mother?
(iii) Do you think that it was anyone else’s fault besides * ’s 
that the little girl got hurt?
(d) The subject then responded to a series of questions (order 
of presentation being counter-balanced between subjects) by 
pointing to a seven-point rating scale. This comprised a line 
at one extreme marked ’not at all’ and six rectangles of 
increasing height, labelled ’just a little’, ’a small amount’, 
’medium’, quite a lot’, ’very much’ and ’totally’. The 
rectangles were solid green strips pasted to an orange card 18 
inches long and 12 inches high. On one face of the card, the 
scale ran from left to right and on the other from right to 
left. Each face of the card was used for half the questions 
(chosen randomly for each subject separately), which were as 
follows (again, * = name of actor or ’you*):
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(1) How much do you think that the little girl got hurt because
of what * did? (Perception of causality.)
(2) How angry do you think we should be with * for the little 
girl getting hurt? (Blame judgement.)
(3) How much do you think that * deserves to be punished for 
the little girl getting hurt? (Punishment judgement.)
( Ü. ) How much do you think that the little girl deserved to have 
an accident?
(5) How much do you think that the accident was the little 
girl's fault?
(6) How sorry do you feel for the little girl?
(7) How much do you feel that the accident was just bad luck?
(8) How seriously do you think that the little girl was hurt?
(9) How much do you think that * should have known that an 
accident might happen when * went off with his/her/your friend?
The last two questions were designed to test the subject’s 
perceptions of the seriousness and foreseeability of the 
accident. Finally, as a check for victim behaviour, the 
subject was asked ’How was the little girl behaving just before 
she fell over - well, badly, or neither well nor badly?’
In the course of interviewing the younger subjects, it 
became evident that ratings of responsibility for the 
intervening actor would be useful. Accordingly, the following 
questions were added for the older subjects:
(10) How angry do you think we should be with the friend for 
the little girl getting hurt?
(11) How much do you think that the friend deserves to be 
punished for the little girl getting hurt?
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Instrumentation
This pilot study demonstrated the viability of the AR 
measure. Subjects appeared to enjoy their interviews, and were 
able to handle the questioning procedure without difficulty, 
except that a few of the seven year-olds had difficulty in 
responding to the open-ended questions. No subject asked for 
further information.
Ratings were scored from 0 (’not at all’) to 6 
(’totally’). Since cell numbers were so small, statistical 
tests were not appropriate, but patterns of results were 
matched against the hypotheses.
Tape-recordings of subjects’ re-telling of the story and 
their responses to the open-ended questions were transcribed. 
For each question, statements were divided into units of 
analysis (Holsti, 1969, p.136) - i.e. a single assertion. If a 
subject made more than one assertion which fell into the same 
category, only one endorsement was recorded. Intra-judgemental 
consistency after a period of two months was 95%. (In Pilot 2 
(Expt. 7) and the main investigation (Expt. 8) the reliability 
of unit coding is estimated more vigorously.) It had been 
anticipated that subjects might introduce evaluations of the 
actors during their re-telling of the story, and that the 
perceptions of internals could then be compared with those of 
externals. In the event, however, all accounts were purely
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descriptive.
With the exception of three of the 7-8 year-olds, subjects 
in the Self condition re-told the story referring to the main 
character as *1*, whilst those in the the Other condition used 
the actor’s name. Thus actor mode had generally been 
successfully manipulated. The accident was judged to be more 
serious by the younger subjects (M = 5.13, or ’very’ serious) 
than the older subjects (M = #.13, or ’quite a lot’ serious). 
All subjects except two at 7-8 years and one at 10-11 years 
considered that the main actor should have known that an 
accident might occur; thus foreseeability had been 
facilitated. Finally, all subjects in the ’Victim Naughty* 
condition identified the victim as having behaved badly before 
the accident; of those in the ’Victim Good’ condition, all 
children judged the victim to have been behaving well before 
the accident with the exception of three at each age who 
considered that the victim had behaved ’neither well nor 
badly’. Victim behaviour was thus considered to have been 
successfully manipulated.
Ratings by Internals v. Externals
The pattern of ratings concerning responses by internals 
V. externals revealed clear differences according to actor 
condition. As expected, for the three central questions 
concerning causality, blame and punishment, consistent support 
was received in the Self condition for the hypothesis that 
internals would attribute more responsibility than externals to 
the main actor. In the Actor Other condition, however,
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differences in attributing responsibility to the main actor 
tended to be smaller and inconsistent in direction. With 
respect to the intervening actor, whom the older subjects were 
asked to evaluate, differences between means were again clear 
and as expected in the Self condition, external subjects 
attributing more responsibility than internals; they were also 
as expected in the Other condition, but differences were 
narrower.
Some support for the internality hypothesis also emerged 
in subjects’ responses to the open-ended questions. Again, 
this was demonstrated mainly in the Actor Self condition, in 
which Internals were more likely than externals to assume that 
the main actor would feel guilty when the little girl was hurt; 
externals were more likely to suggest that the intervening 
actor, the victim, or (less usually) the victim’s mother was 
responsible.
Ratings according to victim condition
To test the hypotheses concerning victim condition, 
subjects were also asked how sorry they felt for the little 
girl, how much they thought the accident was her fault, and how 
much they thought that the accident was deserved. As expected, 
more fault was attributed to the ’naughty’ victim. No subject 
felt that the ’good’ victim deserved her misfortune. Therefore 
evidence from this pilot study does not suggest that children 
of this age hold strong ’just world’ beliefs, unless these were 
applied to the ’naughty’ victim alone. It seems likely that, 
in the case of the ’naughty’ victim, subjects were either
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perceiving the adversity in terms of immanent justice beliefs 
or were positing a naturalistic cause to explain the contiguity 
between the victim’s behaviour and the accident. The latter 
possibility could also apply to the small amount of fault 
attributed to the ’good’ victim. Finally, since no differences 
between victim behaviour conditions emerged in relation to 
feeling sorry for the victim, it seemed that subjects’ sympathy 
was based on her suffering without reference to her behaviour.
Implications for further investigation
These results were considered to have clear implications 
for the future orientation of the study. The first and most 
important arose from the different patterns of results 
according to actor mode. It was thought that the reason for 
these differences was that subjects in the Self condition had, 
by definition, identified with the main actor, whereas those in 
the Other condition had not done so. Indeed, the inconsistency 
in the direction of differences in the Other condition could be 
interpreted in terms of some subjects’ perceiving the actor as 
unlike them (Kauffman and Ryckman, 1979). It thus seemed 
evident that the attempt to facilitate personal similarity 
between subject and actor in the Other condition had been 
unsuccessful and that a more sophisticated procedure was 
needed.
Two changes in the AR measure were also thought 
desirable. If differences between internals and externals can 
be expected to emerge only if there is guilt ambiguity and a 
serious outcome (Phares and Wilson, 1972), then perhaps results
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in the Other* condition were not as hypothesized partly because 
these factors were not adequately operationalized in the AR 
measure. Consequently it was considered (i) that the 
intervention of the actor's friend should be made more 
dramatic, since it is this which makes the actor's guilt open 
to question, and (ii) that the statement concerning victim's 
injuries should be reworded to make the outcome more serious.
Additions to the ratings questions were also seen as 
desirable In order to give a more complete picture of subjects' 
attributional tendencies. It was therefore decided that, in 
future work, subjects should be asked to attribute 
responsibility to all the actors. In order to explore 
subjects' attributional understandings further, it was also 
considered that an open-ended question, which allowed subjects 
to explain why the victim got hurt, should be asked at the 
start of each session. Finally, since a few of the very 
youngest subjects found it difficult to articulate responses to 
the open-ended questions, it was considered desirable to draw 
the sample of younger children entirely from eight year-olds.
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Chapter 9
Experiment 5 
FACILITATION OF PERCEIVED PERSONAL SIMILARITY 
BETWEEN SUBJECT AND ACTOR; A PROCEDURE
INTRODUCTION
The pilot study reported in the last chapter was partly 
concerned with the relationship between locus of control 
tendencies and attribution of responsibility in an accident 
situation. It was found that when the actor was portrayed as 
the subject him/herself, general support was obtained for the 
hypothesis that internals, in comparison with externals, will 
attribute more responsibility to the actor, while externals 
will attribute more responsibility to an intervening agent.
When the actor was portrayed as another child, however, 
differences between internals and externals were smaller and 
inconsistent in direction. It was thought that the differences 
in results according to actor condition may have arisen because 
the informal procedure for facilitating personal similarity 
between subject and actor was inadequate. The present study, 
therefore, addresses this issue.
One of the factors which may produce a motivational bias 
in our evaluations of others is the extent to which those we 
are judging are regarded as sharing our interests and 
attitudes. For instance, according to defensive attribution
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theory (Shaver, 1970), the observer of an accident will be more 
likely to attribute the damage or injury to chance if he 
identifies himself with the perpetrator, since the threat posed 
by the attributional situation will be thereby reduced. Again, 
observational learning may be facilitated if the subject 
perceives the model as possessing similar characteristics to 
himself (Bandura, 1969). However, in investigations concerning 
children’s moral understanding and attributional tendencies, 
perceived similarity between subject and actor is more often 
assumed than demonstrated. Thus, when subjects are presented 
with stimulus material in story form, the researcher can never 
be sure whether the child is making an impersonal and objective 
judgement or whether he is projecting himself into the 
situation.
In studies with adults, personal similarity between 
subject and story character has been manipulated by means of 
such variables as academic status (Shaver, 1970), smoking 
habits (McKillip and Posovac, 1975) and attitudes on a range of 
social issues (McKillip and Posovac, 1975? Kauffman and 
Ryckman, 1970), as well such factors such as age and gender. 
With adolescent boys, Finchara and Hewstone (1982) employed an 
aesthetic judgement task involving liking for similar 
paintings. However, a literature search did not reveal a 
method for manipulating personal similarity with younger 
subjects. It was therefore decided to develop a new procedure 
which could be used with children aged 8-11 years.
Essentially, the development of the procedure entailed 
the construction of an interests and pastimes measure and its
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administration to samples of eight and 10-11 year-olds. 
Responses were used to generate four descriptions, tailor-made 
for each subject; the descriptions were of another child of the 
same age and gender and ordered from personally very similar to 
the subject, through similar and dissimilar, to very 
dissimilar. It was predicted that children between the ages of 
8 and 11 would discriminate significantly between the four 
descriptions, and would rate as most like themselves the 
description which was intended to convey personal similarity. 
The procedure was initially developed in a Pilot Study 
involving a sample of #3 children. It was then validated with 
a sample of I65 children.
Four stages were involved in the development of the 
procedure, reported in detail in the Methods section of the 
Pilot Study below:
Stage 1; The main interests and pastimes of children between 
eight and twelve years were compiled into an inventory of 50 
items.
Stage 2 : Subjects rated their liking for each pursuit in the
inventory on a five-point scale.
Stage 3 : Four descriptions of imaginary children - very
similar to the subject, similar, dissimilar, and very 
dissimilar - were prepared, using the information from Stage 2.
Stage # ; About two weeks after Stage 2, subjects evaluated
each of the four descriptions generated at Stage 3 for personal
similarity, and their ratings were subjected to trend analysis.
I
— 205 —
I, Pilot Study 
METHOD
Subjects. - The sample consisted of #3 children from a First
and Middle school in Surrey (a different school from that used 
in Experiment 5). Ten boys and 10 girls were aged 8,1 to 8,11 
(M = 8 .5 0 ) and 13 boys plus 10 girls were aged 10,6 to 11,9 (M 
= 11.00). The sample was heterogeneous with respect to general 
ability and socio-economic status.
Measure and Procedure.
Stage 1 ; Using a similar procedure to Barker-Lunn (I9 6 9 , 1970),
discussions were held with teachers and with 8-11 year-olds in 
order to establish the activities which children of that age 
enjoy most, inside and outside school. This information was 
used to compile a 50-item inventory (see Appendix a 6 ) which 
included curriculum activities (e.g. doing sums, finding out 
about nature and animals), creative interests (e.g. playing the 
violin, painting pictures), and recreational activities (e.g. 
playing rounders, going ice-skating), as well as general 
pastimes (e.g. sewing, playing with pets). Items were listed 
randomly, the wording for each taking the form ’You like 
[activity]*.
Stage 2; The measure was administered verbally to both ages in 
groups of up to six. The children were told that the 
researcher was interested in finding out what boys and girls 
their age enjoyed doing, but that the exercise was not a test 
and the answers would not be disclosed to teachers or parents.
- 206 -
Following a brief training session, subjects completed 
five-point rating scales by ringing their response to each item 
as it was read out (twice), the choices being 'not true', 'a 
little true', 'fairly true', 'quite a lot true* and 'very 
true'. The order of choices was reversed for half the items, 
chosen randomly. In cases where the activity had never or 
rarely or not recently been attempted, subjects were instructed 
not to ring a response but instead to place a cross in the 
right-hand margin.
Stage 3 ; - Four descriptions of imaginary children were then
constructed for each subject, the age and gender of the 
character being the same as that of the subject. Each 
description contained six statements concerning the character's 
liking for particular activities. A 'very similar' description 
was based on four items which the subject had endorsed as 'very 
true' and two which had been endorsed as 'not true': thus there 
were four '(actor) likes ..' and two '(actor) does not like
.. . ' statements. Where a subject had appropriately endorsed
more than the required number of statements (as was usually the 
case), the items utilized were those which had been found to be 
least frequently endorsed by the relevant age and gender 
group. This arrangement ensured that the less usual pursuits 
were included and so maximized the chances of a subject's 
description being uniquely about him or her rather than a 
stereotype of children of the same age. (Where a tie occurred, 
the item was selected randomly.) In the few cases where less 
than the required number of items had been suitably endorsed,
use was made of those which the child had judged as 'quite a
lot true' and/or 'a little true'.
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Another description again depicted a character of the 
same age as the subject but otherwise represented a person 
'very dissimilar' to the subject. This was the obverse of the 
'very similar' description, consisting of two 'likes' and four 
'dislikes' statements. Given that, in general, only items 
endorsed as 'not true' (score 5) or 'very true' (score 1) were 
utilized and that each description comprised six interest 
statements, the Euclidean distance (i.e. the sum of the squared 
differences between the values assigned to each item) between 
the 'very similar' and 'very dissimilar' descriptions was 96 
[(6 X (5-1 )^ 3 . The two intermediate descriptions of 'similar' 
and ’dissimilar' characters were based upon Euclidean distances 
of 32 and 6# from the 'very similar' description. Table 9.1a 
indicates how descriptions were compiled on this basis and 
Table 9.1b gives an example. To help the children discriminate 
between statements, the items in each description were grouped 
so that those in the same similarity category (e.g. 'John likes 
....' or 'John does not like ...') were together.
A ten per cent sample of statements was checked to ensure 
that the wording was within the expected reading ability of 
children aged 8-11 (Mugford, 1970). Since the average reading 
age emerged as 8.92, all subjects were given the option of 
having descriptions read to them in order that they would not 
be at a disadvantage through reading inadequacy.
Stage ki - Two weeks after the second stage described above, 
subjects were individually tested as follows. One of the 
specially generated descriptions was presented, and the subject 
was then asked to rate the similarity perceived between
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Table 9.1a
VALUE OF ITEMS, WITH EQUIVALENT WORDING, FOR EACH DESCRIPTION
0
Very similar
Euclidean distance from ’very similar' description
32
Similar
64
Dissimilar
96
Very dissimilar
Example of
interest
topic
1 (likes)
1 (likes)
1 (likes)
1 (likes)
5 (does not like)
5 (does not like)
1 (likes).
3 (likes fairly 
well
4 (likes just)
a lit t le )
4 (likes just 
a lit t le )
2 (likes quite
a lot
4 (likes just 
a lit t le )
5 (does not like) 5 does not like) pottery
5 (does not like) 5 (does not like) dog
5 (does not like) 5 (does not like) models
1 (likes)
1 (likes)
5 (does not like) plays
I (likes)
5 (does not like) 1 (likes)
reading
football
Table 9.1b
EXAMPLE OF A SET OF FOUR DESCRIPTIONS BASED ON THE EXAMPLES OF 
INTEREST TOPICS FOR ONE SUBJECT IN TABLE 9.1a
'Very similar'
John in 10 years old.
John likes making pottery.
He also likes playing with his dog.
John likes making models*
He also likes acting in plays.
John does not like reading stories.
And he does not like playing football.
'Similar'
John is 10 years old.
John likes making pottery.
He likes reading stories quite a lot.
John likes playing with his dog fairly well. 
John likes making models just a Ittle .
He likes acting in plays just a lit t le .
He also likes playing football just a lit t le .
'Dissimilar'
John is 10 years old.
John likes acting in plays.
He also likes reading stories.
John does not like making pottery.
He does not like playing with his dog. 
John does not like making models.
He does not like playing football.
'Very dissimilar'
John is 10 years old.
John likes reading stories.
He also likes playing football.
John does not like making pottery.
He does not like acting in plays.
John does not like making models.
He does not like playing with his dog.
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him/herself and the child featuring in the description. The 
scale consisted of a 100mm line, the left pole labelled 'not 
like me' and the right pole labelled 'like me'. The subject 
(after a training session) was asked to place a cross on the 
line at a point which represented the perceived similarity with 
the character in the description. The three remaining stories 
were similarly presented, the sequence of presentation in terms 
of objective similarity being counterbalanced across subjects. 
Finally, the subject was presented with all four descriptions, 
in random order, and asked to arrange them in sequence from 
'least like me' to 'most like me'; choices were recorded.
RESULTS
For the exercise involving judgements of each description 
separately, subjects' ratings on the 100m line were scored from 
0 to 100, the higher the score the greater the perceived 
similarity. The results were then subjected to Page's L trend 
test for related samples (Page, 1963). The same test was used 
to test the significance of subjects' direct orderings.
Table 9.2 shows the average ratings which boys and girls 
assigned to each description at each age level. There is a 
clear pattern in the results across age and gender, the mean 
ratings indicating that, for each sub-sample, subjects 
discriminated between the four descriptions in the predicted 
direction. It is clear that the older subjects discriminated
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Table 9*2
AVERAGE RATINGS (PER CENT) IN PILOT STUDY
Description
N Very 
s imilar
Similar Dis­
similar
Very dis­
similar
L
8 years 
boys 10 8 9 . 50 #5.70 3 5 . 80 2 5 . 80 283*
girls 10 8 5 . 90 6 3 . 30 #5 . 30 2 5 . 90 278*
10-11 years 
boys 13 88. 00 5#. 15 37. 00 7. 39 376*
girls 10 8 9 . 20 5 0 . 30 #8. 00 3 . 50 288*
L = Page' s L value for rank 
*P < .001
s based on ratings
more sharply than the younger subjects between the 'very 
similar' and 'very dissimilar' descriptions. However, except 
for one boy and one girl, the score for the 'very similar' 
description was at least 78 in the case of the eight year-olds 
and 80 in the case of the 10-11 year-olds. Moreover, half the 
younger subjects and two-thirds (N=15) of the older subjects 
judged the character in the 'very similar' description to be 
'totally' like them. Table 9-2 also shows that, in every case, 
the L value in Page's test demonstrated a significant trend at 
the .001 level, thus enabling the null hypothesis to be 
rejected in favour of the ordered alternative.
The average place values which subjects gave to each 
description when invited to order the descriptions directly 
(Table 9.3) also suggests a clear pattern of discrimination in 
the predicted direction, whilst the L value in each case 
demonstrates a significant trend at the .001 level.
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Table 9.3
AVERAGE PLACEMENTS IN PILOT STUDY WHEN DESCRIPTIONS WERE
ORDERED DIRECTLY
Description
Very Similar Dis- Very dis- L
similar similar dissimilar
8 years
boys 10 3.90 2.60 2,10 l.#0 290*
girls 10 3.55 2.8# 2.11 1.67 282*
10-11 years
boys 13 3.85 2.62 2.23 1.31 377*
girls 10 3.70 2.80 2.10 l.#0 288*
L = Page's L value for ranks based on direct ordering
*p < .001
DISCUSSION
The results of the procedure described demonstrate that 
children as young as eight years discriminate significantly 
between four characters whose descriptions are ordered from 
'personally very similar' to 'personally very dissimilar'. 
Further, almost all the children perceived the 'very similar' 
character to be substantially like them.
Although all the children clearly enjoyed the exercises, a 
few of the younger subjects took some time to master the rating 
procedure. The device, which involved placing a mark at an 
appropriate point on a 100mm line, had been employed in order 
to maximize variability of scores between subjects. However, 
on reflection, it unwarrantably assumed that subjects had 
developed a sophisticated concept of arithmetical proportion. 
Since difficulty in eliciting evaluations had not been noticed
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in earlier studies which employed rating scales consisting of 
labelled rectangles of ascending size, it was thought sensible 
to revert to the use of this more conventional method for the 
main study.
II. Main Study 
METHOD
Subjects. - The sample consisted of I65 children from four
schools in a London borough. Thirty boys and 22 girls were aged 
8,0 to 8,11 (M = 8.#5) and 58 boys plus 55 girls were aged 
10,10 to 11,9 (M = 11.39). The schools were chosen with the 
help of the local inspectorate to meet the criteria of 
heterogeneity with respect to general ability and parents’ 
socio-economic status; all but two children were white. Verbal 
reasoning scores (Moray House Test 93) made available by three 
of the schools (N = 1 3 0 ) indicated an intellectual spread (M = 
1 0 5 .1 5 , sp^  = 1 5 .0 9 ) close to the national average. One of the 
schools was Roman Catholic.
Measure and Procedure. - The interests and pastimes inventory 
described in the Pilot Study above was administered to all 
subjects in groups of up to six, following the procedure 
described in Stage 2 of the Pilot Study. Four descriptions 
were then constructed, as described in Stage 3* with the aid 
of a program specially compiled for use with a BBC-B computer. 
Once a subject’s age, four 'likes’ and two 'dislikes' are fed
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in, the computer* automatically prints out the four descriptions 
of another child who is 'very similar' to the subject, j
'similar', 'dissimilar', and 'very dissimilar'. Subjects Ij
evaluated the descriptions as in the pilot work (Stage #) 
except that they used a seven-point scale instead of placing a 
cross on a 100mm line. The scale was in the form of a series 
of boxes of ascending height labelled 'not at all like me' 
through 'just a little, a small amount, medium, quite a lot, 
very much' to 'totally like me'. It was thought that this 
seven-point scale would be more manageable by the younger 
subjects than the line scale previously employed.
RESULTS
For the exercise involving judgements of each description 
separately, subjects' ratings were scored from O ('not at all 
like me*) to 6 ('totally like me'). The results were then 
subjected to Page's L trend test for related samples (Page, 
1 9 6 3 ). The same test was used to test the significance of 
subjects' direct orderings.
Table 9 .# shows the average ratings which boys and girls 
at each age level assigned to the descriptions. There is a 
clear pattern in the results across age and gender, the mean 
ratings indicating that, for each sub-sample, subjects 
discriminated between the four descriptions in the predicted 
direction. However, unlike the pilot results which were based 
on a percentage scale (Table 9.2), the overall difference
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Table 9.%
AVERAGE RATINGS (SCALE 0 - 6 )  IN MAIN STUDY
Description
N Very
similar
Similar Dis­
similar
Very dis­
similar
L
8 years
boys 30 5. 30 3. #0 2 . 07 1. 00 86#*'
(0.88) (1.69) (1. #.#) (1.##)
girls 22 #. 95 2. 95 1. 73 1. 09 637*(1.00) (1.68) (1 .2 8 ) (1.5#)
10-11 years
boys 58 5. 1# 2. 90 1. 83 1. 3# 16#9*
(1.05) (1.68) (1.39) (1.#0)
girls 55 5. 02 2. 87 2. 0# 1. 15 157#*
(1.33) (1.52) (1.23) (1.3#)
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard devi ations
L = Page ' s L value for ranks based on ratings *p < . 001
between the 'very similar' and 'similar' descriptions (2.11) is 
greater than differences between the other descriptions (0.75 
and 1.06). Table 9.# also shows that, in every case, the L 
value in Page's trend test, demonstrated a significant trend at 
the .001 level, thus enabling the null hypothesis to be 
rejected in favour of the ordered alternative.
The average place values which subjects gave to each 
description when invited to order the descriptions directly 
(Table 9.5) also suggests a clear pattern of discrimination in 
the predicted direction, whilst the L value in each case 
demonstrates a significant trend at the .001 level.
From Table 9.6 it can be seen that nine out of ten 
subjects (and every one of the subjects among the younger boys) 
perceived the character in the 'very similar' description as at 
least 'quite a lot' like them. None of the younger subjects or
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Table 9.5
AVERAGE PLACEMENTS IN MAIN STUDY WHEN DESCRIPTIONS WERE
ORDERED DIRECTLY
Description
Very Similar Dis- Very dis­
similar similar similar
8 years 
boys 
girls
30
22
3.80 2.87 1.73 
3.77 3.1# 1.77
1 . 60 
1. 32
866*
6#6*
10-11 years
boys
girls
58
55
3.76 2.76 2.02 
3.76 2.65 2.10
1. #8 
1. 53
1672*
1580*
L = Page's L value for ranks based on placements *p < .001
older boys gave a rating below 3 and only four of the older
girls did so. Not one of the 165 subjects judged the character
in the 'very similar' description as 'not at all' like him or 
her.
The results for the description depicting a 'very 
dissimilar' character are not quite so impressive (Table 9.7), 
but overall approximately 8l% of the S year-olds and 82% of the 
10-11 year-olds judged the character in the description to be 
no more than 'a small amount' like them, whilst only five of 
the younger children and eight of the older children gave a 
rating of # or more.
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DISCUSSION
The results confirmed that children as young as eight 
years discriminate significantly between four characters whose 
descriptions are ordered from 'personally very similar' to the 
subject to 'personally very dissimilar'. The average ratings 
(Table 9.Ü) show a consistent pattern of discrimination for 
each age and gender in the predicted direction. Further, 
subjects discriminated more clearly between the 'very similar' 
and 'similar' descriptions than between the three descriptions 
below 'very similar*. Roughly nine out of ten subjects 
perceived the 'very similar* character to be at least 'quite a 
lot' like them, whilst at least eight out of ten judged the 
'very dissimilar' character to be no more than 'a small amount' 
like them.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The results of this Study supported the hypotheses that 
subjects would perceive themselves as personally similar to the 
story character in descriptions designed to represent such 
similarity, and that they would discriminate significantly 
between four descriptions ordered from personally 'very 
similar* to 'very dissimilar*. This procedure could thus be 
used with confidence by a researcher wishing to facilitate a 
perception of personal similarity between subject and actor. 
However, for each use, it would be prudent to revise the 
inventory in the light of current popular pastimes and the
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known interests of the population under review.
A summary of the procedure which an an investigator would 
adopt would be as follows:
(i) check that the inventory items (Appendix a 6) reflect 
the interests of the population being studied, and amend 
as appropriate;
(ii) administer the measure as described in the Procedure 
section of the Pilot Study (Stage 2);
(lii) calculate the frequency by which each item is 
endorsed as ’very true’ or ’not true* (each age and gender 
separately) in order to facilitate (iv);
(iv) for each subject, identify four ’very true’ and two 
’not true’ statements for use in the ’very similar’ 
description, selecting those which are least frequently 
endorsed by the relevant age and gender group;
(V ) produce the descriptions required (e.g. a ’very 
similar' and a ’very dissimilar’ description, or a ’very 
similar* one only), following the form given in Table 
9.1b. Although the preparation of descriptions is a 
little laborious, the time taken to produce descriptions 
is enormously reduced by the use of the computer program, 
which also ensures consistency of presentation.
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Chapter 10
Experiment 7 
JUDGING OTHERS IN A COMPLEX SITUATION 
PILOT STUDY 2
INTRODUCTION
In the last chapter, a report was given of the development 
of a procedure to facilitate identification between subject and 
actor in a story. Briefly, it was found that children as young 
as eight years could distinguish significantly between four 
descriptions of another child which were based on the subject's 
responses to an interests and pastimes inventory and ordered 
from 'very similar* to 'very dissimilar*. The main aim of the 
present experiment was to test the effect of using this 
procedure in an investigation to follow up Experiment 5. In 
that pilot investigation, subjects had been presented with a 
story of an accident in which the main actor succumbs to a 
friend's invitation to ride a new bicycle before fully 
disposing of the remains of a glass bottle which he/she had 
dropped on a public path in a park. Subsequently, a 
four-year-old girl had fallen on the broken glass and badly cut 
herself. When the main character was portrayed as the subject, 
support was found for the hypothesis that internals will 
attribute more responsibility to him/her than will externals; 
the latter are more likely to attribute responsibility to the
intervening actor. However, when the main character was
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portrayed as another child, differences in ratings tended to be 
narrow and inconsistent in direction, the results in general 
not supporting the hypothesis. Because the relation between 
locus of control and attribution of responsibility was 
generally consistent with the hypothesis when actor was self 
rather than other, it was concluded that subjects in the latter 
condition had not identified with the main actor, despite an 
attempt to facilitate this through informal conversation. The 
argument now was that, by employing the new procedure to 
facilitate personal similarity between subject and actor, 
results would come into line with those from the Self condition 
in Pilot 1.
In this second pilot study, the AR measure consisted 
essentially of the same story-picture presentation used in 
Pilot 1. The characteristics of this measure are that, in 
order to tap subjects' locus of control tendencies, the 
narrative is situationally relevant, the victim's injuries are 
serious, and the guilt of the main actor is ambiguous (Kauffman 
and Ryckman, 1979: Phares and Wilson, 1972; Sosis. 197&).
However, in the light of the results of Pilot 1, it was decided 
to heighten the last two of these factors, as described in the 
Methods section below.
Also as in the first pilot study, the attribution exercise 
included both ratings and open-ended questions, but with 
certain alterations and additions. For ratings, three changes 
were made in the dependent measures. First, in order to 
provide more data for comparing internals with externals,
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subjects were also asked to attribute responsibility to the 
victim's mother. Secondly, blame was operationalized by the 
question 'How angry should we feel with (actor)' rather than 
'...be with (actor)' in case subjects were inclined to 
interpret the task as one involving judgements of reprimand or 
punishment. Thirdly, in view of the difficulties inherent in 
operationalizing AR for children (Expts, 1  and 3). it was 
decided to include questions which elicited evaluations of 
fault. In order not to overload subjects, judgements of 
punishment were omitted. AR was thus tested with respect to 
causation, fault and blame.
For the open-ended questions, subjects were asked, as in 
Pilot 1 ,  to suggest what the main actor was thinking when the 
screams were heard and what would be said to the victim's 
mother. Additionally, three further questions were posed. One 
invited subjects to suggest why they thought the victim got 
hurt. The hypothesis here was that, if subjects were 
identifying with the main character, internals rather than 
externals would spontaneously mention the contribution of the 
main actor; in contrast, externals would be more likely to 
focus on other factors, such as the role of the intervening 
actor or the behaviour of the victim. The question would also 
enable further exploration of the nature of subjects' beliefs 
in relation to the victim's responsibility for the accident, a 
problem discussed in Chapter 7  ( P P 1 7 7 - 1 8 2 ) .  A second 
additional question concerned subjects' perceptions of the main 
actor's response to an enquiry from a friendly neighbour. It 
was thought that subjects would be more inclined to acknowledge 
responsibility to an adult whom they did not perceive as
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threatening (cf. the victim's mother) since, as Lalljee (ig8l; 
Lalljee et al, 1983) has pointed out, the explanations which 
one person offers to another depend on the role of the other 
and what is perceived as an acceptable account within that 
relationship. Explanations should thus be treated as events 
within an interactional framework (Lalljee et al, 1983). In 
the present study the kind of explanation offered to the 
victim's mother may not be of the same kind as that offered to 
a friendly and familiar person who is detached from the event.
Finally, subjects were asked how the actor's mother would 
react when she heard about the events. This represented an 
attempt to elicit data on perceptions of child rearing 
practices. Previous findings have shown that mothers of 
internals are more likely to be suggestive rather than 
directive (Loeb, 1975), less negative in their statements 
(Chandler et al, 1980), and less overt in their control, 
warmer, and more supportive in their attitudes (Bradley and 
Caldwell, 1979; Gordon et al, 1981). Some evidence (Halpin et 
al, 1 9 8 0), but not all (Buriel, 198I), suggests that mothers of 
externals tend to be more punitive in dealings with their 
children. In this study, the expectation was that externals 
would be more likely than internals to perceive mothers as be 
punitive, whilst internals would be more likely to perceive 
mothers as encouraging feelings of internal responsibility by 
reasoning, e.g. by inviting the child to reflect upon the 
consequences of his/her behaviour in relation to others. Of 
course, asking children how they perceive the behaviour of 
their parents is not the same as finding out how parents 
actually behave towards them, but attitudes attributed to
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parents by adult subjects have been found to similar to results 
based on observational data (Crandall and Crandall, 1983).
In the first Pilot Study, the administration of the 
attribution measure was on a one-to-one basis. In this study, 
it was decided to test the viability of administration to small 
groups, subjects recording their ratings and responses to 
open-ended questions on paper. Whilst the main problem here 
was recognized to be subjects' ability to do justice to their 
ideas in writing, previous research had demonstrated how 
written responses from children as young as seven years could 
be successfully subjected to contents analysis (Livesley and 
Bromley, 1973)*
The hypotheses for this study, which extended those of 
Pilot 1, can now be summarized as follows:
(a) Ratings
(1) In comparison with externals, internals will attribute more 
responsibility to a personally similar main actor since those 
who believe that outcomes of their own behaviour are within 
their own control will be more likely to assume that others 
perceived as similar to themselves should accept responsibilty 
for their actions.
(2) In comparison with internals, externals will attribute more 
responsibility to actors other than the main actor 
(particularly the intervening actor) since those who believe 
that outcomes of their behaviour are controlled by factors 
outside themselves will be more likely to externalize 
responsibility in their attributions concerning personally 
similar others.
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(3) In the light of theories which suggest why attributions 
might be made with respect to a victim (immanent justice, 
causal chaining, 'just world' beliefs - reviewed on ppl77-l82), 
subjects in general will show some tendency to attribute more 
fault and more blame, and to perceive the accident as more 
deserved, in the case of the ill-behaved victim. In the light 
of the 'just world' hypothesis, there will also be some 
tendency to perceive the well-behaved victim as having done 
something to deserve the adversity. Externals will be 
especially likely to attribute responsibility to the 
ill-behaved victim and to believe that the accident was 
deserved since this would be in keeping with their general 
disposition to externalise responsibility. For similar 
reasons, externals will feel less sorry for the victim than 
will internals.
(b) Free responses
(1) In accounting for the victim's injuries, internals will be 
more likely to mention that the main actor was responsible, for 
the reasons given above. Conversely, externals will be more 
likely to attribute responsibility to another actor, 
particularly the intervening actor. Accounts might also give 
clues regarding the reasoning of subjects who attribute 
responsibility to the victim.
(2) In their perceptions of the main actor's feelings when 
learning about the victim's accident, internals will be more 
inclined than externals to suggest that the main actor would 
experience feelings not only of responsibility but also of 
guilt since a condition of the experience of guilt is 
acceptance of blame for lapses in behaviour which the subject
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accepts he/she can regulate.
(3) Internals will be more likely to assume that the main actor
would acknowledge responsibility when challenged by adult
authority rather than attempt to externalize responsibility.
(U) Subjects will be more inclined to acknowledge some 
responsibility for the accident to a friendly rather than to an
unfriendly adult since it is easier to be honest and open in an
unthreatening and sympathetic environment.
(5) Externals rather than internals will be more inclined to 
perceive the victim's mother as punitive because upbringing 
practices in which authority is enforced by punishment will 
tend to reinforce the idea of authority as externally based.
METHOD
Design. - Three factors were combined in a 2 (gender) x 2
(locus of control) x 2 (victim behaviour) between-group design, 
as shown in the diagram below:
Internals Externals
Victim
good
Victim
naughty
Victim
good
Victim
naughty
boys
girls
Subjects. - Thirty-five children (19 boys and 16 girls) aged
10 yrs. 6 months to 11 years 9 months took part in the study.
These children comprised the class of a First and Middle School 
in Surrey. Subjects were socially heterogneous; all were
— 2 2 —
white.
Measures. - The locus of control measure was the
Bialer-Cromwell scale for children (anglicized), as in Pilot 
1. The attribution of responsibility (AR) measure was as in 
Pilot 1 (see Methods section in Expt. 5) with two changes in 
wording. The first of these (original form in brackets) was to 
make the guilt of the main actor more ambiguous by emphasizing 
the role played by the intervening actor:
But, just then, John's friend arrives with his new bike. 
['Hey, John!', he says. 'Come and have a ride on my new 
bike.'] 'Hey, John!' he says. 'Never mind about that 
glass now. Come and have a ride on my new bike!'
The other change was designed to heighten the seriousness of 
the victim's injury:
Just as the little girl runs by the place where John had 
been standing, she trips and falls over on the broken 
glass. [She is very badly cut and starts to scream.] She 
cuts her face badly and starts to scream.
As in Pilot 1, the story was presented in two versions, 
one in which the victim's behaviour before the accident was 
portrayed as 'good', the other 'naughty'. Also as in Pilot 1, 
the main and intervening actors were given a masculine or 
feminine name to match the gender of the subject.
Identification between subject and main story character was 
facilitated by presenting subjects with a specially constructed
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description of the character based upon the subject’s interests 
and pastimes, using the procedure developed in the previous 
study.
Procedure. - All subjects received the locus of control
measure in six groups of 5-6, ringing their chosen answers on 
response sheets as in Pilot 1, The interests and pastimes 
inventory was administered during the same session, half the 
groups receiving this measure first and half the locus of 
control scale. Subsequently, the results of the interests 
measure were used to prepare descriptions representing personal 
similarity between each subject and the main actor in the AR 
story, following the procedure for 'very similar' descriptions 
outlined in the last chapter.
About two weeks' later, the AR measure was administered to 
subjects selected on the following basis. Locus of control 
scores (M = 1Ü.26, SD = 1.93) were divided at the median into 
those of 15 and above (internals) and those of lH and below 
(externals). Six boys and six girls were then drawn randomly 
from each locus of control category and randomly assigned to 
the two victim behaviour conditions so that there were three 
boys and three girls in each of the locus of control/victim 
categories. Administration of the AR measure was to four 
groups each comprising three internals and three externals of 
the same gender who had been placed in the same victim 
condition. The children sat in a classroom at separate tables 
spaced well apart. On each table was an A5 envelope containing 
the following:
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(1) an orange-coloured sheet on which was printed the
description of the main actor written specially for the
subj ect!
(ii) five white lined A5 sheets numbered 1 to 5-
(iii) fifteen green A5 sheets lettered A to O, each containing
a seven-point scale consisting of a line labelled ’not at 
all* and six rectangles of increasing height labelled 
’just a little’, through ’a small amount, medum, quite a 
lot, very much’ to ’totally’; (On eight of the sheets, 
selected randomly, the left pole of the scale was ’not at 
all’, while on the remainder it was ’totally’.)
Each group session proceeded as follows. First, subjects 
were told that they would be hearing a story and seeing some 
pictures about a boy/girl called John/Jane [referred to below 
as ’J ’] and what happened when this character went into the 
local park one Saturday afternoon. Subjects were also told 
that they would be asked to give their opinions about the 
events, but that the exercise was not a test and there were no 
right or wrong answers. After brief training in the use of the 
rating scales, it was suggested to subjects that, before the 
story was presented, they would no doubt like to know something 
about the main character. Accordingly, they were asked to 
extract from the envelope the orange sheet which contained the 
description of the actor, and to read it carefully twice. 
Following this, instructions were given to extract the green 
rating sheet marked ’A ’ and to place a tick on the scale to 
record their response to the question ’How much do you think 
that J is like you?’. This question acted as a design check
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for the personal similarity effect.
Subjects then heard the tape-recorded story either in the 
'victim good' or 'victim naughty' condition and with a boy or 
girl actor, as appropriate. As the events were narrated, 
eleven bold line illustrations were projected in turn on to a 
screen (Appendix A5). After the presentation had been 
repeated, subjects were asked to complete five free-response 
questions on the white lined sheets. They were told not to 
worry about spelling or neatness, and were again reminded that 
the exercise was not a test.
On the first lined sheet, subjects were asked to suggest 
one or more reasons for the little girl in the story getting 
hurt, completing the stem 'The little girl got hurt because 
....' On the second sheet, subjects were asked to record
anything which they thought J would think or feel when, at the 
end of the story, screams were heard from across the park. For 
the third question, the investigator said: 'Now I'm going to
tell you something that wasn't in the story. Someone saw J 
break the bottle and go off with his/her friend before picking 
up all the pieces and this person went and told the little 
girl's mum. So the mother, who was very angry, called J over 
to her. OK? Now, I want you to write down what you think J 
would say to the mother.'
Fourthly, subjects were told: 'Now I'm going to tell you
something else that wasn't in the story. Later that day, J was 
talking to a neighbour with whom he/she was really friendly - 
so friendly, in fact, that he/she used to call him/her
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unole/aunty. It turned out that this neighbour had heard all 
about what had happened in the park that afternoon. What do 
you think J says to the neighbour. Remember, J is really 
friendly with this person.’
For the final open-ended question, subjects were told;
'Later on that day, J's mum found out just what had happened. 
Now I want you to imagine that J's mum is just like your mum. 
Write down what you think J's mum does or says. Remember, she 
is just like your mother.'
Subjects were next asked to complete rating sheets 'B ' to 
'M', for which the following twelve questions were presented 
verbally in a pre-determined random order:
(1) How much do you think that the little girl got hurt because 
of what J did? (Perception of causality question.)
(2a) How much do you think it was J's fault that the little
girl got hurt? (Fault judgement.)
(2b, G,  d) [As 2a, but with respect to J's friend, the little 
girl and the little girl's mother.]
(3a) How angry do you think we should feel with J for the 
little girl getting hurt? (Blame judgement.)
(3b, c, d) [As 3a, but with respect to J's friend, the little 
girl and the little girl's mother.]
(il.) How sorry do you feel for the little girl?
(5) How much do you think that the little girl deserved to have 
an accident?
(6) How much do you think that the little girl's accident was 
just bad luck?
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Finally, subjects were asked the following questions as 
design checks. The first two questions were answered on rating 
sheets ’N' and ’O', the third by ringing the chosen answer on a 
separate sheet.
(i) How seriously do you think that the little girl was hurt? 
(Severity of accident check.)
(ii) How much do you think that J should have known that 
someone might get hurt when he/she went of with the friend? 
(Foreseeability check.)
(ill) Before she had an accident, do you think that the little 
girl was behaving well, badly, or neither well nor badly? 
(Victim condition check. )
RESULTS 
(a) Ratings
Ratings were scored from 0 ('not at all') to 6 
('totally'). Design check ratings for each cell were submitted 
to one-way analysis of variance, whilst AR ratings were 
submitted to 2 (locus of control) x 2 (victim behaviour) x 2 
(gender) analyses of variance: p was set at .05. ANOVA tables
are in Appendix B5.
Design checks. - The mean score for personal similarity 
between subject and main actor was it. 92 (SD = 1.01) with no 
significant differences between cells (F [7,16] < 1). This 
suggested that most subject regarded the actor as 'very much' 
like them. The effect was therefore judged to have been
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successful. The mean score for seriousness of accident was 
it. 38 (SD^  = 0 .6 5 )» with no significant differences between cells 
(F [7 ,16] = 1 .3 8 ). Since the accident had generally been 
perceived as 'quite a lot' or 'very' serious, the effect was 
judged acceptable. The mean score for foreseeability was 5.66 
(SD = 0.Ü8), with no significant differences between cells (F 
[7,163 < 1). All twelve subjects in the 'victim naughty' 
condition perceived the victim as behaving 'badly* before the 
accident. In the 'victim good' condition, seven subjects 
judged the victim to have been behaving 'well', the remaining 
five making neutral judgements ('neither well nor badly').
There was thus no overlap of responses between the two 
conditions,
Internals v. Externals. - Table 10.1 gives the mean scores 
of internals' and externals' evaluations of each actor across 
victim conditions. It was expected that, in comparison with 
externals, internals would attribute more responsibility to the 
main actor. The results for each attribution measure show 
consistent differences in the predicted direction between the 
locus of control groups, but for fault and blame these are more 
clear for girls (where differences are at least one point) than 
for boys (where differences are less than 1). However, for 
none of the three attribution measures did locus of control 
emerge as a significant main effect (F [1,16] = 2.45, p  > . 10 
for cause; 3.33, p < .10 for fault; 3.67, p < .10 for blame) or 
in a significant interaction with gender or victim behaviour.
Table 10.1 also gives evaluations of fault and blame in
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Table 10.1
MEAN EVALUATIONS BY INTERNALS AND INTERNALS
— — — — Boys — — —   Girls — — —
Target actor and 
Question topic
Ints. 
(N=6 )
Exts. 
( N = 6 )
Ints. 
(N=6)
Exts. 
( N = 6 )
Main actor 
Cause H . 67 3 . 50 4. 33 3. 33
(1.37) (1 .0 5 ) (0.82) (0 .8 2 )Fault 3 . 17 2. 50 3 . 67 2. 67
(1.47) (1.52) (0.82) (0.52)
Blame 3 . 50 2 . 83 4. 17 3 . 00
(1 .0 5 ) (1.47) (0.75) (0 .8 9 )
Intervening actor
Fault 3 . 00 3 . 50 3 . 00 4. 17
(1.41) (1.22) (0.89) (0.75)
Blame 3 . 67 4 . 00 2. 67 3 . S3
(1.03) (1 .2 6 ) (1.5 1) (1 .1 7 )
Victim
Fault 1. 50 1. 83 1. 17 1 . 67
(0.84) (1.7 2 ) (1.4 7 ) (1 .6 3 )
B1 ame 1. 33 1. 67 0. 83 2. 17
(1.21) (1.63) (0.9 8 ) (2.14)
Desert of accident 1. 50 1. 33 1. 17 1. 33
(1.38) (1.86) (0 .7 5 ) (1.75)
How sorry for 3 . 50 4. 33 3 . 67 2 . 67
(2.17) (0.82) (1.86) (1.63)
Victim's mother
Fault 0 . 67 1 . 17 0 . 50 0 . 67
(0.52) (0.52) (0.55) (1.21)
Blame 0 . 83 1. 00 1. 17 1. 00
(0.75) (0 .8 9 ) (0 .9 8 ) (1.10)
Perception of accident 2.67 2 . 00 2 . 83 2 . 67as just bad luck (1.97) (2 .2 8 ) (1.94) (1.51)
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
relation to the intervening actor. As expected, blame ratings 
are higher amongst externals than internals, but, again 
differences are clearly more pronounced for girls (>1) than for 
boys (<1). As in questions relating to the main actor, locus 
of control was not significant as a main effect (F [1,16] = 
3 .7 0 , p < .10) for fault and 3.38, p < .10 for blame) or in 
interaction with other factors.
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Results for internals v, externals for attribution of 
fault and blame, perceived desert of accident, and feeling 
sorry in relation to the victim are also given in Table 10.1. 
Here again, differences emerge consistently in the expected 
direction for fault and blame, ratings being higher amongst 
externals; for girl subjects, externals considered that the 
accident was more deserved, whilst internals felt more sorry 
for the victim. However, differences for these measures are 
generally very small, and for none of the results is locus of 
control involved in a significant effect.
Results relating to the victim's behaviour are given in 
Table 10.2. The average scores across locus of control 
tendencies are consistent with the expectation that subjects 
would judge the 'naughty' victim more negatively than the 
'good' victim, whilst also feeling more sympathetic towards the 
'good' victim. Moreover, these results are significant in 
every case, i.e. for fault (F [1,16] = 5 6 .0 7 * P < .001), for 
blame (F [I,l6] = 10.53, P < .01) for perceived desert of
accident (F [1,16] = 20.57, P < .001), and for feeling sorry
for the victim (F [1,16] = 11.76, p < .01). Also as
anticipated, some subjects perceived even the 'good' victim' in 
negative terms, though minimally, especially for desert. It 
was also expected that externals would be more prone than 
internals to judge the 'naughty' victim harshly. The results 
given in Table 10.2 are in the predicted direction for fault 
and blame judgements, but no significant interactions were 
obtained involving locus of control. Victim behaviour also 
emerged as a significant main effect in relation to cause
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Table 10.2
EVALUATIONS OF VICTIM ACCORDING TO VICTIM’S BEHAVIOUR
 Victim Good  --Victim Naughty-
Ints Exts Av. Ints Exts Av.
Question topic (N=3) (N=3) (N=6) (N=3) (N=3) (N=6)
Perception boys 1.00 0.33 0.67 2.00 3.33 2.67
of fault (1.00)(0.58)(0.82) (0.00)(0.58)(0.82)
girls 0.00 0.33 0.17 2.33 3.00 2.67
(0.00)(0.58)(0.41) (1.15)(1.00)(1.03)
Attribution boys 1.33 0.33 0.83 1.33 3.00 2.17
of blame (1.53)(0.58)(1.17) (1.15)(1.00)(1.33)
girls 0.00 1.00 0.50 1.67 3.33 2.50
(0.00)(1.73)(1.22) (0.58)(2.08)(1.64)
Desert of boys 0.33 0.33 0.33 2.67 2.33 2.50
accident (0.58)(0.58)(0.52) (0.58)(2.31)(1.52)
girls 0.67 0.00 0.34 1.67 2.67 2.17
(0.58)(0.00)(0.52) (0.58)(1.53)(1.17)
How sorry boys 4.33 4.67 4.50 2.67 4.00 3.33
for victim (2.89)(0.58)(1.87) (1.15)(1.00)(1.21)
girls 5.33 3.67 4.50 2.00 1.67 1.83
(0.58)(1.53)(1.38) (O.00)(1.15)(0.75)
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
attributed to the main actor (Ms = 5.17 v . 4.25 for the 'good'
and 'naughty' victims; F [I,l6] = 6.05, P < .05) and blame
attributed to the intervening actor (Ms = 4.33 v. 2.75; F 
[1 ,1 6] = 15.04, p < .001).
Judgements of responsibility in relation to the victim's 
mother are in the predicted direction for girls only; but for 
fault and blame these are small and no significant effects 
involving locus of control were obtained. Judgements of bad 
luck, though in the opposite direction to that anticipated, are 
small and insignificant.
In summary, although the expected effects for locus of 
control generally approached but not reach significance
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(p < ,10 for fault and blame attributed to main and intervening 
actors), differences in attribution ratings given by internals 
and externals were generally in the predicted direction, but 
were clearer in the case of girl subjects. As regards victim 
behaviour, the results consistently supported the hypothesis 
that the 'naughty' victim would be significantly more harshly 
evaluated than the 'good' victim. Attribution of 
responsibility in relation to the 'good* victim was minimal.
(b) Content Analysis
Responses to the open-ended questions were subjected to 
content analysis. For each question, statements were divided 
into units of analysis (Holsti, 1 9 6 9, p.136) and categorized. 
The categories were developed in relation to the hypotheses 
concerning internality and victim condition, as described 
below. The unit of analysis was defined as a single assertion; 
this was typically a sentence, but sometimes part of a sentence 
or more than one sentence. If a subject made more than one 
assertion which fell into the same category, only one 
endorsement was recorded. This rule avoided group totals being 
inflated by subjects who repeated material in the same 
category, but, in doing so, it may not have done justice to 
subjects' strength of feeling (Atkins 1984).
For the first question, which invited reasons for the 
victim's injury, the categories concerned attribution of 
responsibility to the main and intervening actors and to the 
victim. In the case of the main actor it was possible to 
sub-divide AR responses into those suggesting (a) a simple
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causal link between the actor's negligence and the accident 
(e.g. 'He left the glass on the ground') and (b ) moral 
responsibility (e.g. by the use of such terms as 'fault',
'ought not to have...'). An additional category denoted simply 
that the victim had tripped, without evaluation. Two special 
categories were also created to identify subjects who ascribed 
responsibility exclusively to the main actor or only to another 
actor or actors.
Seven categories were identified for the second question 
concerning the main actor's thoughts and feelings when the 
victim's screams were heard. These concerned: expressions of
regret that the actor had been negligent; explicit 
acknowledgement that the actor was at fault; feelings of guilt 
(e.g. 'feels guilty', 'feels awful', 'feels ashamed'); the 
actor's concern about possible adverse consequence to self 
(e.g. 'scared about being told off'); embarrassment; concern 
for the victim; and a wish to apologize to the victim or her 
mother. It is surprising that no responses for this question 
related to the friend's intervention.
Replies to the third question, inviting perceptions of the 
main actor's responses to the victim's mother, generated eight 
categories. These concerned: apologies; admission of 
responsibility; an attempt to limit responsibility whilst not 
denying it (e.g. 'I didn't mean to ...*, 'I was going to clear
up the glass later', 'I just wanted to ride my friend's bike'); 
straight denial of responsibility; blaming the friend; 
self-protecting remarks (e.g. concern that the matter would be 
taken no further); offers of help; and promises not to act in
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the same way again. Unexpectedly, no subject explicitly 
expressed concern for the victim. These same categories were 
identified in relation to the fourth question, concerning the 
main actor's responses to the friendly neighbour, with 
additional categories denoting non-evaluative description of 
the events plus responses not covered by the above categories.
For the final question, concerning the reaction of the 
main actor's mother when she heard about the events, the 
categories concerned: attributions of character-traits (e.g.
'You stupid boy') or condemnations of the behaviour; 
reprimands; non-physical punishment; physical punishment; 
moralizing, e.g. saying what John/Jane ought to have done); 
prescription of future behaviour (e.g. 'Next time you go into 
the park, remember to ...'); asking for more information; and 
'other'.
After all statements had been coded by the investigator, a 
random fifty per cent sample of each question was in turn 
randomly divided between two independent judges (both retired 
Education lecturers) to check the investigator's coding of 
responses. Judges were blind to the hypotheses, the 
investigator's coding and to subjects' group membership, but 
were given explicit rules for coding responses. Coding 
reliability was estimated by comparing observed agreement with 
that expected by chance, using the formula
observed disagreement
alpha = 1 -
expected agreement 
and following the procedure suggested by Krippendorff (1980). 
For each of the five questions, the extent of agreement between
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the investigator and each judge, together with the 
intra-judgemental agreement by the investigator after a 
two-month interval, is presented in Table 10.3. The indices, 
ranging from .83 to unity, indicate that considerable 
confidence can be placed in the classification.
Table 10,3 
RELIABILITY OF UNIT CODING
A B
Question 
C D
Inter-judgemental agreement 
Judge A - Investigator 
Judge B - Investigator
Intra-judgemental agreement 
Investigator
1 . 00 
0 . 89
• 90 
. 83
.90 1.00
.92 .88
. 92 
. 85
0.89 .90 .92 .88 1.00
The frequencies of categories amongst internal and 
external subjects for each question is given in Table 10.4.
The significance of differences between total internals v. 
externals was based on chi-square analysis and determined by 
consulting Table M in Guilford and Fruchter (1973), designed 
for use in four-fold contingency tests when sample sizes are 
equal and expected frequencies small. Only one anticipated 
result reached significance, viz. the greater number of 
internals than externals amongst girls who mentioned the main 
actor only as being responsible for the victim's accident ( p < 
,0 5 ). Some other key results, however, were also in the 
predicted direction. In particular, more externals attributed 
responsibility to the intervening actor and/or to the victim 
than did internals; and more internals amongst girls perceived 
the main actor feeling guilty on hearing the victim's screams 
and also admitting responsibility to the mother.
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Table 10.4: CONTENT ANALYSIS: NUMBER OF INTERNALS v.
IN EACH RESPONSE CATEGORY
EXTERNALS
Question and Boys Girls Total
response category Int Ext Int Ext Int Ext
N = 6 6 5 6 12 12
A. Why victim got hurt
a . MA causally responsible 3 3 3 1 6 4
b . MA morally responsible 3 3 3 0 6 3
c . lA responsible 0 3 1 2 1 5
d . Victim's fall mentioned 2 1 0 0 2 1
e . Victim responsible 2 3 0 2 2 5
f. MA alone responsible 2 2 6 1 8 3(a or b , but not c,d,e or f )
S. lA or victim responsible 2 4 2 4 4 8
(c or e, but not a or b)1 B. Main actor's thoughts/feelings
1 a. expresses regret 2 1 4 3 6 4
b. acknowledges fault 4 3 3 2 7 5
c . feels guilty 2 2 5 1 7 3
d. is concerned for self 1 1 1 1 2 2
e , is embarrassed .0 2 1 0 1 2
f. is concerned for victim 1 0 0 0 1 0
e. wishes to apologize 0 0 1 0 1 0
C. Main actor's response to victim' s mother
a. admits responsibility 3 2 4 1 7 3b . limits responsibility 4 4 3 2 7 6
c . denies responsibility 1 0 0 0 1 0
d. specifically blames lA 1 1 1 2 2 3
e . is concerned for self 0 0 0 1 0 1
f. apologizes 5 6 5 5 10 11
S. offers to be of help 1 0 1 0 2 0
h. promises to mend ways 0 0 1 0 1 0
Main actor's response to friendly neighbour
a. describes events 2 4 2 1 4 5
non-evaluatively
b. admits responsibility 1 1 2 3 3 4
c . limits responsibility 1 2 1 2 2 4
d. denies responsibility 2 0 0 1 2 1
e . specifically blames lA 2 0 0 1 2 1
f . apologizes/regrets 0 0 1 1 1 1
S. is concerned for self 0 0 3 0 3 0
h. promises to mend ways 0 0 0 1 0 1
i. other 0 0 1 0 1 0
[Continued on next page]
- 2 3 9  -
Table 10.Ü, continued
Question and 
response category
N=
Boys 
Int Ext 
6 6
Girls 
Int Ext 
6 6
Total 
Int Ext 
12 12
E. Response of main actor's mother
a . attributes/condemns 2 H 2 2 a 6
b. reprimands 2 2 3 a 5 6
c . punishes non-physically 3 2 1 a a 6
d . punishes physically 0 0 0 1 0 1
e . moralizes 3 2 1 2 a a
f. prescribes future 
behaviour
1 0 2 1 3 1
S. prescribes apology/’ 
restitution
0 1 2 1 2 2
h. asks for more information 3 0 1 1 a 1
i. other 0 1 0 0 0 1
Key: MA = main actor lA = intervening actor
However, for the last two questions concerning responses to the 
friendly neighbour and the reaction of the main actor’s mother, 
differences between the locus of control groups were small. 
Additionally, there did not seem to be any differences across 
locus of control groups between perceived accounts presented by 
the main actor to the victim’s mother and the friendly 
neighbour.
As regards evaluation of the victim in relation to her 
behaviour, seven of the twenty-four subjects, all in the 
’victim naughty’ condition, attributed some responsibility to 
her. This is consistent with the hypothesis relating to victim 
behaviour.
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DISCUSSION
The small group administration and ratings procedure 
worked smoothly, and content analysis of written responses to 
the open-ended questions proved a viable proposition. Design 
checks indicated that subjects perceived themselves as ' 
personally similar to the main story character, regarded the 
outcome as foreseeable and at least fairly serious, and 
correctly distinguished between the two victim behaviour 
conditions.
The results of this second pilot study were disappointing 
in so far as no significant effects were obtained for locus of 
control in the ratings, though some approached signifiance; 
and, with one exception, the differences between frequencies in 
the content analysis were not significant. Yet, in contrast to 
the pattern of results obtained in the ’Actor Other’ condition 
of Pilot 1, the direction of results of the present study are 
generally consistent with the hypothesis that internals would 
attribute more responsibility to the personally similar main 
story character while externals would attribute more 
responsibility to the other actors, especially the intervening 
actor - though this trend is more clear in the case of girl 
subjects than of boys. It seems reasonable to attribute the 
new pattern of results, at any rate with respect to girls, to 
the personal similarity procedure which, as indicated by the 
design check, successfully demonstrated that subjects were 
identifying with the main character. It is also possible that 
the re-wording of two passages in the stimulus story to 
heighten guilt ambiguity and the seriousness of the accident
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contributed to the improved results.
The results of the content analysis of responses to the 
open-ended questions also showed consistent differences in the 
judgements of internals and externals as regards attribution of 
responsibility, feelings of guilt, and reaction to adult 
authority. Although (with the exception of one case) these 
results did not reach statistical significance, it should be 
noted that the open-ended questions posed a more stringent test 
of the internality hypotheses than the ratings questions since 
subjects were not prompted with a range of possibilities.
It is difficult to interpret the consistently very small 
differences between locus of control groups with respect to the 
boys. This matter will be raised again in the Discussion to 
the main investigation (reported in the next chapter) where 
comparable sex differences were obtained.
The hypothesis concerning victim behaviour was clearly 
supported in relation to ratings for fault and blame attributed 
to the victim, the extent to which she deserved to have an 
accident, and the degree of sympathy which subjects extended to 
her. Only minimal responsibility was attributed'to the 
well-behaved victim. Theories of attribution to a victim in 
terms of immanent justice, developmental changes in causal 
understanding, and 'just world' beliefs, were discussed in 
Chapter 7. The present results with respect to the 'naughty' 
victim could be interpreted in terms of immanent justice 
concepts (Piaget, 1932), subjects perceiving adversity as a 
consequence of wrong-doing. However, inspection of the
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answers to the first of the open-ended questions showed that 
subjects did not link the victim’s disobedience directly with 
her misfortune, but rather explained the accident with such 
phrases as 'She was in such a bad temper that she can’t have 
been looking where she was going’. This suggests that subjects 
attributed responsibility to the victim by positing a 
naturalistic causal link to account for the contiguity between 
misbehaviour and adversity (Karniol, 198O). Another possibility 
is that subjects were demonstrating 'just world’ concepts 
(Lerner, 1970, 19 8Q), being motivated to believe that people in
general get what they deserve. However, ’just world’ theory 
also predicts that even ’good’ victims will be held 
responsible, the perceiver being motivated to devalue the 
victim in order to preserve his or her beliefs that people in 
general get what they deserve. In fact, although the ratings 
indicated that subjects did perceive the ’good’ victim as 
slightly at fault and to blame, they provide negligible 
evidence that subjects saw her adversity as deserved. In 
contrast, attributions of desert in relation to the ’naughty’
victim were comparable to those of fault and blame. The small
amount of blame and fault attributed to the ’good’ victim may 
have been a consequence of subjects positing a naturalistic
explanation (for instance, the fact that the victim was
skipping might have made her fall more likely). Since no 
subject in the ’victim good’ condition identified the victim as 
responsible in the replies to the open-ended questions, it 
remains to be seen whether the free responses from larger 
samples in the main investigation (Experiment 8) can throw 
light on this matter.
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In their* ratings, subjects in the 'victim good' condition* 
attributed significantly more causality to the main actor and 
blame to the intervening actor. This suggests that they 
perceived the negligence of these actors as particularly 
reprehensible when the victim was plainly innocent. Further, 
in support of the locus of control hypothesis, externals 
consistently found the victim to be more at fault and more to 
blame than did internals; however, this effect was not 
significant.
A sampling problem in this pilot study was that externals 
and internals were separated by only one point in the Bialer 
scale, with only two or three subjects of each gender 
represented in the extreme scores. It was thought possible 
that the tendency for internals and externals to be 
differentiated in the manner predicted might become more marked 
and statistically significant if larger numbers of relatively 
extreme internals and externals were tested. It was therefore 
decided to conduct the main study (Experiment 8) on this basis.
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Chapter 11
Experiment 8 
JUDGING OTHERS IN A COMPLEX SITUATION 
MAIN INVESTIGATION
INTRODUCTION
This chapter is a report of the main investigation 
concerning the two central hypotheses which were discussed in 
the General Introduction to Experiments 5 - 8  (Chapter 7)*
First, it was predicted that internal-external locus of control 
tendencies would be significantly related to the amount of 
responsibility attributed to actors in an accident story which 
is relevant to the children’s experience, serious in outcome, 
foreseeable, and ambiguous as regards the guilt of the main 
actor with whom the children personally identify. In 
particular, it was thought that internals would attribute more 
responsibility to a personally similar main actor, whilst 
externals would attribute more responsibility to an intervening 
actor. The second set of predictions concerned children's 
evaluations of the victim of an accident. On the basis of 
theories concerning immanent justice, children's causal 
understanding, and beliefs in a 'just world', it was considered 
that the victim of an accident would be perceived as more 
responsible and deserving of misfortune if she had been 
behaving badly before the accident, while the 'just world' 
hypothesis would additionally predict that a virtuous victim
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would also be evaluated negatively.
These general hypotheses were investigated to some extent 
in pilot work (Expts. 5 and 7). Both pilot studies found clear 
support for the hypothesis that greater responsibility would be 
attributed to the ill-behaved victim. As regards the 
internality hypothesis, however, consistent support was found 
in Pilot 1 (Expt. 5). using subjects aged 7-8 and 10-11 years, 
when the main story character was portrayed as the subject 
him/herself; but when the actor was another person, differences 
between locus of control categories were narrower and 
inconsistent in direction. Pilot 2 (Expt. 7), involving 10-11 
year-olds, employed the personal similarity procedure developed 
in Experiment 6; the main actor was portrayed as another child 
but one whose personal similarity to the subject could be 
facilitated and verified. This time, the pattern of results 
was generally consistent with the predictions; however, they 
were not statistically significant, and differences between 
subjects of different locus of control tendencies were more 
evident amongst girls.
With these provisos, it thus seemed that the special 
procedure to facilitate subjects' identity with the main story 
character was instrumental in bringing about a pattern of 
results consistent with the hypothesis. Now that subjects 
perceived the main actor to be 'like them', the internals were 
more likely to assume that the main actor would see his or her 
actions as under personal control and therefore be willing to 
accept responsibility; externals, in contrast, were more likely 
to assume that the main actor would see his or her actions as
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under external control, and would therefore be less willing to i
accept responsibility. It was concluded that clearer and j
!significant results might emerge if locus of control categories |
were based upon subjects with relatively extreme locus of
control scores. The present (main) study was therefore jj
conducted on that basis. j
There were four other major differences between the j
present study and Pilot 2, First, as in Pilot 1, subjects came j
from two age groups, 8 years and 10-11 years. Secondly, the I
number of subjects involved was much larger, the experimental iI
sample consisting of forty-eight children at each age, selected '
I
from 108 eight year-olds and 185 10-11 year-olds. Thirdly, the 
four Primary schools involved were in a London borough rather |
than suburban Surrey, and included a higher proportion of j
!
subjects whose parents were manual workers. Finally, because 
of the constraints imposed by working in four schools, the |
attribution measure was administered on an individual rather 
than group basis.
The specific predictions were as in Pilot 2 (see pp 
222-4).
METHOD
Design. - Four factors, each with two levels, were combined in
a between-group design involving locus of control 
(internals/externals), victim conditions (good/naughty 
behaviour), age (8 and 10-11 years), and gender, as shown in the
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diagram below;
Internals Externals
Victim
good
Victim
naughty
Victim
good
Victim
naughty
boys
8 years -------
girls
boys
10-11 y e a r s ------ -
girl's
Subjects. - Ninety-six subjects, 48 at each age, whose locus of
control scores represented extreme internal and external locus of 
control tendencies, were drawn from an original sample of 293 
subjects in four Primary schools situated in a London borough.
The parent sample comprised 58 boys and 50 girls aged 8,0 to 8,11
years (N = 8.47 years) plus 95 boys and 90 girls aged 10,10 to
11,9 years (M = 11.35 years). These included all the pupils of
the age groups, with the exception of twenty children who were
absent (N = 15) or whose parents withheld permission to 
participate in the study (N = 5)* The schools had been 
identified by the local school inspectorate to be socially and 
intellectually heterogeneous; all except two children were 
white.
Measures. - As in the pilot studies, locus of control was
assessed using the Bialer-Cromwell scale (anglicized as for for 
Experiments 1 and 3). The same attribution of responsibility 
(AR) measure was used as in pilot work, with changes in wording
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to heighten guilt ambiguity and seriousness of outcome, as in 
Pilot 2. Also as in Pilot 2, identification between subject and 
main story character was facilitated by using the procedure 
developed in Experiment 6, each subject being presented with a 
specially constructed description of the character based upon 
that subject's interests and pastimes.
Procedure. - All subjects in the parent sample received the
locus of control measure in groups of up to six, ringing their 
chosen answers on response sheets. During the same session, 
which lasted 30-40 minutes, the interests and pastimes inventory 
was administered, half the groups receiving this measure first.
About two weeks' later, the AR measure was administered to
the sub-sample of subjects, selected on the following basis. For
the younger subjects, extreme locus of control scores were 
defined as those of 14 or above (internals, N = 30) and 10 or 
below (externals, N = 31). For the older subjects, the relevant 
scores were 16 or above (internals, N = 35) and 11 or below 
(externals, N = 37). Further details are given in Table 11.1. 
(Unfortunately, in spite of a search through the literature and 
personal communication with the author of the scale, it has not 
been possible to establish normative data. It is therefore not 
known where the distribution in the present sample stands in
relation to any reference group.)
On random bases, twelve boys and twelve girls at each age 
were drawn from each locus of control category and then assigned 
to the two victim behaviour conditions, generating four groups of 
boys (N = 6) and four groups of girls (N = 6) in which locus of
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Table 11.1
LOCUS OF CONTROL SCORES
(a) 8 year- olds
Score of Score of Score of Mean
10 or under 11 - 13 14 or over ( and
N % N % N % SD)
Boys (N = 58) 17 29.3 25 43. 1 16 27.6 12 . 24
(2.63)
Girls (N = 50) 14 28.0 22 44. 0 14 28.0 12. 08
(2.41)
(a) 10- 11 year-olds
Score of Score of Score of Mean
11 or under 12 - 15 l6 or over ( and
N % N % N % SD)
Boys (N = 95) 17 17.9 60 63. 2 18 18.9 13. 63
(2.27)
Girls (N = 90) 20 22.2 53 58. 9 17 18,9 13. 93
(2 .5 2 )
control was crossed with victim behaviour (see table in Design 
section above). The only constraint in this procedure was that 
subjects, for the interests exercise, had endorsed the 
statement 'You like riding your bike' as at least 'quite a lot 
true' for them. This was necessary in order to maximize the 
perception of personal similarity between subject and main 
actor in the AR story, who was portrayed as enjoying cycling.
In the event it was necessary to exclude only one boy and one 
girl, both from the older group.
The procedure was substantially the same as in Pilot 2 
(see P226-230), but subjects were interviewed individually. 
After being assured that the exercise was not a test and that 
there would be no right or wrong answers, each subject was
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introduced to the attribution story, shown how to use the 
seven-point rating scales, and asked to rate how much the main 
actor was like him or her. The latter evaluation was made on 
the basis of the personal similarity exercise, based on 
responses to the interests and pastimes inventory, following 
the procedure outlined in Experiment 6. The subject then heard 
a recording of the AR story in one of the variants (i.e. the 
gender of the main and intervening actor gender matched that of 
the subject, and the victim was depicted as behaving either 
well or badly prior to the accident). As the events were 
narrated, eleven bold line illustrations on A4 cards were 
presented to the subject (see Appendix A5). The subject then 
re-told the story, using the illustrations as cues.
Next, the subject was asked the same five free-response 
questions used in Pilot 2 (details on pp228-9). The questions 
concerned the reasons for the victim getting hurt; perceptions 
of the actor's feelings on hearing the victim's screams; 
perceptions of the actor's responses to the victim's mother and 
to a friendly neighbour; and the reaction of the actor's mother 
on learning about the incident. The investigator gave no 
prompting, except encouraging words such as '1 see, that's very
interesting'. When the subject appeared to have completed each
answer, the investigator asked if there was anything else he or 
she wished to say. This was to ensure that the subject said 
all that was in his or her mind, but the request was not
pressed in order to minimize the chances of insincere answers
made just to please the questioner. Responses were 
tape-recorded.
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The subject was then asked to shuffle twelve rating sheets 
'A’ to ’L* and to call out the letters in turn, enabling the 
questions to be presented in a random order. These were the 
same questions as used in Pilot 2 (pp229-230), and concerned
judgements of responsibility in relation to each of the actors, 
how sorry the subject felt for the victim, how much she 
deserved the accident, and how much the accident was bad luck. 
Three design check questions assessed perceptions of the 
accident’s seriousness, its foreseeability, and the victim’s 
antecedent behaviour. Finally, to check that the personal 
similarity ratings were genuine and not a ’polite assent*, the 
subject was asked to evaluate three other descriptions of the 
main actor. The descriptions were variations on the 'very 
similar' description presented at the start of the interview. 
They represented 'very dissimilar', 'dissimilar' and 'similar' 
interests to those of the subject, as in Experiment 6.
Each session lasted about 35 minutes, at the end of which 
the subject was thanked for participating and escorted back to 
the classroom.
RESULTS
(a) Ratings
Ratings were scored from 0 ('not at all') to 6 
('totally'). Mean scores and standard deviations for the 
questions relating to the hypotheses are given in Appendix 
B6.1. The results for each question were submitted to a
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Table 11.2
SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT EFFECTS
Question Age LC VB S X  
LC
A X A X A X A
S X S X LC X S :
LC VB VB LC
VB
Perceptions of 
Main Actor
Cau
Fau
Bla
Perceptions of Fau
Intervening Actor Bla
*
Perceptions of 
Victim
Fau
Des
Bla * * *
Sor **
Perceptions of Fau
Victim's Mother Bla
Perceptions of bad luck
* P < . 05 A = Age Cau = Causality** P < . 025 LC = Locus of Control Fau = Fault*** P < . 01 VB = Victim Behaviour Bla = Blame
P < , 001 S = Sex Sor = How Sorry
Des =
For
Desert of 
Accident
Note: Only those effects which are significant for at least
one question are given in the column headings.
2 X (locus of control) x 2 (victim behaviour) x 2 (age) x 2 
(gender) analysis of variance, with p. set at .05. A summary 
of the significant effects is given in Table 11.2 (full ANOVA
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tables in Appendix B6.1 ). The procedure for the main analyses 
plus the computation and interpretation of simple effects and 
a priori t-tests were those recommended by Kirk (I9 6 8, Ch7. )
Design checks. - All subjects could re-tell the story 
accurately and without difficulty. The accident was judged as 
'very* foreseeable by both age groups (M = 5.17 at 8 years and 
5.21 at 10-11 years) with no significant differences between 
cells. It was perceived as more serious by the younger 
subjects (M = 5 .0 8, = 0.94) than the older subjects (M =
4.21, SD^  = O.go). Although this difference was highly 
significant (F [1,80] = 20.91, p < .001), the level of
seriousness for the 10-11 years-olds ('quite a lot') was 
considered satisfactory. No other significant effects emerged 
for seriousness of accident.
Subjects tended to identify the main story character as 
'very much* like them (M = 5 .0 8 , SD = 0.99 at 8 years; M =
5.12; S2 = 0.94 at 10-11 years), with no significant 
differences between groups. Ratings for the four descriptions 
ranging from 'very similar' to 'very dissimilar* were subjected 
to Page's L test for related samples (Page, 1 9 6 3). At each age 
and gender level, the trend was found to be highly significant 
(L > 800 in each case, p < .001), replicating the results from 
Experiment 6 and indicating that subjects had successfully 
discriminated between the descriptions in the predicted manner.
Finally, all subjects in the 'victim naughty' condition 
perceived the victim as behaving 'badly' rather than 'well' or 
'neither well nor badly* before the accident. In the 'victim*
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good' condition none of the subjects thought that the victim
had been behaving 'badly'; amongst the younger children, all
but three thought she had been behaving 'well', whilst the
10-11 years olds were evenly divided between those who judged :
j
the behaviour as good or neutrally. The two victim conditions j
jwere thus satisfactorily separated. '
I
Internals v. Externals. - (1) Evaluations of main actor. i
From the data presented in Fig. 11.1, it can be seen that the ]
expectation that internals would attribute more responsibility '
to the main actor than would externals is given general support !
among the girl subjects; differences between locus of control
I
groups among the boys are in the same direction, but minimally 
so for the cause and blame questions. A significant main 
effect for locus of control emerged for each attribution ;
measure, viz. perceptions of causality (F [l,8o] = 10.19, p < j
.01), fault (F [1,80] = 9.76, p < .01) and blame (F [1,80] = i
1
11.25, P < .01). However, significant interactions between jj
this factor and gender occurred for causality (F [1,80] = 5.20, j
p < .025) and blame (F [l,8o] = 6.8l, p < .025), reflecting the j
different pattern of results for boys and girls noted above. I
Locus of control was not significantly affected by age or by ;
victim behaviour. To investigate the nature of these
interactions, tests for simple effects were carried out. For '
both causality and blame, a simple main effect for locus of 
control was obtained for girls and not boys. To probe the |
significant effects in greater detail, comparisons were made
!amongst means for internals v. externals, using a priori ;
t-tests. With respect to each attribution measure, significant j
differences emerged at each age for girls (p < .01), but not !> 'j
-  2 5 5  - I
Fis- 11,1
EVALUATIONS OF MAIN ACTOR BY INTERNALS AND EXTERNALS
(a) Causality
5 . 085 . 00
4.00
8 yrs 10-11 yrs
boys
(b) Fault
yrs 10-11 yrs 
girls
4 . 50 4 . 5 04 . 0 8
3 . 0 0
8 yrs 10-11 yrs
boys
(c) Blame
8 yrs 10-11 yrs
girls
4.67 4 . 67 4 . 254.08
3 . 5 0
2.75
8 yrs 10-11 yrs
boys yrs 10-11 yrs girls
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for boys (p. > .10). The pattern of results thus gives
consistent support to the hypothesis in relation to girls only.
(2) Evaluations of intervening actor. With respect to the main 
actor's friend, attribution of responsibility was expected to 
be higher amongst externals than internals. The results, 
presented in Fig. 11.2, show that differences were in the 
predicted direction for both fault and blame except amongst the 
older boys. The main effect for locus of control was 
significant for fault (F [1,80] = 5.15, p < .05) and also for
blame (F [1,80] = 8.13, P < .01). In the case of fault, locus
of control was not significantly affected by victim behaviour, 
but a moderately significant interaction with gender (F [1,80]
= 4.12, p < .0 5 ) was further qualified by a significant 
three-way interaction also involving age (F [1,80] = 6.90, p <
.01). This reflects the data pattern in Fig. 11.2(a) which 
shows that differences were in the opposite direction to that 
expected amongst the older boys. A priori comparisons made 
amongst means for each attribution measure demonstrated that, 
amongst the younger boys and older girls, externals gave 
significantly higher ratings than internals in their judgements 
of fault and blame ; for the younger girls the effect approached 
significance (p < .10), but for the older boys the effect was 
not significant at all.
(3) Evaluations of main v. Intervening actors. It followed 
from previous hypotheses that internals rather than externals 
would attribute more responsibility to the main than the 
intervening actor. Comparisons of the attributions of fault 
and blame made to these two actors by each locus of control
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F i s .  1 1 . 2
EVALUATIONS OF INTERVENING ACTOR BY INTERNALS AND EXTERNALS
(a) Fault
3.83
2.75
2.00
1.83
yrs 10-11 yrs
boys
8 yrs 10-11 yrs
girls
(b) Blame
3.923.503.17
2.672.67 2.67 2.42
1.17
yrs 10-11 yrs
boys
8 yrs 10-11 yrs 
girls
Internals Externals
Note: N = 12 internals and 12 externals 
of each gender at each age.
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group are given in Fig. 11.3. The data was analysed separately 
in a 2 (age) x 2 (actor) x 2 (sex) x 2 (locus of control)
ANOVA, with repeated measures on the second factor (tables in 
Appendix B6.2). Since it was the relation between actor and 
locus of control which was of interest in these analyses, only 
interaction effects involving both these factors will be 
reported.
Consistent with the expectation, significant actor x locus 
of control interactions emerged both for fault (F[l,88] =
13.Ü1, p < .001) and blame (F[l,88] = 8.37, P <.00). However, 
in the case of fault, this interaction was further qualified by 
sex (F[1,S8] = 5.Ü7. P < .025), while four-way significant
interactions additionally involved age in the case of both 
fault (F[l,88] = 5.85, P < .025) and blame (F[1,8S] = 7.00, p <
.025). These latter interactions can be interpreted by 
reference to Fig. 11.3. Amongst the female subjects, the data 
patterns of internals and externals are different: internals
clearly and consistently attributed more fault and blame to the 
main actor, while externals at 8 years made no distinctions 
between actors and at 10-11 years attributed more 
responsibility to the intervening actor. The expectation of 
contrasting attributions by internals and externals to the main 
v, intervening actors was thus strongly supported in the case 
of girls, particularly the older subjects. In the case of 
boys, the data patterns of the two locus of control groups are 
similar, but the younger male internals made clearer 
distinctions than their external counterparts.
(U) Evaluations of victim. It was expected that externals
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Fig. 11.3
EVALUATIONS OF MAIN V. INTERVENING ACTORS 
BY INTERNALS AND EXTERNALS
In} PorCelyBd Kuull
2.42
i . a j
yr» 10-11 yrs
3.753.67
2.75
2.00
8 yr* 10-11 yr* ■••••«gi 1*1 8 yrs 10-11 yr* 8 yrs 10-11 yru......8oy*............... jjlrl*.....
(b) Jud|{«aanta of BIubo 
4.67
3.83
2.6?
\
\
1.17 \
\ \
\ V
4.67
\
\
\\
4.25
2.42 2.67\\\\
8 yrs 10-11 yrs 8 yrs 10-11 yr* .... boy  girl*....
4.08
Kxturrittl u
3.923.58 3.50 3.50
3.17
2.752.67
yr* 10-11 yr* 8 yrs 1 0-11 yrs  boys................girls....
j I Huln Actor tervsning Actor
Nota» N . 12 Intsrnsls and 12 oxturn»!* of o«oh gsndor at **eti sga.
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would attribute more fault and blame to the victim, for whom 
they would also feel less sorry and more deserving of the 
accident. As can be seen from Fig. 11. ll, differences in 
attributions between internals and externals for fault and 
blame were generally small and inconsistent in direction. No 
significant main effects or interactions involving locus of 
control emerged for either attribution measure with the 
exception of a moderately significant locus of control x age x 
gender interaction (F [1,80] = 5.11, p < .05) in the case of
blame, this in turn being qualified by a four-way interaction 
also involving victim behaviour (F [l,8o] = U.Ok, P < .05).
Inspection of means for blame showed no clear pattern as 
regards locus of control.
Results relating to the extent that subjects believed that 
the victim deserved the adversity, and how far they felt sorry 
for her, are presented in Figs. 11.5 and 11.6. As can be seen, 
differences between internals and externals are again very 
small, and no significant effects or interactions were obtained 
in relation to internality.
(5) Evaluations of victim's mother. Externals were expected to 
attribute more fault and blame to the victim's mother. The 
results are given in Fig. 11.7. No significant main effect 
involving locus of control emerged for either attribution 
question, but a moderately significant locus of control x 
victim behaviour x age effect emerged in the case of fault (F 
[1,80] = U.59. P < .05). As can be seen from Fig. 11.7, 
differences were clearly in the expected direction amongst the 
younger but not the older subjects. Inspection of means showed
2 5 8  -
F i s .  1 1 . %
FAULT AND BLAME ATTRIBUTED TO THE VICTIM 
BY INTERNALS AND EXTERNALS
(a) Fault
2.33
2.08-2.08 2.081.75 1.001.33
yrs 10-11 yrs
boys
8 yrs 10-11 yrs
girls
(b) Blame
2.17 2.001.92 -.67 1.25
8 yrs 10-11 yrs
boys
yrs 10-11 yrs
girls
Internals Externals
Note: N = 12 internals and 12 externals 
of each gender at each age.
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FIs. 11.5
PERCEPION OF ACCIDENT AS DESERVED 
BY INTERNALS AND EXTERNALS
1.751.50 1.671.33 -- <3 0.67 1.17 1.17k \
yrs 10-11 yrs 8 yrs 10-11 yrs
boys girls
Internals Externals\
Note: N = 12 internals and 12 externals 
of each gender at each age.
Fie. 11.6
HOW SORRY INTERNALS AND EXTERNALS FELT FOR THE VICTIM
till, 5.174.674.08
8 yrs 10-11 yrs
boys
8 yrs 10-11 yrs
girls
Internals Externals
Note: N = 12 internals and 12 externals 
of each gender at each age.
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F i e .  1 1 . 7
FAULT AND BLAME ATTRIBUTED TO THE VICTIM'S MOTHER 
BY INTERNALS AND EXTERNALS
(a) Fault
2.17
1.58
1.33 1.08 1.08 08
0.58
10-11 yrs 10-11 yrsyrs yrs
boys girls
(b) Blame
2.58
2.17
1.67 1.83 1.42l.OC
yrs 10-11 yrs
boys
8 yrs 10-11 yrs
girls
Internals Externals
Note: N = 12 internals and 12 externals 
of each gender at each age.
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the same pattern in both victim conditions, but t-tests 
demonstrated significance in the ’victim good* condition only. 
For the blame question, the data pattern is similar, but here 
the age x locus of control interaction fell short of 
significance (F [1,80] = 3.Ü6, p < .10).
(6) Perceptions of bad luck. Finally, externals rather than 
internals were expected to perceive the accident as bad luck. 
However, the main effect for locus of control was insignificant 
(F < 1), as was each interaction involving this factor.
In short, the expectation that internals would attribute 
significantly more responsibility to the main actor than would 
externals was supported in the case of the girl subjects, but 
not in the case of the boys; the complementary expectation that 
externals would attribute significantly more responsibility to 
the intervening actor than would internals received support in 
the case of the younger boys and older girls, differences among 
the younger girls also being clearly in the same direction.
When comparing evaluations of the main and intervening actors, 
it was among the girls rather than the boys that internals 
clearly attributed more responsibility to the main actor and 
externals made no distinction or attributed more responsibility 
to the intervening actor. However, internals among the younger 
boys discriminated much more clearly in their evaluations of 
the two actors than did the younger external boys.
Surprisingly, the results for internals v. externals were not 
significantly different in relation to the victim, but, amongst 
the younger subjects, general support was found for the 
expectation that externals would the more harsh in their
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evaluations of the victim's mother. The findings in relation 
to perceptions of bad luck did not reveal significant 
differences between locus of control groups.
Victim behaviour. - It was generally expected that 
attribution of responsibility would be affected by knowledge of 
the victim's behaviour before the accident. Differences 
between subjects in the 'victim good' and 'victim naughty' 
conditions in relation to perceived fault, blame, desert of 
accident, and feeling sorry for the victim are given in Fig. 
11.8. As can be seen, all differences are consistent with the 
expectation that subjects in the 'victim naughty' condition 
would be more likely to evaluate the victim negatively than
those in the 'victim good' condition. A small amount of fault
and blame, but hardly any desert, is also attributed to the 
'good' victim. Moreover, the analysis of variance results 
revealed a highly significant main effect for victim behaviour 
as regards each of the three attribution measures, viz. fault 
(F [1,80] = 28.26, p < .001), blame (F [1,80] = 18.23, P <
.001), and desert (F [1,80] = kâ.UH, p < .001). A moderately
significant effect also demonstrated that subjects felt more 
sorry for the victim who had been behaving well (M s = 5.02 v .
Ü.25, F [1,80] = 5-9 6 , P < .0 5 ). The result for blame was
qualified by a moderately significant victim behaviour x age x 
gender interaction (F [1,80] = 5.11, p < .05) which in turn was
complicated by a moderately significant third-order interaction 
also involving locus of control (F [1,80] = H.Ok, p < .0 5 ).
Inspection of means revealed that only the younger internal 
female subjects failed to discriminate between the 'good' and 
'naughty* victims in the predicted manner.
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Fie. 11.8
EVALUATIONS OF THE VICTIM ACCORDING TO HER BEHAVIOUR
(a) Fault
3.00 3.08 2.67
1.83
1.17 1.00
8 yrs 10-11 yrs10-11 yrs8 yrs
boys girls
(b) Blame 3.17
boys
2.50 2.501.921.67
0.920.92 0.42
10-11 yrs8 yrs10-11 yrs8 yrs
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(c) Accident deserved 2.75
2.33 2.08 1.83
0.75
0.250.08 0.08
10-11 yrs8 yrs10-11 yrs8 yrs
girlsboys
/ Continued
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F i g .  1 1 . 8  ( c o n t i n u e d )
(d) How sorry for the victim
5 . 5 0 5.085.00
4.67
4.173.92
10-11 yrs 10-11 yrsyrs yrs
boys girls
\
Victim 'good' \ Victim ’naughty'
Note: N = 12 in each victim behaviour
condition for each gender 
at each age.
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Two further significant results arose involving victim 
behaviour, these being consistent with the hypotheses though 
not amongst the predictions. First, victim behaviour emerged 
as a significant main effect with respect to causality 
attributed to the main actor (F [1,80] = 6.06, p <.025).
subjects making the causal link rather more clearly when the 
victim had been behaving well rather than badly (Ms = Ü .65 v.
/I. 0 8 ). Inspection of means (Appendix B6.1) shows that, with 
the exception of fault judgements made by the younger subjects, 
evaluations of the main actor across locus of control groups 
were consistently more negative by subjects in the 'victim 
good' condition, though only in the case of causality was the 
result significant (F [1,80] = 6.07, P < .025). Secondly,
differences according to victim behaviour fell just short of 
the .01 level of significance as regards blame attributed to 
the victim's mother (F [1,80] = 6.90), subjects judging the
mother more harshly when her daughter had been behaving badly 
rather than well (Ms = 2.17 v . 1.17),
In short, consistent with the prediction, highly 
significant results supported the hypothesis that subjects in 
the 'victim naughty' condition would be more likely to view the 
victim more negatively. At the same time, the 'good' victim
was seen to be somewhat at fault and to blame, but not
deserving of the adversity. Additionally, victim behaviour 
also significantly affected some perceptions of the main actor 
and the victim's mother, subjects attributing significantly 
more causality to the main actor if the victim had been
behaving well, and significantly more blame to the mother if
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she had been behaving badly.
Age differences. - Inspection of the mean scores in Appendix 
B6.1 demonstrates how the younger subjects generally endorsed 
higher evaluations except with regard to the intervening 
actor. With respect to the main actor, the age differences 
were significant in the case of causality, (F [l,8o] = 8.00, p
< .01), and blame (F [1 ,8 0] = 7.81, p < .01), though not fault
(F < 1). The younger subjects also attributed significantly 
more blame to the victim (F [1,80] = 5.11, p < .05); age
differences for other attributions to the victim were in the 
same direction, but slight and not significant.
Sex differences. - There were no significant main effects for 
gender with respect to any question. However, gender emerged 
regularly in interaction with other factors, particularly locus 
of control, as explained in previous sub-sections.
(b ) Content Analysis
Categorization. - Answers to the open-ended questions were
transcribed from the tape-recordings and subjected to content 
analysis, as in the pilot work. For each question, responses 
were divided into units of analysis (Holsti, 1969, p.136) from 
which a series of content categories were generated. The unit 
of analysis was defined as a single idea. The categories were 
chosen to be psychologically interesting in relation to the 
hypotheses, to be as exhaustive as possible so that virtually 
all units could be assigned to one of them, and exclusive so
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that a unit could be assigned to only one category. If a 
subject made more than one assertion which fell into a 
particular category, only one endorsement was recorded. This 
rule avoided group totals being inflated by subjects who 
repeated essentially the same material, though it also meant
sacrificing emphasis given to a category.
The categories, which were substantially the same as those
used in Pilot 2, are fully described in Table 11.3. For the
first question, which focussed on subjects' perceptions of the 
cause of the victim's injuries, the categories mainly 
distinguished between attribution of responsibility to the 
various actors. Two multiple categories were also created to 
identify subjects who ascribed responsibility exclusively to 
the main actor (Category i) or to any actor other than the main 
actor (Category j). For the second question, concerning the 
main actor's thoughts and feelings on hearing the victim's 
screams, the categories covered regret at being negligent, 
acknowledgement of culpability, feelings of guilt, concern for 
self, and concern for the victim. Categories for the third
question, which asked how the main actor would respond when
apprehended by the victim's mother, covered different ways of 
assigning responsibility to self or another, concern for self 
and for the victim, apologies and restitution, and promises 
about future behaviour. Answers to the fourth question, which 
asked how the main actor would respond to enquiries from a 
friendly neighbour, were much the same as those for the third 
question, but also included ones which denoted non-evaluative 
description of events and attempts to avoid getting involved in
the subject. Categories for the last question, concerning the
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Table 11.3
DEFINITIONS AND EXAMPLES OF CONTENT ANALYSIS CATEGORIES
Question A; Why victim got hurt
a. Main,, actor 
responsible
b. Main actor 
morally 
responsible
c. Intervening 
actor
responsible
d. Victim
responsible
e. Victim's mother 
responsible
f. Victim fell
Glass/stones
h. Other
i. Only main actor 
responsible
j . Only non-main 
actor
responsible
A simple causal link between the actor's 
negligence and the accident (eg. 'Jane left 
the glass on the ground').
Use of such terms as 'fault', 'ought not 
to have...', 'careless', 'didn't bother to'
(e.g. 'John ought not to have left 
the broken glass').
Main actor's friend seen as either the 
causal link and/or as blameworthy (e.g. 
'Jane's friend told her not to bother with 
the rest of the glass').
The victim is held responsible either
(i) because she has been naughty (e.g.
'Because the little girl was in such a 
bad temper with her mum') or
(ii) because she was assumed to have been 
negligent (e.g. 'She wasn't looking 
where she was going*).
The little girl's mother seen as the 
causal link or as blameworthy (e.g. 'The 
mum shouldn't have let the little girl run 
off').
Reference to the little girl tripping or 
falling but without attributing 
responsibility to her (e.g. 'The little 
girl fell over').
Glass or stones given as the cause.
Any response not falling within one of the 
above categories.
Responses which fall in category a or b, 
with no other reason for the victim's 
injury given.
Responsibility is attributed to 
an actor other than the main actor and 
no reference is made to the main actor.
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Table 11.3 continued
B. Main actor's thoughts and feelings
a. regrests 
negligence
Regret that glass had not been fully 
cleared away (e.g. 'He was sorry that 
or acknowledgement that the main actor 
should have resisted the friend's 
exhortations to leave the glass on the 
path .
b. acknowledges 
fault
feels guilty
d. concern for 
self
e. concern for 
victim
f. other
Acknowledgement that the main actor was at 
fault (e.g. 'She would think "It was my 
fault"' or 'Oh dear, I didn't pick up the 
glass').
Feelings which go beyond regret and suggest 
blamewothiness (e.g. 'He would feel awful', 
or 'She'd feel guulty').
Thinks about adverse consequence to 
(e.g. 'She'd be scared about being told 
off').
Reference to the victim being hurt, or 
feeling sorry for the victim.
Any response not falling within one of the 
above categories.
C. Main actor's response to victim's mother
a. admits
responsibility
b. limits
responsibility
c. denies
responsibility
responsibility explicitly or implcitly 
acknowledged (e.g. 'I know I should have 
cleared the glass away' or 'I was very 
careless').
Attempts to play down culpability yet 
without blaming anyone else (e.g. 'I was
going to come back to clear the glass up' 
or 'I just wanted to ride on my friend's 
b i k e ') .
Straight denial of having anything to do 
with the glass, or an explanation made up 
to deceive the mother (e.g. 'It wasn't me', 
'It must have been someone who looks just 
like m e ').
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Table 11.3 continued
d. blames
intervening
actor
directly
e. concern for 
self
f. concern for 
victim
g. apologies
h. offers help
i. will mend ways 
j. other
The friend is blamed, at least in part 
(e.g. * It was my friend's fault - he said
"Leave that glass there"'). Category 'b ' 
is used if the friend is mentioned but not 
accused.
Remarks which are self-protecting (e.g. 
'Please don't tell my mum, will you?').
Concern expressed for the mother's 
daughter (e.g. 'Is your little girl all 
right?' ) .
E.g. 'I'm very sorry'.
Offers of help (e.g. 'Shall I call an 
ambulance?').
Promises not to be negligent again.
Any response not falling within one of the 
above categories.
D. Main actor's response to friendly neighbour
a. describes 
events non- 
evaluative ly
b. admits 
responsibility
c . limits 
responsibility
d. denies 
responsibility
e. blames intervening 
actor directly
f. blames victim
g . apologizes
h. concern for self
i. concern for victim
d . will mend ways
A series of statements which describe 
what happened without attributing 
responsibility.
As
for
Question C
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Table 11.3 continued
k. avoidance 
tactics
Maintenance that nothing (probably) 
would be said; would try to change the 
subject; pretend ignorance of the event.
1, don't know 
m. other
Subject could not articulate a reply.
Any response not falling within one of the 
above categories.
E. Responses of main actor's mother
a. attributes/ 
condemns
Labels child negatively (e.g. 'You 
stupid boy') or condemns the behaviour 
(e.g. 'That was a silly thing to do').
b. reprimands Telling off, shouting, being angry.
c. punishes
non-physically
A punishment which doesn't involve 
hitting the child (e.g. 'She'd send him to 
bed').
d. punishes 
physically
Hitting behaviour.
moralizes Mother says what the child ought to have 
done, or how one ought to behave in 
sutuations like this (e.g. 'You know you 
should clear up things you break').
f. prescribes 
future, 
behaviour
Mother says how the child must behave in 
future (e.g. 'Next time you go out, 
remember to ...').
g . prescribes 
apology/ 
restitution
Mother tells child to apologize to 
the victim's mother or to visit the 
little girl.
h. requests more 
information
1. other
Mother tries to find out more about what 
happened.
Any response not falling within one of the 
above categories.
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reaction of the negligent actor's mother, covered condemnations 
of the behaviour, reprimands, punishment, moralizing, 
prescription of behaviour, and requests for further 
information.
The procedure for establishing reliability of unit coding 
followed the same procedure as that used in Pilot 2. The 
estimated ratio of observed to expected agreement was based on 
the formula recommended by Krippendorff (1 9 8 0). Agreement 
between the investigator and the first and second judges is 
given in Table 11.Ü, from which it can be seen that values 
ranged from .87 to unity. Intra-judgemental agreement 
estimates by the investigator after a two-month interval, given 
in the same table, ranged from .88 to unity. These results 
suggest that considerable confidence can be placed in the unit 
coding.
Table 11.Ü
RELIABILITY OF UNIT CODING
Question 
A B C D E
Inter-judgemental agreement
Judge A - Investigator 1.00 .9^ .90 .92 .93
Judge B - Investigator 1.00 .95 .87 .90 .93
Intra-judgemental agreement
Investigator 1.00 .96 .88 .92 1.00
The mean number of category statements for each age and gender 
group is given in Table 11.5. As can be seen, the older 
children consistently offered more statements than the younger 
children, except for the girls in Question D. The results for
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each question were submitted to a 2 (age) x 2 (gender) ANOVA. 
Since the number of statements per subject was very small, a 
square root transformation was applied, using the formula 
recommended by Winer (1971, P.399). However, the mean 
proportions in the summary table are untransformed. A 
significant main effect for age was obtained with respect to 
Question B (F [1,92] = 5.81, p < .025), Question C (F [1,92] = 
12.20, p < .001) and Question E (F [1,92] = 7.30, p < .01). No 
significant differences arose for ' ~ gender.
Table 11.5
CONTENTS ANALYSIS: MEAN NUMBER OF STATEMENTS FOR EACH QUESTION
Age :
Boys
8 10-11
Girls
8 10-11
Totals
8 10-11
N = 24 24 24 24 48 48
Question A 1. 54 1. 79 1. 67 1.75 1 . 60 1. 77
Question B 1 . 67 2 . 08 1. 71 2. 13 1 . 69 2. 10
Question C 1. 88 2. 38 1. 67 2. 50 1. 77 2. 44
Question D 1. 29 1. 42 1. 46 1 . 38 1. 38 1. 40
Question E 2 . 04 2. 42 1. 79 2. 46 1. 92 2. 44
Internals v. Externals, The results of the content analysis
comparing internals with externals, are set out in Table 11.6. 
The significance of differences (p set at .05) between 
frequencies of responses for internals v. externals with 
respect to each category was based on chi-square analysis, 
using Table M in Guilford and Fruchter (1973), as in Experiment 
7, since this deals with small expected frequences for
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calculations in which group sizes are equal. Because this 
table omits some sample sizes, its source (Mainland and Murray, 
1 9 5 2 ) was also consulted.
In their explanations for the victim's injuries (Question 
A), it was expected that internals rather than externals would 
mention the main actor, whilst externals would be more Inclined 
to mention other actors. As Table 11.6 shows, all differences 
between internals and externals were in the expected direction 
in relation to the main and intervening actors and the victim. 
Significantly, Table M in Guilford and Fruchter (1973) revealed 
that more internals than externals among the 8 year-olds 
perceived the main story character to be causally responsible 
for the accident, and that at each age more internals than 
externals attributed causal and/or moral responsibility 
exclusively to the main actor. Conversely, the number of 
externals amongst the older subjects who named the victim as 
responsible was significantly greater than the number of 
internals who did so, both for boys and the total group. 
Externals among the older subjects as a group were also 
significantly more likely to attribute responsibility to an 
actor other than the main character. Finally, whereas 
internals (N = 14) at 8 years were more likely than externals 
(N = 5) to describe the main actor as causally responsible,
at 10-11 years internals (N = 13) were more likely than 
externals (N = 8) to use terms which inferred moral 
culpability.
It was also anticipated (Question B) that internals rather 
than externals would assume that the main actor would
— 266 —
experience feelings of responsibilty and of guilt when learning 
about the accident. The results in Table 11.6 suggest that 
internals and externals were equally likely to mention that the 
main actor would regret having been negligent in leaving broken 
glass on the path. However, as expected, internals were more 
likely to mention feelings of being at fault or feeling guilty, 
though the results are significant only amongst the younger 
subjects. There were no clear differences between internals 
and externals regarding the main actor's concern for self or 
for the victim.
The third hypothesis concerned perceptions of the way in 
which the main actor would respond to the victim's mother 
(Question C). As expected, internals were more likely to admit 
responsibility and to apologise, whilst externals were more 
likely to make excuses or play down responsibility, to deny 
responsibility explicitly, and to blame the intervening actor. 
These differences were significant at each age as regards 
apologies and blaming the intervening actor. Among older 
subjects, internals were more likely than externals to offer 
help to the mother, but the difference was not significant.
As regards reactions to the friendly neighbour (Question 
D), there were modest tendencies for internals to admit 
responsibility (younger subjects) and for externals to deny it 
(both ages), but no support emerged for the expectation that 
subjects as a whole would be more likely to admit culpability 
to a friendly adult than to the admonishing mother of the 
victim. Other results for this question showed no differences 
between locus of control groups.
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II
Finally, externals were expected to assume more punishing j
behaviour by the mother of the main actor (Question E). The 
results showed, as expected, that externals rather than i
Iinternals were more likely to mention punishment, results [
being significant for non-physical punishment amongst the |
younger subjects. Finally, internals at 10-11 years were :
significantly more likely to suggest that the mother would |
prescribe restitutive behaviour.
Victim behaviour. - In addition to the predictions relating j
to locus of control, it was anticipated that, in accounting for 
the victim's injuries, those subjects who placed some 
responsibility on the victim herself would be somewhat evident 
in the 'victim good' condition but more numerous in the 'victim 
naughty' condition. The results supported this expectation at 
each age (N’s for 'naughty' v. 'good' victim conditions = 10 v .
2 at 8 years; l4 v. 7 at 10-11 years). Table M in Guilford and 
Fruchter (1973) shows that these differences were significant 
(p < .01) with respect to the younger children and the total 
group. More of the older (N = 21) than younger (N = 12) 
subjects attributed some responsibility to the victim, though 
the difference is not significant. Utilizing the sub-divisions 
of Category 'd ' for Question A (see Table 11.3), it was found 
that at 8 years subjects in the 'victim naughty' condition were 
equally divided between those who held the victim responsible 
because of her bad behaviour (N = 5) and those who postulated 
negligence (she was not looking where she was going) to account 
for the accident (N = 5)« At 10-11 years, however, all but two 
of the fourteen subjects in this category postulated 
negligence. In the case of the 'good' victim, the
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responsibility was invariably attributed on grounds of 
negligence. Mention of the victim falling, without 
attributions of responsibility, was more evident in the 'victim 
good' than the 'victim naughty' condition, both at 8 years (4 
V ,  10) and at 10-11 years (5 v. 13); these results were 
significant for the total group (p < .01).
Accounts to the victim's mother and friendly neighbour.
Finally, accounts which subjects imagined would be given by the 
main actor to the threatening mother and the friendly neighbour 
were, for the most part, unexpectedly similar in character. 
However, the younger subjects were more inclined to perceive 
the actor trying to play down responsibility with the victim's 
mother rather than with the friendly neighbour (mean number of 
responses = 22 v . 10, chi-square =5.67, p < .02). The older
subjects tended to view the main actor admitting responsibility 
more readily to the victim's mother (15 responses) than the 
friendly neighbour (7 responses), but the result is not 
significant (chi-square = 2.89, P < .10).
In sum, the results for the contents analysis, although 
disappointing for the question relating to the friendly 
neighbour, gave considerable support for several of the 
hypotheses relating to locus of control and victim behaviour. 
The older children offered more statements than the younger 
ones, but, in contrast to the earlier questions which were 
analysed on the basis of ratings, the free response questions 
did not produce any consistent sex differences.
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Table 11.6
CONTENT ANALYSIS: NUMBER OF INTERNALS v. EXTERNALS
IN EACH RESPONSE CATEGORY
8 years 10- 11 year s
boys girls all boys girls all
Response category I E I E I E I E I E I E
N = 12 12 12 12 24 24 12 12 12 12 24 24
A. Why victim got hurt
a. MA causally resp. 7 3 7 2 14 5* 3 0 5 6 8 6
b . MA morally resp. 3 3 2 1 5 4 6 5 . 7 3 13 8
c . IA responsible 0 3 2 4 2 7 1 3 0 0 1 3
d . Victim resp. 3 2 1 6 4 8 2 10** 4 5 6 15**
e. V's mother resp. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
f. Victim fell 3 4 4 3 7 7 5 7 3 3 8 10
S. Glass/stones 3 2 5 2 8 4 1 0 2 3 3 3h. Other 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOTALS 19 18 22 18 41 36 18 25 22 20 4o 45
1. MA only resp. 4 0 3 0 7 0** 6 0* 3 2 9 2*
d . Only non-MA resp. 1 2 1 6 2 8 3 7 0 2 3 9*
B. Main actor's thoughts and feelings
a. regrets negligence 5 7 8 5 13 12 8 8 8 9 16 17
b. acknowledges fault 2 1 6 0** 8 1* 4 3 4 1 8 4
c . feels guilty 11 6 3 17 8* 7 4 8 5 15 9
d. concern for self 0 1 2 3 2 4 1 0 2 2 3 2
e . concern for victim 4 3 2 3 6 6 6 3 4 5 10 8
f. other 1 0 1 2 2 2 3 3 1 2 4 5
TOTALS 23 17 25 16 48 33 29 21 27 24 56 45
C. Main actor's response to victim's mother
a. admits resp. 2 1 3 0 5 1 3 7 3 2 6 9
b. limits resp. 6 5 3 8 9 13 4 4 6 8 10 12
c . denies resp. 1 3 0 4 1 7 1 2 0 4 1 6
d . blames lA directly 0 2 0 3 0 1 5 0 ^ * 1 10**
e . concern for self 0 2 0 0 0 2 1 0 1 1 2 1
f, concern for victim 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 2 0 1 2 3
S. apologizes 10 7 11 4**21 11**11 8 12 8 23 16*
h. offers help 1 2 0 0 1 2 2 1 5 1 7 2
i. will mend ways 0 1 3 0 3 1 0 1 1 1 1 2
d. other 0 2 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 0 2 1
TOTALS 20 25 21 19 41 44 26 31 29 31 55 62
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Table 11.6 continued
Response category
8 years 
boys girls allI E  I E  I E
10-11 years 
boys girls all
I E  I E  I E
N = 12 12 12 12 24 24 12 12 12 12 24 24
D. Main actor's response to friendly neighbour
a . describes events 
non-evaluat ively
5 2 2 3 7 5 4 1 4 3 8 4
b . admits resp. 3 0 3 1 6 1 2 1 2 2 4 3
c . limits resp. 3 1 2 4 5 5 6 5 3 4 9 9
d. denies resp. 0 2 1 3 1 5 0 2 0 2 0 4
e . blames IA directly 1 2 1 5 2 7 0 2 2 4 2 6
f. blames victim 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 2 1
g. apologizes/regrets 1 0 2 2 3 2 0 0 1 1 1 1
h. concern for self 1 0 1 0 2 0 0 2 1 0 1 2
i. concern for victim 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
d. will mend ways 0 0 1 2 1 2 1 1 0 0 1 1
k. avoidance tactics 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 2 0 4 3
1. don't know 3 4 1 0 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0
m. other 1 2 1 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOTALS 18 13 
E. Responses of main actor's
15
mo
20
ther
33 33 16 18 16 17 32 35
a. attributes/condemns 1 2 2 2 3 4 1 2 6 1 7 3b. reprimands 6 4 5 5 11 9 6 8 5 9 11 17
c . punishes
non-physically
7 12* 3 5 10 17* 5 8 4 7 9 15
d. punishes physically 1 5 2 3 3 8 0 3 1 1 1 4
e . moralizes 3 1 4 1 7 2 2 5 5 4 7 9
f. prescribes future 
behaviour
1 0 3 2 4 2 3 2 2 1 5 3
e. prescribes apology/ restitution
2 2 1 2 3 4 2 0 3 0 5 0^
h. requests more 
information
1 0 0 1 1 1 4 1 2 5 6 6
i. other 0 1 0 1 1 2 3 3 0 3 3 6
TOTALS 22 27 21 22 43 49 26 32 28 31 54 63
Key MA = main actor 
V = victim
lA = intervening actor 
VM = victim's mother
Asterisks indicate that differences between the frequencies are 
significant at p < .05 (*) or p < .01 (**).
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DISCUSSION
The aim of this study was to investigate the possibility 
that children's attributions of responsibility to others in an 
ambiguous but fairly serious accident situation will vary as a 
function of their locus of control tendencies and their 
knowledge of the victim's pre-accident behaviour. The results 
lent some support to the predictions.
In relation to the locus of control hypotheses, three sets 
of results in the ratings supported the expectations that 
internals would be more likely than externals to attribute 
significantly more responsibility to a personally similar 
actor. First, for each of the three attribution measures, 
internals among the girls clearly, consistently and 
significantly made more negative evaluations of the actor than 
did the external girl subjects; among boys, differences were in 
the same direction but less pronounced and not statistically 
significant. Secondly, among the younger boys and older girls, 
significantly more fault and blame was attributed to an 
intervening actor by externals; the pattern of results was 
similar and approached significance for the younger girls, 
though not for the older boys. Thirdly, a significant trend 
emerged among internals rather than externals for higher 
responsibility ratings to be assigned to the main than to the 
intervening actor, but again this pattern of results was more 
marked in the case of girls and, to a lesser extent, the 
younger boys. Additionally, externals among the eight 
year-olds, were predictably and significantly more negative in 
their evaluations of the victim's mother.
- 270 -
These results extend those obtained with adult samples by 
Kauffman and Ryckman (1979) and with senior high school 
students by Sosis (1974). However, because personal 
similarity, outcome seriousness, and situational ambiguity were 
facilitated but not manipulated, it is not possible to confirm 
Kauffman and Ryckman's (1979) finding that all the ingredients 
in the mixture of factors were necessary to produce the 
results. Arkkellin et al (1979), for instance, found that 
adult subjects in a road accident case did not take the 
seriousness of the accident into consideration when several 
other factors were present - though these did not include 
personal similarity, situational ambiguity and situational 
relevance, which were variables included in the present study. 
Also, it is important to remember that, in the present study, 
subjects in the experimental sample represented relatively 
extreme locus of control orientations (though it is not known 
how far the samples compare with norms). Since we do not know 
how those of moderate tendencies in the sample would have 
assigned responsibility to the actors, it would be wrong to 
conclude that locus of control and attribution of 
responsibility to others is related in the manner found over 
the entire locus of control continuum.
Nevertheless, the obtained differences in attributional 
style were as expected in the light of earlier results from the 
two pilot studies. In the first of these (Experiment 5) the 
effects generally appeared as anticipated when the subject was 
evaluating him/herself, but not when evaluating another child. 
When personal similarity between subject and actor was
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successfully facilitated in Experiment 7. the effect began to 
appear in evaluations of others, some results approaching but 
not reaching significance. In the present study, with larger 
cell sizes and subjects from extreme ends of the locus of 
control distribution, findings relating to attribution of 
responsibility were much more clearly in the expected 
direction, though generally they were significant only for 
girls, those amongst boys being less consistent and convincing 
(especially with respect to the older boys).
It is not easy to interpret the sex differences which 
occurred in relation to ratings by internals and externals. 
These findings cannot be compared with previous relevant 
studies with adults (Phares and Wilson, 1972; Kauffman and 
Ryckman, 1979) since those involved male subjects only. Sosis 
(1974) found no comparable sex differences, but her subjects 
(16-17 year-olds) were much older than those in the present
study. How, then, are we to interpret the sex x locus of
control interactions in the ratings?
One possible interpretion is in terms of defensive 
attribution theory. Shaver (1970) hypothesized that, in 
judging dissimilar others we attribute the outcome of an action
to the actor; but that when the actor is perceived as similar
to ourselves, we feel threatened by the attributional situation 
and prefer to attribute the outcomes to chance. When we 
identify ourselves with the perpetrator of an accident, it is 
as if we said, 'There but for the grace of God go I'. In the 
present study, care was taken to facilitate personal similarity 
between subject and actor. In terms of Shaver's defensive
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attribution theory, then, the boys rather than the girls may 
have believed that the situation in the story was of a kind in 
which they could well be placed, being familiar with 
circumstances in which they are held responsible for 
unthinking, careless behaviour: the girls might have been less
inclined to believe that they would get themselves into such a 
position. If this was the case, the boys would feel the need
to distance themselves from what happened, thinking 'It could
easily have been me'. If this perception was strong, it might 
have the effect of depressing the impact of locus of control 
differences in the case of boys.
Two problems arise with the defensive attribution
interpretation. One is that Shaver's hypothesis has not 
received unequivocal support, and has been questioned in 
particular by Fincham and Hewstone (1982). However, in his 
meta-analytic review of twenty-two studies (all with adults), 
Berger (198I) concluded that the defensive attribution 
hypothesis was 'quite robust' provided that personal and 
situational similarity between the observer and perpetrator was 
included as a variable: this factor which was only minimally
manipulated in Fincham and Hewstone's (1982) study, which also 
involved a restricted sample (adolescent boys from an 
independent school), A second problem is that, if the boys 
rather than the girls had felt threatened by the situation, 
then their attributions with respect to the main actor should 
have been less negative than those of the girls - but this was 
not so. In fact, attributions were sightly more severe in the 
case of boys.
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A more plausible interpretation of the sex differences is 
based on the assumption that the girls were more empathetically 
aroused by the predicament of the victim. They would therefore 
be more motivated to attribute responsibility to the ’right’ 
actor, and locus of control orientations would therefore be 
more readily engaged. Previous studies have demonstrated how 
girls are generally better able to imagine themselves in 
another’s place (Hoffman, 1977), more likely to take on an 
empathetic role when making moral judgements (Gibbs et al,
1984), and more interested in social behaviour and personal 
relationships (Livesley and Bromley, 1973). Livesley and 
Bromley also found that girls demonstrated a larger trait 
vocabulary in their descriptions of people, and were more prone 
to include evaluative terms such as ’good’, ’nice’, ’nasty’, 
and ’cheeky’.
Moreover, the fact that the victim in the stimulus story 
was a female gives added strength to the possibility that the 
events aroused the girls more than the boys. Unfortunately, 
although care was taken to match the gender of main and 
intervening actors with that of the subject, the four-year old 
victim was always a girl. It was assumed that subjects would 
not identify with her because of the age difference, but a 
recent study has shown how sex of actor can affect children’s 
attributions (Condry and Ross, 1985).
If this interpretion were valid, the girls’ evaluations of 
the victim should have been less derogatory than those of the 
boys. The results showed no significant tendencies for girls 
to attribute less responsibility to the victim or to feel more
274 -
sorry for her. However, the accident was seen as more deserved 
by the boys (a result which approached significance, p < .10); 
and, the older boys (among whom sex differences were more 
pronounced) attributed more fault to the victim than did the 
older girls (except for internals who judged the ’good’ 
victim). Additionally, in the free responses, half the older 
boys, compared with a quarter of the older girls, were likely 
to mention the victim's contribution to the accident.
No consistent sex differences arose in the results of the 
content analysis of free responses, which also supported the 
main arguments regarding locus of control. In particular, 
internals rather than externals were significantly more likely 
to attribute either moral or causal responsibility exclusively 
to the main actor, whilst externals were significantly inclined 
to limit their attributions to another actor. Equally, 
internals were more likely to assume that the main actor would 
acknowledge fault and feel guilty (significantly so in the case 
of the younger group). At both ages, externals were 
significantly more likely to assume that the main actor would 
blame the intervening actor when apprehended by the victim’s 
mother, and internals were significantly more likely to suggest 
that the main actor would apologize to the victim’s mother.
Some of the perceived parental upbringing practices were also 
related to subjects’ locus of control. Externals were more 
inclined to expect the main actor’s mother to be punitive 
(significant for non-physical punishment amongst the eight 
year-olds), and the older internals were significantly more 
inclined to expect that the mother would request her 
son/daughter to apologize or to help the victim’s mother in
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some way.
Two hypotheses were not supported in relation to locus of 
control. No significant differences between internals and 
externals emerged in ratings of the victim or in perceptions 
that the accident was bad luck. Finally, in the free 
responses, internals and externals did not offer different 
perceptions of what the main actor would admit to a friendly 
neighbour.
It is important to remind the reader here that locus of 
control in this study was based on the Bialer (196I) scale for 
children since the items relate to social rather than academic 
settings. However, as discussed in Chapter U., the Bialer 
measure contains a number of shortcomings, although the test 
re-test reliability on American samples is high (Bachrach and 
Peterson, 1976). An instrument developed by Dahlquist and 
Ottinger (1 9 8 3), published since this study begun, might be 
more successful in predicting attributional style in relation 
to other people since it is specifically designed to assess 
children's perceptions of social interactions.
The hypothesis that subjects across locus of control 
conditions would attribute more responsibility to a 
non-virtuous than to a virtuous victim was clearly supported in 
the ratings. Consistent with results from the pilot studies, 
subjects who were told the story when the victim had been 
'naughty’ rather than 'good' before the accident were 
significantly more likely to attribute fault and blame to the 
victim, and to perceive the adversity as deserved. This same
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trend emerged in the content analysis of responses to the 
open-ended question which invited subjects to account for the 
victim getting hurt.
Further analysis of the ratings and the free responses 
help to determine the relative weight which can be put upon 
each of the theories, reviewed in Chapter 7, which concern 
attribution of responsibility to a victim. As regards 
evaluations of the 'good' victim, the ratings indicated that, 
on average, subjects attributed 'just a little* fault and 
blame, but virtually no desert (Table 11.8). It would seem, 
therefore, that subjects were not employing 'just world' 
concepts (unless they were doing so with respect to the !
ill-behaved victim alone) since the 'just world' hypothesis 
holds that even apparently innocent victims will be regarded as ;
having done something to merit their misfortune (Lerner and 
Miller, 1 9 7 8). In their answers to the first open-ended !
question, subjects who suggested that the 'good' victim 
contributed to the occurrence of the accident claimed that the !
little girl could not have been looking where she was going. j
It would seem, then, that they were engaging in causal chaining 
by positing a naturalistic cause. Thus, subjects' evaluations 
of the 'good' victim are more easily interpreted in terms of 
Piaget's analysis of children's understanding of physical 
causality (Karniol, 198O; Piaget, 1930) than in terms of the 
'just world' hypothesis.
Turning now to the 'naughty' victim, the content analysis 1
suggested that the younger subjects who attributed
responsibility were equally divided between those who mentioned j
Ij
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the victim's naughtiness only (e.g. 'She was in a bad temper 
with her mum') and those who postulated a naturalistic 
explanation (e.g. 'She wasn't looking where she was going'). 
Among the older subjects, however, the vast majority gave the 
naturalistic explanation. This helps to explain why, in their 
free responses, the 'naughty* victim was held responsible by 
rather more subjects at 10-11 years than at 8 years. It was 
not because more of the older children were demonstrating 
immanent justice beliefs, but because they were more able to 
provide a plausible, mediating cause. The fact that, at the 
same time, the mean ratings decreased suggests that the 
contribution which the victim made to the occurrence of the 
adversity was judged less important by the older subjects.
In short, the findings regarding attributions to a victim 
extend those of previous studies in two respects. They 
demonstrate that children may still hold a victim somewhat 
responsible for an accident in situations where other actors 
are more clearly implicated, and they indicate that a victim 
who is virtuous is not entirely exempt in this respect. The 
results from the ratings and free responses, taken together, 
give support to the theory that immanent justice beliefs 
decline with age (Piaget, 1932). At the same time, it appears 
that older children may still blame a victim, but this is 
because they posit a naturalistic cause (Karniol, 1980). 
However, the results do not contain information to support the 
suggestion, raised in Chapter 7, that the 'just world' model 
might provide an alternative means by which children’s 
attributions to a victim could be interpreted. 'Just world' 
concepts probably arise as a result of long experience of
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apparently unjust suffering, and are therefore characteristic 
of the thinking of some adults rather than children. Further 
research is needed to determine the developmental nature of 
these beliefs.
Although not specifically predicted, another rating result 
was consistent with the hypothesis that children’s attributions 
of responsibility for an accident would vary as a function of 
the victim’s antecedent behaviour. When the victim was ’good’, 
subjects attributed significantly more causality to the main 
actor, presumably because his or her negligence was 
particularly salient when the little girl was behaving well. 
This effect had also been significant in the second pilot study 
(Expt. 7)« It was also the case that, when the victim was bad, 
her mother attracted significantly more blame. This could be 
interpreted in terms of vicarious responsibility, subjects 
believing that the accident would not have occurred had the 
mother kept her daughter in check. It is also conceivable
that, in terms of the ’just world’ hypothesis, subjects were
indirectly demonstrating that the mother's own negligence (as 
it was presumably perceived) merited some suffering.
The remaining significant results related to age.
Compared with the 10-11 year-olds, the younger subjects in
their ratings viewed the main actor as significantly more the 
cause of the accident and more to blame, while also attributing 
significantly more blame to the victim. This tendency for 
younger subjects to be harsher in their attributions is 
consistent with the findings of Harris (1977) and Fincham and 
Jaspars (1979). It is also in line with the results of
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Experiment 3, except that there the age differences for 
causality did not reach significance. Younger children 
probably attribute more responsibility in an ambiguous 
situation because they focus more on the salient, objective 
features of the situation and less on subjective factors such 
as intentionality and mitigating circumstances (Fincham and 
Jaspars, 1979; Piaget, 1932). Another age difference occurred 
in the free responses. The 10-11 year-olds offered 
significantly more statements concerning the actor's feelings, 
his/her responses to the victim's mother, and the reaction of 
the actor's mother. Flapan (1968) and Livesley and Bromley 
(1973) also found that children older than eight years would 
more often infer the feelings and thoughts of actors. With a 
decline in egocentrism (Piaget, 1967), older subjects are 
better able to imagine the feelings of others; and as a result 
of their greater experience, older subjects have more 
understanding of others’ motives (Rogers, 1 9 7 8 ).
Finally, the older subjects (but not the younger ones) 
were more inclined, though not significantly so, to suggest 
that the main actor would acknowledge some responsibility to 
the angry mother rather than to the friendly neighbour. May be 
this reflects a self-serving bias, the older subjects ’feeling 
better’ and redressing their self-esteem by admitting fault 
(Lalljee et al, 1 9 8 3 ): or may be (as a response from one
subject implied) the friendly neighbour was inadequately 
operationalized, perceived as a busybody rather than a 
sympathetic and neutral observer.
To conclude, the results from the present study suggest
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that, when children of Primary school age see themselves as 
personally similar to a negligent actor, locus of control 
tendencies in girls will tend to be related to their 
assignments of responsibility in an ambigious situation 
involving personal injury. In the case of boys, especially the 
older ones, such a conclusion cannot be made on the basis of 
the present data. In this experiment, sex differences may have 
arisen because the nature of the attributional situation, being 
concerned with interpersonal relations and a female victim, 
more readily engaged the locus of control orientations of the 
female subjects. Our conclusion regarding subjects’ 
attributions to a victim is that children of both sexes will be 
more ready to attribute responsibility when the victim has been 
behaving badly prior to the accident, though a small amount of 
blame will also be attributed to a ’good’ victim. This result 
was found to be more easily interpreted in terms of cognitive 
developmental theory (immanent justice and causal 
understanding) than in terms of the ’just world' concepts.
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Chapter* 12
GENERAL DISCUSSION
This research has addressed three main issues concerning 
the way in which children of Primary school age attribute 
responsibility for injury which is associated with the actions 
of others.
The first issue concerns developmental differences. 
Heider’s (1958) model of responsibility attribution 
distingushes between five levels of commission. Because these 
were held to constitute ’successive stages in which attribution 
to the person decreases and attribution to the environment 
increases' (p.113), there is the possibility that they 
represent cognitive developmental stages. Although, when this 
research began, this hypothesis had been the subject of 
considerable empirical research (reviewed in Chapter 2), only 
two studies involving attributions in relation to personal 
injury (Ferguson and Rule, 1980; Fincham and Jaspars, 1979) had 
been free from serious methodological weaknesses. Further, 
only the Fincham and Jaspars study had involved an English 
sample, and no previous investigation had considered all three 
dimensions of ’responsibility’ discussed in Chapter 1, viz. 
cause, blame, and punishment.
The levels manipulated in Experiments 1 and 3 related to 
outcomes ranging from those which the actor was instrumental in 
producing but which were unforeseeable ('Causality’), through
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those which the actor could have foreseen but which were 
unintended (’Foreseeability’) and those which were purposeful 
and malicious (’Intentionality’), to those which were a 
function of well-motivated responses to a situation 
(’Justification').
Using vignettes adapted from a measure devised by Ferguson 
and Rule (198O), the results of Experiment 3 extended those of 
recent investigations in various respects. One set of findings 
relates to the 'sophistication' of the younger subjects’ 
judgements of moral responsibility. In Ferguson and Rule's 
study, the 7-9 year-olds had discriminated significantly only 
between the non-adjacent levels of Foreseeability and 
Justification, while in the Fincham and Jaspars (1979) study 
the 8-9 year-olds had discriminated significantly between only 
one pair of adjacent levels. In contrast, the 8 year-old 
subjects in Experiment 3 discriminated significantly between 
each adjacent level in their evaluations of both blame and 
punishment (though with some gender differences in the case of 
blame). This means that the children were successful not only 
in separating intentional from non-intentional behaviour, but 
also in separating behaviours which were accidental v. 
negligent, negligent v. malicious, and intentional for good v. 
bad reasons. It was suggested that the younger subjects’ 
judgements appeared more differentiated in Experiment 3 because 
the intent information had been made clearer at the lower . 
levels of commission and had also been made more salient by 
keeping outcomes consistently mild; additionally the blame 
question had been reformulated to reduce ambiguity of meaning. 
As Fincham (1 9 8 3), Keasey (1977) and Rogers (1978) have pointed
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out in reviews of the literature concerning children’s use of 
intentionality information in moral evaluation, the ability of 
young children to make sophisticated judgements is materially 
enhanced as the attributional information is made more 
explicit, if the damage or injury is fairly slight, and if care 
is taken to word questions so as to avoid conceptual confusion.
The ability of children to offer differentiated moral 
judgements was further demonstrated in Experiment IX. Subjects 
(particularly the younger ones) made clearer and statistically 
more significant discriminations between Heider's levels when 
they were allowed time to compare their evaluations with 
respect to each level rather than make each judgement ’cold’, 
and when they were permitted to offer revised evaluations, if 
necessary, after ’second thoughts’. A further possible reason 
why children may have found it easier to make differentiated 
judgements in this experiment is that the attributional 
information was made more salient by being represented on cards 
which the children physically manipulated on a rating scale. 
Together with Experiment 3 and the findings of previous 
researchers (especially Fincham and Jaspars, 1979, and Fincham, 
1 9 8 1), these findings demonstrate that Heider’s levels cannot 
be construed as developmental stages in Kohlberg’s sense of 
structural wholes. In attributing moral responsibility to 
others, young subjects are sensitive to the criteria which 
characterize Heider’s levels; however, their judgement will not 
be as clearly differentiated as that displayed by older 
subjects, except under certain ’favourable conditions'.
Another way in which the present results extend those of
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Ferguson and Rule (1980) relates to the different natures of 
the significant Age x Stimulus Level interactions which were 
found in relation to attributions of causality and of moral 
responsibility. When the cause question was cast in the form 
'How much do you think that (outcome) was the result of what 
(actor) did?*, the adult subjects produced less differentiated 
judgements than they did with respect to the questions about 
blame and punishment, and the 8 and 11 year-olds made only 
minimal distinctions between levels of commission. In relation 
to Heider's hypothesis concerning attribution of 
responsibility, it would appear that subjects, especially 
children, will make greater use of personal and environmental 
information when making moral judgements than when attributing 
causality. There is a sense in which an actor causally 
contributes to an unintended outcome in that, but for his or 
her movements, the event would not have occurred. But in moral 
judgements, the role of unintentional actions, or of those 
which are intentional but well-motivated, are more likely to be 
discounted.
The relationship between attributions regarding cause, 
blame and punishment was also examined. The correlation 
pattern which emerged among the I! ÿpaîNiîct subjects suggested an 
entailment model similar to that found in adult subjects by 
Fincham and Shultz (1981) and Shultz et al (1 9 8 1), judgements 
of punishment depending on those of blame, which in turn 
depended on perceptions of causality. However the link between 
blame and punishment was found to be much stronger than that 
between cause and blame.
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The second issue addressed in this thesis concerned 
individual differences in children’s attributions concerning 
the behavioural outcomes of others. As in a previous study 
(Shaw and Schneider, 1969a), no clear link was found between 
general intelligence and attributional tendencies.
Consideration was then given to the possibility that Rotter et 
al’s (1 9 7 2) social learning theory of personality, involving 
the concept of locus of control, might help to explain 
individual differences in children's attributions to others. 
Shaver's (1975) suggestion that an association might be found 
between internal locus of control and a tendency to attribute 
responsibility to others had been previously investigated only 
in relation to older adolescents and adults. Following the 
failure to find a significant link between the two variables 
(Experiment 1), a measure was constructed for estimating locus 
of control in relation to the subject’s liking for the target 
person, the success or failure of the outcome, and the 
stability of its perceived cause (Experiment 2). In spite of 
the refinement of the new self-attribution measure, only a 
tenuous link was found with attribution of responsibility to 
others (Experiment 3). Following the leads given in studies 
with older subjects, culminating in the work of Kauffman and 
Ryckman (1979), a procedure to facilitate perceived personal 
similarity between subject and main story character was 
successfully accomplished (Experiment 6), and attribution of 
responsibility was then assessed in a complex situation in 
which the guilt of the main actor was ambiguous (Experiments 7 
and 8). In these more controlled circumstances, subjects in 
the second pilot investigation (Experiment 7) whose internality 
scores were above the median on the Bialer-Cromwell scale gave
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higher* responsibility ratings to a personally similar actor 
than those whose scores fell below the median, but the results 
at best only approached statistical significance.
In the main investigation (Experiment 8), which involved a 
larger sample and subjects whose locus of control tendencies 
contrasted more markedly than in the pilot study, the impact of 
locus of control was more successfully demonstrated. In a 
content analysis of responses to open-ended questions, 
internals rather than the externals were significantly more 
likely to attribute responsibility exclusively to the actor, 
whilst the externals tended to refer to the contribution of 
other actors. Internals were also significantly more likely to 
assume that the actor would apologize in public, would admit 
fault, and would feel guilty; externals were more likely to 
believe that the actor would place the blame on the friend, and 
that the actor’s mother would punish him or her when she found 
out what had happened. In analysis of subjects’ ratings, 
significant main effects for locus of control were obtained in 
a range of measures. However, these tended to be qualified by 
significant interactions with sex, attribution of 
responsibility being related to internality more obviously in 
the case of girls. This was interpreted partly in terms of the 
greater interest which girls seem to have in interpersonal 
relationships (Livesley and Bromley, 1973) and the greater 
ability of girls to take on an empathetic role (Gibbs et al, 
1980.; Hoffman, 1970). It was also thought that the female 
subjects would be more likely to identify with the victim 
because she was a young girl. Boys, in contrast (and 
particularly the older ones amongst whom the impact of locus of
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control seemed the least pronounced), may have demonstrated 
chauvinistic tendencies towards a female victim. For these 
reasons, female subjects may have been more motivated to 
attribute responsibility to the ’right* actor, and their locus 
of control orientations would therefore have been more readily 
engaged.
The third issue which was addressed concerned attributions 
made with respect to the victim of an accident. This issue had 
previously been studied with children with reference to 
immanent justice concepts (Fein and Stein, 1977» Freeman and 
Daly, 198%; Karniol, 1980; Piaget, 1932) and the development of 
causal reasoning (Karniol, 198O). However, in these studies, 
the situation in which a virtuous victim meets misfortune had 
not been investigated. Further, only with adults had 
attributions to a victim been examined in relation to beliefs 
in a ’just world’ (Lerner and Matthews, 1967; Lerner, 1 9 8 0),
In the present study, victim behaviour was manipulated, and 
opportunity was given for attributions to be made to other 
actors who were more clearly implicated in producing the 
adversity.
In the main investigation relating to the victim’s 
responsibility (Experiment 8), subjects who judged an 
ill-behaved four year-old girl perceived her to be 
significantly more at fault, more blameworthy, and more 
deserving of misfortune than subjects who judged a victim of 
the same age and sex who had been behaving well. At the same 
time, some subjects attributed a small measure of fault and 
blame even to the well-behaved victim. Analysis of the free
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responses suggested that, where the victim had transgressed, 
half the younger children and almost all the older children 
were not seeing the adversity in terms of immanent justice but 
were postulating a naturalistic cause, assuming that the victim 
cannot have been minding her step. Where a virtuous victim was 
held responsible, the reasoning was always in terms of a 
naturalistic cause. The evidence was thus consistent not only 
with Piaget’s (1932) belief that immanent justice concepts 
diminish with age, but also with Piaget's (1930) analysis of 
developmental trends in causal reasoning relating to physical 
events, since the older children were more likely to suggest 
plausible causal links. However, results from the study did 
not seem to suggest that children of this age invoke 'just 
world’ beliefs, for, although some subjects in their free 
responses maintained that the virtuous victim was negligent, 
they were disinclined to indicate in their ratings that she 
deserved to suffer, as the ’just world’ hypothesis would 
predict.
In addition to realizing findings having a direct bearing 
on the three central issues, aspects of the work of Weiner and 
his colleagues (Weiner et al, 1976) in achievement settings 
were applied to interpersonal situations. In Experiment 2, 
doubt was thrown on the notion that locus of control is a 
unidimensional construct, even within the restricted context of 
interpersonal behaviour, since significant interactions were 
obtained with respect to the nature of the outcome, the 
perceived stability of its cause, and the status/familiarity of 
the target person. Thus subjects aged 8 and 11 years generally 
took greater credit for their successes than for their
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Ifailures, this in turn being conditional on the cause of 1
outcome being stable over time. In interpreting this finding, ii
it was assumed that self-esteem is more likely to be maintained 
not only if the subject reserves the acceptance of i
responsibility for outcomes which are successful, but also j
attributes those successes to his or her own skill rather than j
ito a temporary good mood. Another finding suggested that the |
i
younger subjects found it hard to see themselves as responsible j
I1for unsuccessful outcomes, while the older children tended to j
do so when they would be less likely to suffer loss of face, i
I
i.e where the target person was liked and the reason for |
failure was attributed to a temporary bad mood. With !i
less-liked others, internality was barely evident amongst the i
younger subjects even for successful outcomes, while the older j
subjects who made self-attributions in these cases tended also j
to explain the success in terms of a temporary good mood, 
suggesting that they regarded the situation as exceptional. It 
was also found that internality increased significantly between 
8 and 11 years in relation to outcomes caused by factors which 
were unstable over time, but not in relation to those 
associated with stable causes.
Finally, the investigation reported in Experiment 6 proved 
methodologically innovative in producing a procedure by which 
perceived personal similarity between a child subject and an 
actor could be assessed. If attributions for the behavioural 
outcomes of others are dependent upon the extent to which the 
subject perceives himself or herself as personally similar to 
the actor, as some attributional studies with older subjects 
(e.g. Kauffman and Ryckman, 1979» Shaver, 1970) have
- 290 -
demonstrated, it is unwise to assume that children identify 
with the story character presented in stimulus materials.
Basing personal similarity on a liking for certain interests 
and pastimes, the new procedure involved matching the story 
character's interests to those of each subject. In a set of 
four descriptions specially constructed for each subject, the 
similarity between the story character and the subject ranged 
from 'very similar' to 'very dissimilar'. It was found that 
children aged 8 and 10-11 years can discriminate significantly 
between these four descriptions, and agree that the 'very 
similar* character is essentially like them. This procedure 
should help to provide a means for controlling the effect of 
personal similarity in studies involving young children.
Of the issues addressed in this thesis, those concerning 
individual differences have proved the most difficult to 
answer. This may be because the degree to which responsibility 
is attributed to others is related to multiple factors (e.g. 
sub-cultural differences, child-rearing practices, educational 
experiences, personality) rather than to any one 'master* 
factor. Further, some factors may be significant in some 
attributional contexts but not in others. For instance, 
intelligence is likely to be more important when evaluations 
depend upon complex information processing, and less important 
when they depend upon an acquaintance with the social norms, 
which is acquired with age (Shaw and Schneider, 1969a). Future 
work might be more successful in uncovering the complex nature 
of individual differences if the investigation is based more on 
an interpretative than a scientific paradigm. Rather than set 
up hypotheses to predict variations in attribution of
— 291 —
responsibility to others on the basis of pre-specified factors, 
it might be more productive to regard attribution of 
responsibility to others as the independent variable and to 
conduct case studies of children who appear to be 'low* and 
’high* attributors, particularly if these tendencies were based 
upon the observation of children’s attributions in naturalistic 
settings. Account might also be taken of the children's 
tendencies to vary the strength of their attributions to an 
agent according to the status of the audience (e.g. peers v. 
adults, friends v. authority figures; cf. Lalljee et al,
1 9 8 3). This more exploratory approach might expose clusters of 
factors which, in given contexts, appear to predispose children 
to attribute more or less responsibility to others.
Previous research on individual differences in children's 
attributional style (reviewed in Chapter 2), has concentrated 
on cultural and sub-cultural differences plus intelligence; the 
present series of experiments has concentrated mainly on locus 
of control. Future research might usefully turn to the impact 
of school 'ethos*. Significant differences between schools in 
academic and social behaviour, even after controlling for such 
factors as socio-economic background and levels of attainment 
and behaviour on entry, have been demonstrated in recent 
studies (reviewed by Rutter, 1 9 8 3 , and Reynolds, 1985). More 
specifically, Buriel (1981) has shown how teachers' 
socialization behaviour appears to have a more pervasive 
influence on children's locus of control orientations than does 
parental behaviour, and various investigations have 
demonstrated how teachers influence pupils' self-attributions 
by means of verbal appeals and verbal feedback as well as by
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direct reference to causality (see review by Bar-Tal, 1 9 8 2 ). 
These recent findings suggest that children's attributions with 
respect to others will also be affected by school climate and 
teacher behaviours. For instance, schools such as those run by 
the Society of Friends, in which emphasis is placed on 'a 
relaxed atmosphere of friendliness, in which children may 
discover themselves as persons in their own right' (Gorman, 
1 9 8 1 ), and which seek without the undue imposition of extrinsic 
reinforcements to develop feelings of responsibility towards 
the community in 'the conviction that we are all members of one 
another' (Friends School Joint Committee, 1980) may help to 
foster a disposition in their pupils to assume that others, as 
well as themselves, should accept responsibility for their 
actions. If the attribution of personal responsibility is 
learnt through experiencing the attributional tendencies of 
significant others, then differences should emerge in the 
attributions of children exposed to contrasting models.
Studies in the attribution of personal responsibility 
deserve a prominent place in psychological literature since our 
propensity to perceive personal causality and to make 
judgements of blame and punishment is central to the concept of 
personhood. We attribute to persons intentionality and 
evaluate human behaviour in terms of intentions and motives 
rather than physical causes (Shotter, 1975). As children 
develop an understanding of intentionality, motivation, and the 
features of a situation which warrant attribution to external 
factors, so we can help them to 'attribute responsibility 
responsibly' and thus to develop more fully as persons. 
Developmental studies are of practical significance in
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achieving this end not so much for the way in which they 
provide teachers with realistic levels of expectation but for 
the way in which they enable teachers to appreciate the 
appropriate conditions in which children can be more discerning 
in their judgements. As we have seen, the ability of children 
to discriminate amongst Heider's levels is not simply a 
function of age but also a function of the kind of conditions 
in which judgements are made.
Whilst our understanding of developmental differences in 
the attribution of responsibility has advanced considerably 
since the pioneering studies of Shaw and Sulzer over twenty 
years ago, much work remains to be done regarding individual 
differences. The task is daunting not only because of the 
multiplicity of potentially influencing factors but also 
because of the unique meaning which each child may give to the 
act of attributing responsibility in a given situation. An 
attributional situation which appears threatening for one child 
may appear challenging and rewarding for another. Nonetheless, 
the complexity of the task need not mean that there are no 
pervasive factors which account for individual differences in 
attributional tendencies, even if the association is not a 
strong one. More progress might be made if the focus was 
shifted from testing the strength of individual predictors in 
relation to the hypothetical incidents of others to comparisons 
among children who demonstrate different attributional style in 
real situations.
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Appendix Al
STIMULUS STORIES USED IN EXPERIMENTS 1 AND 3, ADAPTED FROM THE 
MATERIALS COMPILED BY FERGUSON AND RULE (1980)
The words in parentheses indicate changes in wording for female 
subjects.
Story 1
Jack (June) and Bob (Brenda) were building sand castles on the 
beach one day.
Jack (June) was moving some sand with his (her) feet when 
Bob (Brenda) ran off to paddle. Jack (June) did not see 
Bob (Brenda) suddenly run back, and kicked sand in his 
(her) face. (Causality level)
Jack (June) didn't look to see where Bob (Brenda) was 
standing and kicked sand in Bob's (Brenda's) face. 
(Foreseeability level)
While they were playing. Jack (June) kicked sand in Bob's 
(Brenda's) face because Bob (Brenda) had built a better 
sand castle. (Intentionality level)
Jack (June) kicked sand in Bob's (Brenda's) face to stop 
him treading on some broken glass. (Justification level)
Some sand got into Bob's (Brenda's) eyes, which stung and 
watered.
Story 2
Jim (Joy) and Peter (Pat) were up in a tree house.
While they were playing, Jim (Joy) lost his (her) balance
and knocked Peter (Pat) out of the tree house.
(Causality level)
While they were playing, Jim (Joy) didn't look to see
where Peter (Pat) was standing and pushed a table against
Peter (Pat), who fell out of the tree house.
( FoiEseeability level)
While they were playing, Jim (Joy) pushed Peter (Pat) out
of the tree house because he (she) wanted Peter (Pat) to
go home. (Intentionality level)
While they were playing, Jim (Joy) saw the tree house
catch fire. He pushed Peter (Pat) out of the tree house
as they both had to get out quickly. (Justification 
level)
When Peter (Pat) hit the ground, he (she) sprained his (her) 
arm.
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story 3
Len (Lucy) and Mike (Mary) were at the local shops. While Len 
(Lucy) went off to look around, Mike (Mary) found a toffee on 
the floor and started to eat it as Len (Lucy) was coining back.
Len (Lucy) did not realize that Mike (Mary) had something 
in his (her) mouth, and thumped him (her) on the back to 
say ’Hello’. (Causality level)
Len (Lucy) saw Mike (Mary) eating the toffee, and thumped 
him (her) on the back to say ’Hello*. ( Forsseeabili ty 
level)
Len (Lucy) thumped Mike on on the back because he (she) 
wanted the toffee for himself (herself).
((Intentionality level)
Len (Lucy) thumped Mike (Mary) on the back to stop him 
eating the toffee because it was dirty. (Justification 
level)
Mike (Mary) swallowed the toffee whole, and choked on it a bit.
Story 4
Richard (Rita) and Max (Michelle) were at the pictures. They
got some popcorn and sweets and went into the cinema.
As they were going to their seats, someone shoved Richard 
(Rita), who fell against Max (Michelle). (Causality 
level)
As they were going to their seats, Richard (Rita) didn’t 
look where he (she) was going and bumped into Max 
(Michelle). ( Forsseeability level)
As they were going to their seats, Richard (Rita) pushed 
Max (Michelle) because he (she) wanted the sweets. 
(Intentionality level)
As they were going to their seats, Richard (Rita) pushed 
Max (Michelle) to prevent him (her) walking into an 
attendant who was carrying a tray full of soft drinks. 
(Justification level)
Max (Michelle) stumbled and knocked his (her) head on a wall. 
His (her) head came up in a bump.
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story 5
Keith (Karen) and Gary (Gwen) were walking down the High 
Street. Keith (Karen) noticed a pound note on the pavement a 
few yards in front of them.
Keith (Karen) went to pick up the pound note. He didn’t 
realize that Gary (Gwen) was running as well, and bumped 
into him. (Causality level)
Keith (Karen) said to Gary (Gwen), ’Come on, let’s get 
that money!’ As they both ran to grab the pound note, 
Keith (Karen) bumped into Gary (Gwen). ( Foi^seeability 
level)
Keith (Karen) wanted to get the money, so he (she) knocked 
Gary (Gwen) out of the way. (Intentionality level)
Keith (Karen) wanted to give the money back to the person 
whom he (she) had seen drop it, but Gary (Gwen) wanted to 
keep the money. So Keith (Karen) knocked Gary (Gwen) out
of the way, as he (she) ran to return the money. 
(Justification level)
Gary (Gwen) fell over and his (her) nose bled.
Story 6
Colin (Cathy) and Geoff (Jean) were painting pictures in their 
classroom one afternoon.
Colin (Cathy) didn’t notice Geoff (Jean) leaning over to 
look at his (her) painting, and knocked him wth his (her) 
arm. (Causality level)
As Colin (Cathy) rushed to show the teacher his (her) 
painting, he (she) bumped into Geoff (Jean).
( Foisseeability level)
Colin (Cathy) pushed Geoff (Jean) because Geoff (Jean)’s 
painting was better than his (hers). (Intentionality 
level)
Colin (Cathy) pushed Geoff (Jean) to stop him (her) 
treading in a puddle of paint. (Justification level)
Geoff (Jean) fell over and hurt his (her) ankle.
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story 7
Steve (Shirley) and Alan (Anne) were at the fairground, riding 
on a merry-go-round.
As Steve (Shirley) went to jump off, he (she) stumbled and 
knocked Alan (Anne) off the merry-go-round. (Causality 
level)
When Steve (Shirley) went to jump off, he (she) didn’t 
look where he (she) was going and knocked Alan (Anne) off 
the merry-go-round. (Fogseeability level)
Steve (Shirley) knocked Alan (Anne) off the merry-go-round 
because he (she) wanted his (her) seat. (Intentionality 
level)
Steve (Shirley) knocked Alan (Anne) off the merry-go-round 
as he (she) tried to prevent Alan (Anne) sitting on some 
spilled ice-cream. (Justification level)
Alan (Anne) grazed his (her) nose.
Story 8
John (Julie) and Bill (Barbara) were playing outside the sweet 
shop. They found some chocolate which somebody had dropped.
Before they could eat it, John (Julie) slipped in some 
mud, knocking into Bill (Barbara), whomever. (Causality 
level)
As they raced to get the chocolate, John (Julie) bumped 
into Bill (Barbara), who fell over. (Foreseeability 
level)
John (Julie) tripped Bill (Barbara) up because he (she) 
wanted to get the chocolate for himself (herself). 
(Intentionality level)
As Bill (Barbara) went to get the chocolate for himself 
(herself), John (Julie) tripped him up because he (she) 
wanted to give it back to the person he (she) saw drop it
Bill (Barbara) cut his (her) chin slightly on the pavement.
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Appendix A2
BIALER-CROMWELL LOCUS OF CONTROL SCALE FOR CHILDREN
(ANGLICIZED)
Ip. When somebody gets angry with you, do you usually feel 
there is nothing you can do about it?
2f. If you try hard enough, could you be anything you want to
be by just trying?
3f. When people are unkind to you, could it be because you did
something to make them be unkind?
4f. Do you usually make up your mind about something without 
asking anyone first of all?
5f. Can you do anything about what is going to happen 
tomorrow?
6f. When people are good to you, is it usually because you did 
something to make them be good?
7f. Is it ever possible to make other people do things you 
want them to do?
8f. Do you ever think that people your age can change things 
that are happening in the world?
9f. If another child was going to hit you, could you do 
anything about it?
lOf. Can a person your age ever have his (her) own way?
lip. Is it hard for you to know why some people do certain 
things?
12f. When someone is nice to you, is it because you did the 
right things?
13f. Can you ever try to be friends with someone else your age 
even if he (she) doesn’t want to be friends?
I4f. Does it ever help to think about what you will be when you 
grow up?
15f. When someone gets angry with you, can you usually do 
something to make him (her) your friend again?
I6f. Can people your age ever have some say about where they’re 
going to live?
17f. When you get in a argument, is it sometimes your fault?
- 3 2 3  -
iSp. When nice things happen to you, it is usually only good 
luck?
19p. Do you often feel you get punished when you don’t deserve 
it?
20f. Will people usually do things for you if you ask them?
21f. Do you believe that someone your age can usually be
whatever he (she) wants to be when he (she) grown up?
22p. When bad things happen to you, is it usually someone 
else's fault?
23f. Can you ever be sure that you know why some people do 
certain things?
Note. The letter ’f ’ following an item number indicates than 
an answer of ’Yes’ is scored as internal control. The letter 
’p ’ signifies that an answer of ’N o ’ is scored as internal 
control.
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Appendix AÜ 
STIMULUS STORIES USED IN EXPERIMENT %
Story A
Janet and Kate were placing in the playground at school.
Janet tripped over a stone and fell against Kate. 
(Causality level)
Janet was running around not looking where she was going, 
and bumped into Kate. (Forseeability level)
Janet gave Kate a push because she didn't want to play 
with her any more. (Intentionality level)
Janet saw a ball about to hit Kate on the head, so she 
pushed Kate out of the way. (Justification level)
Kate fell over and grazed her knee.
Story B
Susan and Joan were riding their bicycles one day.
A car came too near Susan, who swerved and bumped into 
Joan. (Causality level)
Susan was showing off, riding with her feet in the air,
and bumped into Joan. (Forseeability level)
Susan was jealous of Joan's new bike and pushed her bike 
against Joan's. (Intentionality level)
Susan gave Joan a push to stop her riding into a pot hole. 
(Justification level)
Joan fell off her bike and sprained her ankle.
Note. For male subjects, the names David and Paul were used in
Story A and Tom and Ken in Story B.
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APPENDIX A5
ACCIDENT STORY AND ILLUSTRATIONS FOR EXPERIMENTS 5. 7 AND 8
Following Experiment 5 (Pilot 1), the wording of the story was 
revised slightly (see p. 225) and some Illustrations were 
altered accordingly. This appendix contains the revised 
version used in Experiments 7 (Pilot 2) and 8 (Main 
Investigation).
Below are the narrative and illustrations (reduced by 
one-quarter) used for male subjects in the 'victim good' 
condition. The alternative text and illustrations for the 
'victim naughty' conditions affect sequences 7, 8 and 9, which
are given on PP335-336.
When presented to female subjects, the main actor (Jane) and 
her friend are drawn as girls.
In Experiments 5 and 8, the attribution measure was 
administered to subjects individually, and the illustrations 
were presented on AH cards. In Experiment 7. the measure was 
administered to small groups, and the illustrations were 
projected on to a screen from tranparencies.
m
One Saturday afternoon, John goes into the local 
park to meet a friend. He is excited because his friend has a new bike which he has said John can 
r i d e .
-
c u u
John gets to the park early. While he is waiting, he decides to open a bottle of coke which 
he has brought with him.
But the bottle slips out of John's hands, falling on to the concrete path and breaking into 
several pieces.
- 330 -
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John picks up a piece of the broken bottle to 
put in a litter bin just by him.
But, just then, John's friend arrives with his new bike. “Hi, John !“, he says. “Never mind 
about that glass now. Come and have a ride on my new bike.“
- 331 -
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'*OKî“, says John — and gets on the bike, leaving the rest of the glass on the path. His friend runs after him.
WWiwv
Meanwhile, a little girl age 4 is walking through the park with her mum. She is carrying some of her mum’s shopping in her doll's pram.
-  332 -
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The little girl's mother stops to sit on a bench 
quite near where John had been standing. The girl 
gives her mother a kiss.
(S3^ C » ' *  -V'Vo
The little girl skips off along the path while 
her mother stays resting on the park bench.
_ 333 _
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Just as the little girl runs by the place where John had been standing, she trips and falls over on 10 the broken glass. She has cut her face badly and 
starts to scream.
John and his friend hear the little girl's screams from across the p)ark and turn round to see what has happened. They realize that the little 
girl has fallen on to the broken glass which was 
left on the path.
- 33A -
Variations for 'victim naughty* condition
C/LaJju
Meanwhile, a little girl age 4 -is walking through the park with her mum. She keeps asking 
for more sweets, but her mum says that she has had 
enough sweets for the moment.
The little girl loses her temper and starts to 
hit her mother
- 335 -
The little girl runs off along the path. She is in a very bad temper because her mother won't 
let her have any more sweets.
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Appendix A6
INTERESTS AND PASTIMES INVENTORY 
(Experiments 6, 7 and 8)
You like ....
1.
2.
3.
li,
5.
6.
7.
8. 
9.10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.16.
17.18.
19. .
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 24 .
25.
26.
27.28.
29.
30.
31.32.
33.34.
35.36.
37.38.
39.40.
41.
42.
43.44.
45.46.
47.48.
49.50.
..collecting things
..reading stories
..reading poems
..playing the violin
..horse-riding
..drawing pictures
..playing chess
..writing stories
..singing in a choir
..learning about life long ago
..finding out about nature and animals
..painting pictures
..doing sums
..swimming
..playing the guitar 
..playing with friends 
..sewing
..listening to pop music 
..fishing
..playing the flute 
..riding your bike 
..playing rounders
..playing board games (eg snakes & ladders or ludo)
..playing cricket
..going ice-skating
..colouring pictures
..writing poems
..playing computer games
..playing in the playground
..doing science experiments
..playing the piano
..playing netball
..playing the recorder
..watching TV
..acting in plays
..running races
..playing with your dog
..dancing
. .climbing trees
..reading comics
..roller-skating
..playing with Lego
..playing with dolls
..going to school
..playing football
..playing snooker
..making pottery
..making cakes
..finding out about other countries 
..making models
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Appendix B6.2 
Experiment 8: ANOVA - MAIN v. INTERVENING ACTORS
(a) Judgements of fault
Source SS df MS F P <
BETWEEN SUBJECTS 213.578 95
A (age) 0 . 005 1 0 . 005 0, 002
C. (sex) 1. 172 1 1.172 0 . 509
X> (locus of control) 0 . 255 1 0.255 0. Ill
AC 1. 172 1 1. 172 0 . 509
AD 1. 505 1 1.505 0.653
CD 1.172 1 1.172 0.509
ACD 5.672 1 5.672 2. 463
Subj w gps 202.625 88 2. 303
WITHIN SUBJECTS 408.500 96
B (actor) 92.130 1 92.130 3 4 .429 . 001
AB 3. 255 1 3.255 1 . 216
BC 7. 130 1 7.130 2.664
BD 3 5 .880 1 35.880 1 3 .410 . 001
ABC 1. 505 1 1. 505 0.562
ABD 2.755 1 2.755 1.030
BCD 14.630 1 14.630 5.467 . 025
ABCD 15.755 1 15.755 5.888 . 025
B X subd w grps 2 3 5 .458 88 2.676
TOTAL 622.078 191
(b) Judgements of blame
Source SS df MS F P <
BETWEEN SUBJECTS 166.479 95
A (age) 0 . 188 1 0. 188 0. 114
D (sex) 8. 333 1 8. 333 5.038 . 05C (locus of control) 3. 521 1 3 . 521 2. 129
AC 0.750 1 0.750 0.453
AD 6. 021 1 6.021 3.640
CD 0. 000 1 0. 000 0. 000
ACD 2. 083 1 2. 083 1.259Subj w gps 145.583 88 1.654
WITHIN SUBJECTS 3 9 8 .000 96
B (actor) 58.521 1 58.521 19.199 . 001AB 1 5 .187 1 15.187 4.983 . 05
BC 6. 750 1 6.750 2. 215
BD 25.521 1 25.521 8.373 . 01
ABC 0.750 1 0.750 0. 246
ABD 1.688 1 1.688 0.554
BCD 0. 000 1 0. 000 0. 000
ABCD 21.333 1 21.333 6.999 . 025
B X subj w grps 268.250 88 3 . 048
TOTAL 564.Ü79 191
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